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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 4A of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a lawsuit for declaratory relief, breach of 
contract, and bad faith. The lower court granted defendants 
motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs1 loss was 
excluded by the earth movement provision of defendant's 
policy. (At the hearing, plaintiffs stipulated that their 
claim for bad faith could be dismissed with prejudice (R. 
200).) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant accepts plaintiffs1 statement of the issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant accepts plaintiffs1 statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs argue that the earth movement exclusion is 
limited to acts of God or natural phenomena. However, State 
1 
Farm's policy plainly states that earth movement is excluded 
regardless of its cause. In other words, earth movement need 
not be caused by an act of God in order to be excluded. The 
policy states: 
The Company does not insure for loss which would not 
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the 
following excluded events. The Company does not 
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of 
the excluded event . . . 
• • • • 
(1) earth movement, whether combined with 
water or not . . . 
See page 6 of the policy, a copy of which is attached hereto 
in the addendum. State Farm inserted this language into its 
policies in 1983 in order to make certain that excluded events 
such as earth movement would not result in coverage even if 
the loss was attributable to human activity. Every court that 
has had occasion to consider this new policy language since 
then has found it to be valid and enforceable. Earth movement 
is excluded regardless of its cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Earth movement is excluded regardless of 
its cause. 
2 
Plaintiffs have failed to quote the critical policy 
language in their brief. This language is known as the 
"lead-in" clause to the earth movement exclusion. The clause 
reads as follows: 
The Company does not insure for loss which would not 
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the 
following excluded events. The Company does not 
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss; 
or c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in 
any sequence with the excluded event to the produce 
the loss: 
• • • • 
(1) earth movement . . . 
See page 6 of the policy, a copy of which is attached hereto 
in the addendum. 
As the lead-in clause plainly states, earth movement is 
excluded regardless of its cause. Earth movement need not be 
caused by an act of God, as plaintiffs argue, in order to be 
excluded. The lead-in clause states: "The Company does not 
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the 
excluded event [earth movement] . . . " Therefore, 
plaintiffs1 argument that earth movement needs to be caused by 
a natural phenomenon or an act of God simply does not have any 
merit. 
The lead-in clause was inserted in State Farmfs policies 
in 1983 principally to avoid the type of construction which 
3 
plaintiffs urge upon this court. As discussed more fully in 
Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: 
A Landslide in Coverage. 50 Ins. Counsel J. 418 (1983), a copy 
of which is attached hereto in the addendum, courts have used 
either the efficient cause analysis or the eiusdem generis 
analysis in order to find coverage for the insured in the face 
of the "most carefully wrought [earth movement] exclusions." 
Id. at 418. According to the efficient cause analysis, first 
enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Sabella v. 
Wisler. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963), 
if a covered peril sets in motion a chain of events in which 
the last step may be an excluded peril, the excluded peril 
will not defeat coverage. Gordon and Crowley refer to this 
analysis as "focus[ing] on the source of the property 
disruption." 50 Ins. Counsel J. at 421. Gordon and Crowley 
refer to the eiusdem generis analysis as "dissect[ing] the 
language of the policy." Id. 
As a result of these two analyses, the "trend across the 
country [was] to find coverage . . . regardless of policy 
exclusions." Id. at 425. "[F]aced with a financial drain 
neither accounted for through premium payments and reserves, 
nor even anticipated, [insurance companies felt] the earth 
slipping out from beneath their underpinnings just as surely 
4 
as did their insured homeowners." Id. State Farm countered 
by redrafting the language of its policies. As noted by 
Michael Bragg in an article entitled Concurrent Causation and 
the Art of Policy Drafting; New Perils for Property Insurers, 
a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum, 
The traditional response of insurers upon 
discovering that their contract language is not 
being interpreted by the courts as the drafters 
intended is to rewrite the language. In fact this 
alternative is often judicially mandated. Courts 
have told the insurance industry countless times 
that insuring agreements will be interpreted broadly 
and exclusions narrowly. If the insurer desires to 
exclude some event it must say so clearly and 
uneguivocably. 
Forum, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, ABA, Vol. 20, No. 
3, 385, 391 (Spring 1985). (The Supreme Court of California 
recently cited the Bragg article with approval in a case which 
has not yet been published but was filed on March 30, 1989, 
Garvev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, (S.F. 25060) 
Ct. App. A017878.) 
As previously indicated, State Farm introduced its new 
policy language in 1983. Although the lead-in clause has been 
subject to close scrutiny, 50 Ins. Counsel J. at 426, it has 
been upheld by every court that has considered it, as 
discussed infra. 
The difficulty of plaintiffs1 argument is that plaintiffs 
fail to realize that the new policy language not only 
5 
eliminates the efficient cause analysis but also eliminates 
the eiusdem generis analysis. (Plaintiffs initially argued 
that the broken water main was the efficient cause of the loss 
and hence there was coverage. See letter from plaintiffs1 
counsel to defendant's counsel attached hereto in the 
addendum. However, plaintiffs later abandoned this theory in 
light of the new policy language.) Subclause a) of the lead-
in clause eliminates the eiusdem generis analysis and 
subclauses b) and c) eliminate the efficient cause analysis. 
This was clearly the intent of State Farm. As Michael Bragg 
states in his article, 
The new language establishes a purging effect by 
making the occurrence of any of these excluded 
events an absolute prohibition to a finding of 
coverage. Thus, once a loss occurs which would not 
have happened in the absence of an excluded event, 
there is no coverage. The policy states that this 
is so "regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded 
event . . . ." 
20 Forum, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, at 393-94. 
As indicated above, every court that has had occasion to 
interpret the lead-in clause has found it to be valid and 
enforceable. In fact, the very courts which began the trend 
of finding coverage for the insured in the face of the most 
carefully wrought earth movement exclusions (the California 
courts) have honored the redrafted policy language. For 
example, in Milliken v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance 
6 
Company, No. 86-1284-E, Memorandum Decision (S.D. Cal., March 
1987), a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the 
court without hesitation applied the redrafted earth movement 
exclusion to the "settlement of . fill soils" and the 
"consolidation of [a] utility trench." Id. at 16. The court 
stated, "Any loss which would not have resulted but for earth 
movement is excluded, regardless of . . . the cause of the 
movement." Id. (emphasis in original). In Bayless v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, No. WEC 87135 (Los Angeles 
County, Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 1986), although summary judgment 
was not granted because of the existence of a triable issue of 
fact, the court adjudicated the following issues as being 
without substantial controversy: 
1. The applicable insurance policy excludes 
coverage for earth movement; 
2. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless 
of the cause of the earth movement; 
3. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless 
of whether other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with earth movement to cause the loss. 
See Page 2 of the Order, a copy of which is attached hereto in 
the addendum (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Turrill v. State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Insurance Company, No. WEC 104 457 (Los Angeles County, Cal. 
Super. Ct., May 1987), the court adjudicated the same issues 
7 
as being without substantial controversy and therefore "deemed 
established." See Pages 1-3 of the Order, a copy of which is 
attached hereto in the addendum. 
The only two published decisions also hold that the lead-
in clause is valid and enforceable. In State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379 (CD. Cal. 1987), a copy 
of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the court held 
that the policy language was "explicit as to exclusions [and] 
unambiguous." Id. at 1382. The court further held that 
"State Farm had an absolute right to limit the coverage." Id. 
at 1383. (The Martin case was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit 
on April 10, 1989, the court stating as follows: "[T]he 
policy exclusions are unambiguous . . . An insurance company 
has the right to limit the coverage in a policy it issues." A 
copy of the case is attached hereto in the addendum.) In 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 
1988) , a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the 
court said that the lead-in clause was "not ambiguous. It is 
plain and clear." Id. at 766. The court then concluded its 
opinion by stating: 
[A] court [is restrained] from liberally and 
unreasonably construing an insurance contract to 
permit a strained or unnatural interpretation in 
order to find coverage for innocent victims who are 
subjects of enormous sympathy. Otherwise, the 
8 
effect would be to bind an insurer to a risk that 
was not contemplated and for which it was not paid. 
Id, at 772; see also the companion case to Paulson, State Farm 
Fire and Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 756 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1988), where 
the court reached the same conclusion, a copy of which is also 
attached hereto in the addendum. 
All of the cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point 
because they do not deal with the new lead-in language 
contained in State Farm's policies. Nor do the cases deal 
with earth movement exclusions containing the phrase "whether 
combined with water or not" following the words "earth 
movement." State Farm's policy states that earth movement is 
excluded "whether combined with water or not." See page 6 of 
the policy. This phrase, together with the lead-in clause, 
makes it clear that earth movement is excluded even if it is 
caused by a broken water pipe. 
Earth movement is excluded regardless of its cause,. The 
new policy language eliminates the eiusdem generis analysis. 
Moreover, plaintiffs' own cases seem to cast doubt on whether 
the eiusdem generis analysis is appropriate in this case. One 
provision of Jones v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. 
App. 1986) which plaintiffs fail to cite is as follows: 
We initially address appellant's contention that the 
doctrine of eiusdem generis limits the scope of the 
term "earth movement." Under that doctrine, where 
9 
words of a specific and particular meaning are 
followed by general words, the general words are 
construed to mean only the class or category framed 
by the specific words. In the exclusion before us, 
the opposite construction is used. The general 
words, earth movement, do not follow the specific 
words, but precede them. The doctrine of eiusdem 
generis does not apply in such a case. 
Id. at 292. Similarly, because the general words "earth 
movement" in State Farm's policies precede the specific words, 
the doctrine of eiusdem generis does not apply in this case. 
Eiusdem generis only applies when a general term follows (as 
opposed to precedes) an enumeration of specific words. In 
fact, Black's Law Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979) defines 
eiusdem generis as follows: 
[T]he "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general 
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by 
words of a particular and specific meaning, such 
general words are not to be construed in their 
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only 
to persons or things of the same general kind or 
class as those specifically mentioned. 
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs have misapplied the eiusdem 
generis doctrine. Furthermore, eiusdem generis is a rule of 
construction, and rules of construction do not need to be 
resorted to if the policy is clear and unambiguous. See 2 
Couch on Insurance §§ 15:69, 15:70 (2d ed. 1984) ("When the 
contract is clear, precise, and unambiguous . . . there is no 
proper scope for a resort to rules of construction.") Since 
every court that has considered the new policy language has 
10 
found it to be clear and unambiguous, eiusdem generis does not 
apply in this case. 
II. 
The phrase "earth movement" is not 
ambiguous, especially in light of the 
lead-in clause. 
In Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, CCH 1988 Fire and 
Casualty Cases 1806 (Tenn. App. 1988) the court considered the 
definitions of "earth" and "movement" separately and concluded 
that the phrase "earth movement" applied to "any change of 
place, position or posture of the soil." Id. at 1808. In Lee 
a sewer pipe broke beneath plaintiff's home, saturating the 
soil, and causing the foundation to shift. The policy 
provided as follows: 
The Company shall not be liable for loss: 
. . . . 
7. due to any and all settling, shrinking, 
cracking, bulging or expansion of driveways, 
sidewalks, swimming pools, pavements, foundations, 
walls, floors, roofs or ceilings; 
12. caused by, resulting from, contributed to, or 
aggravated by any of the following; 
(a) earth movement, including but not limited 
to earthquake, landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, 
earth rising or shifting; 
11 
2. The following is added to the EXCLUSIONS 
section: 
This policy does not insure under Section I for 
loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the 
following exclusions in this policy. Such loss is 
excluded regardless of any other cause or event 
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the 
loss. 
c. Earth movement; 
. . . . 
Id. at 1806. The court held that earth movement, as commonly 
understood, had occurred in the case and that the loss was 
therefore excluded: 
The words, "earth movement" mean: 
differential movement of the earth's 
crust; elevation or subsidence of land. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
Unabridged. 
Taken separately, the meaning of the word, 
"earth" includes: 
fragmental material composing part of the 
surface of the globe; soil, ground, 
usually distinguished from bed rock. 
Ibid. 
The word, "movement" means: 
The action or process of moving, change of 
place or position or posture. 
12 
Ibid. 
It thus appears that, taken together or 
separately, the words, earth movement, mean any 
change of place, position or posture of the soil. 
Id. at 1808. The court specifically rejected plaintiff!s 
interpretation of the earth movement exclusion as being 
limited to natural phenomena. id. at 1807. A copy of the 
case is attached hereto in the addendum. 
Moreover, an insurance policy should be construed as a 
whole. Thus, the phrase "earth movement" cannot be 
interpreted in isolation of the lead-in clause. The lead-in 
clause specifically states that earth movement is excluded 
regardless of its cause: "The Company does not insure for 
such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded event 
[earth movement] . . . " Therefore, it would be unreasonable 
for a layperson to conclude that earth movement meant only 
earth movement caused by an act of God. What caused the earth 
movement is irrelevant. The lead-in clause could not make 
this any clearer. 
III. 
The policy is not duplicative. 
Plaintiffs argue that "earth movement" must not encompass 
settling because there is a separate exclusion for settling. 
13 
However, that exclusion (exclusion I.e.) does not apply in 
cases where there are multiple causes as in the case at bar. 
In multiple cause cases, exclusion 3. applies. This was noted 
by Mr. David Randel, fire claim superintendent for State Farm, 
in his deposition. 
Q I take it there came a point at which you 
concluded that Exclusion . . . E did not apply? 
A Thatf s correct. 
Q At what point was that? 
A . . . I would guess that probably from the 
beginning I would have been referring to Exclusion 3 
Subsection B. 
Q That's [the] earth movement clause? 
A Correct. . . . I'm familiar enough with the 
policy language that I realized that with the broken 
pipe that we would have to be relying on that 
exclusion rather than the settling and shrinking. 
Because we had a potential concurrent cause 
situation. 
Deposition of David Randel, page 28, lines 4-19. 
Furthermore, exclusion I.e. only applies to "gradual 
sinking," as noted in the Holy Angels Academy case cited by 
plaintiffs. 487 N.Y.S.2d at 1007. Gradual sinking did not 
occur in this case. The soil collapsed. The apartments were 
built upon sand, silt, and clay — collapsible soils. When 
the underground water main broke, the soils lost their weight-
bearing capacity and collapsed. Deposition of Ralph E. 
14 
Watson, page 20, line 16; page 21, line 22; page 57, line 8; 
exhibit 1, appendix A, page 3; see also the letter from 
plaintiffs' counsel to defendant's counsel, attached hereto in 
the addendum, stating as follows: "We have reason to believe 
that the soil, when saturated with water, does not actually 
sink or settle. Rather, it loses its weight-bearing ability. 
This allows the foundation to sink or shift.11 
As noted by David Randel, anytime there are multiple 
causes, exclusion 3. applies and not exclusion I.e. 
Therefore, the policy is not duplicative. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point 
because they do not address the new lead-in language contained 
in State Farm's policies; nor do plaintiffs even quote the new 
policy language in their brief. Every court that has had 
occasion to consider the new policy language has found it to 
be valid and enforceable and not ambiguous. Moreover, the 
policy is not duplicative. The order of the lower court 
15 
granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment should be 
affirmed. j/1 ^) 
DATED this / / t / day of AprilT^lQSQ. 
MORGAN h HANSEN 
3arwin C. Hansen 
John C. Hansen 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondeat 
fTfVU-^ 
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SECTION I 
LOSSES INSURED AND 
LOSSES NOT INSURED (cont.) 
ance of property, or shortage of property 
disclosed on taking inventory; 
i. due to any delay or loss of market; 
j . caused by repeated leakage or seepage of 
water or steam whether continuous or inter-
mi t tent f rom any: 
(1) heating, air condit ioning or refrigerating 
system; 
(2) domestic appliance; or 
(3) plumbing system, including from or 
around any shower stall or other show-
er bath installation, bath tub or other 
plumbing f ixture. 
2. The Company does not insure for loss either con-
sisting of, or directly and immediately caused by 
power, heating or cooling failure, or due to change 
in temperature or humidi ty, unless the failure or 
change results f rom physical damage to the build-
ing or to equipment contained therein caused by a 
Loss Insured. Also, the Company shall not be liable 
under this exclusion for any loss resulting f rom 
riot, riot attending a strike, civil commot ion, or 
vandalism or malicious mischief. 
3. The Company does not insure for loss which 
would not have occurred in the absence of one or 
more of the fo l lowing excluded events. The Com-
pany does not insure for such loss regardless 
of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other 
causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes 
acted concurrently or in any sequence wi th the 
excluded event to produce the loss: 
a. occasioned directly or indirectly by enforce-
ment of any ordinance or law regulating the 
construct ion, repair or demoli t ion of build-
ings or structures; 
b. caused by, resulting f rom, contr ibuted to, or 
aggravated by any of the fo l lowing: 
(1) earth movement , whether combined 
w i th water or not, including but not 
l imited to earthquake, volcanic erup-
t ion, landslide, subsidence, mudf low, 
sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking, rising, 
shi f t ing, expanding, or contracting of 
earth; 
(2) f lood, surface water, waves, tidal w a -
ter or tidal waves, overf low of streams 
or other bodies of water, or spray f rom 
any of the foregoing, all whether driven 
by w ind or not; 
(3) water which backs up through sewers 
or drains; 
(4) water below the surface of the ground 
including that which exerts pressure on 
or f lows, seeps or leaks through side-
walks, driveways, foundations, walls, 
basement or other floors, or through 
doors, w indows or any other opening 
in such sidewalks, driveways, founda-
t ions, walls or f loors; 
unless fire or explosion as insured against 
ensues, and then the Company shall be liable 
only for loss caused by the ensuing fire or 
explosion. This exclusion shall not apply to 
loss arising f rom theft ; 
c. hostile or warlike action in t ime of peace or 
war, including action in hindering, combating 
or defending against an actual, impending or 
expected attack: 
(1) by any government or sovereign power 
(de jure or de facto), or by any authority 
maintaining or using military, naval or 
air forces; 
(2) by military, naval or air forces; or 
(3) by an agent of any such government, 
power, authority or forces; 
it being understood that any discharge, ex-
plosion or use of any weapon of war employ-
ing nuclear fission or fusion shall be conclu-
sively presumed to be such a hostile or 
warlike action by such a government, power, 
authority or forces; 
d. insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil war, 
usurped power, or action taken by govern-
mental authority in hindering, combating or 
defending against such an occurrence, 
seizure or destruction under quarantine or 
cus tom's regulations, confiscation by order 
of any government or public authority, or 
risks of contraband or illegal transportation 
or trade; 
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EARTH MOVEMENT AND WATER 
DAMAGE EXPOSURE: 
A LANDSLIDE IN COVERAGE 
STUART M. GORDON AND DIANE R. CROWLEY 
San Francisco, California 
TH E DISASTROUS RAINS of recent winters have touched off earth move-
ments including landslides and mudflows 
across the nation; at the same time, court 
decisions have set off equally unsett l ing 
tremors among insurance companies as the 
most carefully wrought exclusions are ig-
nored or deliberately discarded. Th is arti-
cle will trace the development of exposure 
for earth movements from its origins in 
the smoke of the great San Francisco earth-
quake and fire through the current t rend 
favoring recovery regardless of exclusion. 
I. The California Experience 
T h e richest source of case law on land-
slide liability is the state of California, 
where the unsettled coastal soil, the conti-
nental-edge geology, and the hilly geogra-
phy found in the heavily populated areas 
combine to create numerous property losses 
from earth movements and where sympa-
thetic courts have long strained to find re-
lief for those whose homes have been lost. 
Nearly all "earthquake exclusion" cases 
date back to the losses sustained in the San 
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. Per-
haps because judges and juries of that day 
shared so heavily in the losses described to 
them by San Francisco plaintiffs seeking re-
covery, those plaintiffs became the first 
beneficiaries of a judicial bias toward the 
owners of damaged property. 
For example, when merchants whose 
store was destroyed in one of the major 
fires sweeping the city after the ear thquake 
sought relief, the court found coverage al-
though the policy excluded "loss or dam-
age occasioned by earthquake." T h e court 
insisted that the exclusion had to mean 
that there be a direct connection between 
the ear thquake and the origins of the fire, 
and that if the fire had started in a dis tant 
bu i ld ing and was communicated from one 
bui ld ing to the next unti l it reached the 
insured property, the earthquake would 
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only have been the indirect cause of the 
loss. T h e court found that the context of 
the exclusionary clause showed that it was 
intended to include only the proximate or 
immediate cause, and overruled the defen-
dant 's demurrer in favor of the property 
owners.1 
In more recent times, landslides and 
mudslides have provided more litigation 
for the California courts than have earth-
quakes, as the heavy rains of 1978, 1980, 
iBaker & Hamilton v. Williamsburgh City Fire 
Ins. Co., 157 F 280 (ND Cal 1907); see also Wil-
liamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 F 404 
(9th Cir), cert, denied, 212 US 521 (1908); see also 
Richmond Coal Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. 
Co., 169 F 746 (9th Cir), cert, denied, 215 US 609 
(1909) . 
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and 1982, have cost Californians hundreds 
of millions of dollars in property loss,2 and 
the rains of 1983 are already adding to the 
devastation. 
The presence in homeowners' policies of 
stock exclusions for earth movements has 
led to crushing disappointments for home-
owners, angry litigation, and subsequent 
publicity. A length article appearing in 
the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and 
Chronicle quoted numerous aggrieved 
homeowners and their indignant attorneys 
under a headline which trumpeted "Angry 
Homeowners Who Say Insurance Firms 
Left T h e m Out in the Rain."3 
Placing the perceptions of these unfor-
tunate homeowners aside, it might appear 
that it is the insurance companies them-
selves which have been left out in the rain. 
T h e trend among the California courts has 
been to find coverage even in the face of 
specific exclusions. For example, in the 
case of Hughes v. Potomac Insurance Com-
pany,4 homeowners sought recovery under 
an insurance policy after the earth to the 
rear of their home slid into a creek border-
ing their lot. They were denied coverage 
based upon an exclusion for flood or high 
water damage to the insured dwelling. 
Initially, the court found that the policy 
could be interpreted in such a manner as 
to cover the damage to the property, even 
though only the "dwelling building," and 
not the earth in the back yard, was cov-
ered. T h e court stated that the "dwelling 
building" suffered real and severe damage 
when the soil slid away, and until the land 
was stabilized, the structure could scarcely 
be considered a "dwelling building" safe 
for residence.5 
Secondly, the court found that the ex-
clusion for losses covered by flood or high 
water could not bar coverage for this loss. 
Expert testimony as to the cause of the 
landslide conflicted, bu t the lower court 
found that the slide was caused solely by 
the soaking of the land from heavy rains, 
rather than by "flood" or "high water." 
The appellate court stated that even if the 
trial court had been wrong in that finding, 
coverage would still apply under the pol-
icy. 
2Norton, Counseling Clients Whose Property In-
curs Earth Movement Damage. 2:8 CAL. LAW. 26. 
3San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, 
Aug. 22, 1982, at A7. 
*199 CalApp2d 239, 18 Cal Rptr 650 (1962). 5/d. at 249. 
Looking for guidance to a 1929 personal 
injury case, the appellate court stated that 
"when two causes join in causing an injury, 
one of which is insured against, the insured 
is covered by the policy."6 With this theory 
in mind, the court held that there was cov-
erage under the policy as "appellant has 
failed to show that respondents' loss would 
not have occurred 'but for' a peril specifi-
cally excepted under the policy."7 
The next year, California courts expand-
ed their willingness to find coverage in the 
face of exclusions by eliminating the "but 
for" language used in the Hughes interpre-
tation. In Sabella v. Wisler,8 the California 
Supreme Court found that when two or 
more factors are a possible cause of an in-
sured's loss, coverage will be extended re-
gardless of the causes which are excluded 
by the policy if the "efficient" cause of the 
loss is not excluded. 
In Sabella, a home buil t on fill over an 
old excavation was damaged by settling. 
The "all-risk"' policy held by the home-
owners carried an exclusion for loss by set-
tling, but the court eventually found cov-
erage after the homeowners argued that a 
sewer pipe below the house was leaking 
and the escaping water infiltrated the un-
stable earth, causing the settlement which 
damaged the house. Balancing the two 
causes, the excluded settlement and the in-
cluded peril of damage from faulty plumb-
ing fixtures, the court concluded that the 
absence of subsidence damages up unti l the 
time the pipe began leaking showed that 
it was the broken pipe which was the pre-
dominating or efficient cause of the loss 
and that 
in determining whether a loss is within an 
exception in a policy, where there is a con-
currence of different causes, the efficient 
cause — the one that sets others in mo-
tion — is the cause to which the loss is to 
be attributed, though the other causes may 
follow it, and operate more immediately in 
producing the disaster.9 
The Sabella court obviously intended that 
a determination of the "efficient cause" 
should be distinctly different than the 
prior Hughes "but for" test, as it made a 
^Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal 
App 723, 726, 279 P 464 (1929) . 
"199 CalApp2d at 245. 
859 Cal2d 21. 27 Cal Rptr 689 (1963). 
*ld. at 31-32, citing 6 COUCH, INSURANCE §1466 
(1930) 
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poin t of disproving the "but for" language 
in Hughes.10 
This sort of search for the "efficient 
proximate cause" continued for a few years 
in such cases as Sauer v. General Insurance 
Company,11 where, once again, faulty 
p lumbing causing discharge of water into 
the ground under a house was found to be 
the cause of the loss, rather than the ex-
cluded settling of the earth. Sauer appears 
to extend the rationale of Sabella to the ex-
tent that neither contribution nor aggrava-
tion of an excluded risk will bar recovery 
as a matter of law when the contribution 
or aggravation results from a peril which 
is covered by the policy. 
Th i s line of causation analysis cont inued 
through a case involving a windstorm, 
rather than earth movement, in Gillis v. 
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.12 Here, an in-
sured boat dock was originally damaged by 
a gust of wind, then fell into the water and 
was further damaged by the action of the 
waves. T h e policy offered coverage for 
windstorm damage, but excluded coverage 
for damage caused by water or waves, 
whether driven by the wind or not. Admit-
t ing that it could not be ascertained wheth-
er the final loss was caused by the wind-
storm or by the excluded waves, the court 
concluded that the evidence sustained the 
findings of the lower court that the wind-
storm was the dominant and efficient cause 
of the damage, and that the water damage 
was merely incidental and could not bar 
coverage. 
T h e Gillis case carefully sidestepped sev-
eral questions, including a determination 
of whether in every case involving several 
perils, the insured may recover if one of 
those perils is insured against, and what 
the effect of an exclusion would be where 
the excluded peril precedes the insured 
peril, or where both operate simultaneous-
ly.13 
T h e question left open in Gillis may not 
have been answered unti l 1973, in the case 
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company v. Partridge,14 In this case, 
the insured, who held both automobile and 
homeowners ' policies through State Farm, 
was driving his car over rough terrain when 
he hi t a bump, causing a gun, which he 
io/d. at 33-34. 
ii225 CalApp2d 275, 37 Cal Rptr 303 (1964). 
12238 CalApp2d 408, 47 Cal Rptr 868 (1965). 
i3/d. at 424. 
1*10 Cal3d 94, 109 Cal Rptr 811 (1973). 
had specially modified to have a hair trig-
ger, to discharge, injuring his passenger. 
Although the homeowners' policy excluded 
injuries arising from the use of any vehicle, 
the court found coverage under both poli-
cies, and referred back to the Hughes, 
Sabella, Sauer, and Gillis cases in forming 
this opinion.15 The court stated that in the 
case before it, a risk insured under the 
homeowners' policy (the modification of 
the gun) combined with an excluded risk 
(the negligent use of the automobile) to 
produce the ultimate injury. 
Although there may have been some ques-
tion whether either of the two causes in 
the instant case can be properly character-
ized as the "prime," "moving" or "effi-
cient" cause of the accident, we believe 
that coverage under a liability insurance 
policy is equally available to an insured 
whenever an insured risk constitutes sim-
ply a concurrent proximate cause of the 
injuries. That multiple causes may have 
effectuated the loss does not negate any 
single cause; that multiple acts concurred 
in the infliction of injury does not nullify 
any single contributory act.18 
In a footnote,17 the Partridge court dis-
cussed the "efficient cause" s tandard of the 
earlier cases and discarded it as not very 
helpful in situations like the one at hand 
where, neither the careless driving nor the 
firing of the gun caused the other to occur, 
bu t both combined to cause the injury. 
T h e Partridge answer to the Gillis ques-
tions is, then, when concurrent proximate 
causes lead to an injury, and one cause is 
covered, the entire loss is covered. 
T h a t same year, this rat ionale was ap-
plied to a landslide case following a mild 
earthquake. In Strubble v. United Services 
Auto Association,1* the question was raised 
as to whether the defendant insurer had 
proved that an excluded landslide was the 
efficient cause of loss to a home which was 
covered for earthquake damage, under an 
"all-risk" policy. T h e court disregarded 
the argument that the insured has a duty 
to find a proximate cause wi thin the pol-
icy limits, and stated 
in an action upon an all-risk policy such 
as the one before us . . . the insured does 
is/d. at 104-105. 
i«/d. 
17/d. 
1835 CalApp3d 498, 110 Cal Rptr 828 (1973). 
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not have to prove that the peril proximate-
ly causing the loss was covered by the pol-
icy. This is because the policy covers all 
risks save for those risks specifically ex-
cluded by the policy. The insurer, though, 
since it is denying liability upon the pol-
icy, must prove the policy's noncoverage 
of the insured's loss — that is, that the in-
sured's loss was proximately caused by a 
peril specifically excluded from the cover-
age of the policy.19 
Affirming the coverage determination of 
the lower court, the court of appeals found 
that the evidence established that the land-
slide had been proximately caused by the 
earthquake, operat ing through the ex-
cluded peril of earth movement. In a foot-
note, the court stated that it was regarding 
the earthquake endorsement as merely nar-
rowing the earth movement exclusion, 
rather than changing the "all-risk" nature 
of the underlying policy. T o hold other-
wise would be "a case of the tail wagging 
the dog," the court concluded.20 
Finally, on May 17, 1982, a federal court 
adopted the Partridge reasoning in a prop-
erty damage case, Safeco Insurance Com-
pany v. Guy ton.21 When record rains ac-
companying Hurr icane Kathleen broke 
through flood control facilities near Palm 
Desert, California, extensive flood damage 
resulted. Safeco policyholders were denied 
coverage because of a flood damage exclu-
sion; they answered by asserting that their 
losses were proximately caused by negli-
gence of the local water district in main-
taining flood control structures and were 
therefore covered as damages caused by 
third-party negligence. A diversity action 
in the federal district court ended with a 
ruling in favor of the insurance company 
based upon an analysis of the flood as the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, coverage was found with the 
court quot ing directly from Partridge: "We 
believe that coverage under a liability in-
surance policy is equally available to an in-
sured whenever an insured risk constitutes 
simply a concurrent proximate cause of the 
injuries."22 While the insurance company 
i9/d. at 504 (citations omitted; emphasis in origi-
nal) . 
2o/d„ at 505 n. 6. 
21677 F2d 721 (9th Cir 1982) (opinion published 
in advance sheets withdrawn at the request of the 
court). 
22/d. 
attacked the appel lants reliance upon Part-
ridge, arguing that it applies only where 
two causes operate independently of one 
another, the court found Partridge to be 
dispositive in the policyholders' favor, and 
pointed out that the twin causes in Part-
ridge were independent only in that each 
had an independent origin, not that they 
did not interact. Jus t as the flood control 
structures in Palm Desert would not have 
collapsed without the flood striking them, 
the gun in Partridge would not have fired 
without the lurching of the car and, in 
both cases, two independently created con-
ditions interacted to cause a loss.23 Under 
this analysis, it is no longer necessary that 
the chain of events be set in motion by an 
included peril.24 
II. Expanding Exposure Elsewhere 
Other jurisdictions may differ in their 
analyses, yet courts from coast to coast are 
increasingly finding coverage regardless of 
exclusions for earthquakes, landslides, 
earth movements, floods, and the like. 
While some courts focus on the source of 
the property disruption, others dissect the 
language of the policy, and a third group 
of courts deliberates on the chain of causa-
tion. 
Courts seem more likely to find coverage 
in the face of exclusion when the cause the 
insurer raises as a bar is external to or not 
inherent in the specified risk which is ex-
cluded. For example, in Peach State Uni-
form Service, Inc. v. American Insurance 
Company,25 where a portion of a founda-
tion collapsed after heavy rain, a Georgia 
jury found that relief was barred by policy 
exclusions for certain earth movements or 
for water damage. T h e Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed, finding that coverage 
was not barred by either of these exclu-
sions. 
Criticizing the policy phrase "other earth 
movements" as ambiguous, the court 
stated: 
Taking the phrase in its contractual con-
text, then, and continuing to resolve am-
biguity in favor of the insured, we read 
other earth movement as referring only to 
phenomena relating to forces operating 
within the earth itself, and not to the 
23/d. 
24/</. 
25507 F2d 996 (5th Cir 1975). 
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merely superficial effects of external forces, 
such as erosion by run-off rainwater.26 
A few years earlier, another Georgia 
court had come out with a sharply contrast-
ing verdict. In Underwood v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company,27 no cover-
age was found for damages sustained when 
a bridge sank dur ing a heavy rainfall im-
mediately after city officials had widened 
the banks on either side of the privately-
owned bridge. T h e policy had an exclu-
sion for "any earth movement." T h e jury 
found that "although the loss might have 
been incipiently caused by a human 
agency, it was at least 'contributed to' 
within the exclusionary language, by an 
excepted natural agency."28 
More in line with Peach State and with 
decisions of other jurisdictions, the case of 
Souza v. Corvick29 found coverage in the 
face of exclusions for settling and earth 
sinking when the plaintiff alleged that the 
damages were caused by the negligent or 
willful blasting in the construction of adja-
cent storm sewers. T h e District of Colum-
bia court held that the exclusion should 
not be interpreted as barr ing recovery for 
damage caused by the subsidence of the 
property if that subsidence resulted from 
something other than the conditions of the 
soil.30 In contrast is the holding of Olm-
stead v. Lumbermens Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company,31 an Ohio case which found 
no coverage for a building so badly dam-
aged by adjacent excavation that it had to 
be condemned and torn down. T h e court 
found that the exclusions for collapse and 
landslide, including "other earth move-
ment ," barred recovery, although the court 
found neither collapse or landslide, and 
failed to discuss "other earth movements." 
Quite a few cases turn on the language 
of the policy exclusions, as sometimes ex-
actly the same policy terms provide the 
bases for totally opposite interpretations. 
For example, in Stewart v. Preferred Fire 
Insurance Company,32 a building collapsed 
when the soil underlying its foundation 
gave way and the building sank into a pre-
existing cavern or mineshaft. Even though 
the policy covered "collapse," the Supreme 
2*Id. at 1000. 
27H8 Ga App 847, 165 SE2d 874 (1968). 
28/d. at 875. 
2*441 F2d 1013 (DC Cir 1970) . 
3o/d. at 1022. 
3122 Ohio St2d 212, 259 NE2d 123 (1970) . 
32206 Kan 247, 477 P2d 966 (1970). 
Court of Kansas found no coverage on the 
basis of an earth movement exclusion 
which it found to be "really qui te spe-
cific."33 T h e exclusion in question read as 
follows: "[L]oss caused by, resulting from, 
contributed to, or aggravated by any earth 
movement, including but not limited to 
earthquake, landslide, mud flow, earth 
sinking, rising, or shifting. . . Z'34 
Precisely the same exclusion was found 
in the policy in Wyatt v. Northwestern Mu-
tual Insurance Company,35 where it was 
held to be no bar to coverage for a loss 
sustained by a building following excava-
tion on contiguous property. T h e federal 
district court, applying Minnesota law, 
found the exclusion so broad as to require 
some interpretation, and held that the ex-
cluded but undefined earth movements, if 
not limited to natural phenomena, a t least 
would not exclude coverage under the facts 
at bar. 
Looking at the special exclusionary clause 
in the policy here in question, it seems to 
cover situations where one single event 
could adversely affect a large number of 
policyholders. . . . This gives some force to 
the view that the various exclusions were 
not intended to cover the situations as here 
where "earth movement" occurred under a 
single dwelling, allegedly due to human 
action. . . .36 
In reaching this decision, the federal dis-
trict court relied on Sabella and Sauer, and 
also cited recent Minnesota cases which it 
found to be consistent in theory.37 
Unlimited and undefined exclusions for 
"earth movements" provide the focal point 
for many subsidence cases. Generally found 
to be too broad to operate as a bar, "earth 
movement" is often limited through the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis, which holds 
that when general words follow an enu-
meration of specific items, the general 
words are to be construed as applying only 
to items of the same general k ind as those 
specifically mentioned.38 Accordingly, when 
"other earth movements" is tacked onto a 
string of disasters, including ear thquakes 
or landslides, the term is to be l imited to 
33477 P2d at 969. 
3*W. 
35304 FSupp 781 (D Minn 1969). 
36/d. at 783. 
37See, e.g., Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central 
Ins. Co., 280 Minn 325, 159 NW2d 268 (1968). 
38BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951). 
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natural phenomena of the same general de-
scription. 
With this in mind, the frequently cited 
case of Anderson v. Indiana Lumbermens 
Mutual Insurance Company™ found cover-
age for a homeowner whose property was 
damaged by expansion and contraction of 
the clay soil underlying the foundation. 
T h e Louisiana appellate court decided that 
the cracking of the home's foundation 
could be considered as a "collapse," a 
covered risk, by defining that term as "a 
material impairment of structural in-
tegrity." T h e court also held that the 
earth movement exclusion was too broad, 
and, if limited by ejusdem generis, would 
be inapplicable. T h e Anderson court stated 
that it was adopting the view of the Su-
preme Court of Kansas in an earlier case, 
Jenkins v. United States Fire Insurance 
Company.40 
Adopting the same view of the policy 
term "collapse," and rejecting the majority 
view which would define the term as a 
complete change in structure involving a 
loss of distinctive character or usefulness 
as a building, Government Employees In-
surance Company v. Dejames41 found 
coverage in another collapse-or-earth-move-
ment case. Construing the policy term "any 
earth movement" as above, the Maryland 
court found that, of necessity, such an ex-
clusion did not refer to settlement or dam-
age from normal soil pressures. " T o hold 
otherwise would make virtually meaning-
less the coverage . . . for it would be diffi-
cult to envision many other reasons why a 
house would collapse."42 
Building upon the court-imposed limita-
tions of the term "earth movement" seen 
in Stewart, Wyatt, and Anderson, the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin reversed a judg-
ment in favor of the defendant insurance 
company in a case in which a building con-
structed along the very edge of a bluff 
collapsed, following slippage of the un-
stable soils in the bluff. In Wisconsin 
Builders, Inc. v. General Insurance Com-
pany of America,43 the court pointed out 
that although the standard exclusion is 
ambiguous and must be construed against 
its author, no contract of insurance should 
be rewritten to bind the insurer to a risk 
which had not been contemplated and for 
39127 So2d 304 (La App Ct 1961). 
40185 Kan 665, 347 P2d 417 (1959). 
41256 Md 717, 261 A2d 747 (1970). 
2^261 A2d at 752. 
43221 NW2d 832 (Wis 1974). 
which no premium had been paid. For this 
reason, the court found error below and 
instructed that the trial court should have 
limited the definition of "earth movement" 
for the jury pursuant to the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis.44 
T h e courts of many jurisdictions focus 
on a chain of causation analysis, either in 
addition to or in place of the analyses of 
damage source and of policy language 
mentioned above. A restrictive reading of 
causation was advanced by the Michigan 
appellate decision in Vormelker v. Olek-
sinski45 The property involved in this case 
became uninhabitable when unstable soil 
deposits 120 feet below the surface led to 
the motion of large masses of land, destroy-
ing the building. T h e policy covered "col-
lapse," but excluded "earth movement." 
Deciding that "but for" inadequate con-
struction of the building, it would never 
have collapsed, the court held: 
It is our opinion that the exclusions con-
tained in the policy apply only when it 
can be shown that earth movement et 
cetera was the sole cause of the damage. 
If it can be shown that the building was 
improperly constructed (taking into ac-
count the type of soil, the geography of the 
area, et cetera) and "but for" the inade-
quate construction the building would not 
have collapsed even with earth movement, 
then the damage should come under the 
protection of the policy. One of the pri-
mary purposes of a policy such as this is 
to protect against faulty workmanship or 
planning.46 
Honoring an exclusion only when the 
excluded risk was the sole cause of the in-
jury is, after all, just one more way of 
allowing coverage in the face of an ex-
clusion when concurrent causes combine 
to cause an injury, as in Sabella, Sauer, 
Safeco, and many other cases discussed. 
Along these same lines, when a home in 
Pennsylvania collapsed into a coal mine 
shaft burrowing under it, coverage was 
found even though the policy excluded 
damage to walls caused by earth move-
ments and damage to the bui lding caused 
by settling.47 T h e court found that earth 
movement of a sort had taken place, but 
not the underground lateral movement to 
"Id. at 838. 
4540 Mich App 618, 199 NW2d 287 (1972) . 
46199 NW2d at 294. 
47Shaffer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 21 Pa.D&C.2d 79, 
49 Luzerne Leg.Reg.R. 279 (1959) . 
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which it felt the exclusion referred. 
Similarly, it found the damage was not 
caused by settling, which it defined as a 
gradual sinking as the ground yields to the 
building's foundation. In other words, the 
presence of excluded factors in the damage 
scenario did not block coverage. 
The frequently-cited case of Gullett v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Com-
pany48 presented a situation in which rocks 
from a retaining wall came loose and 
struck the insured building, damaging it. 
The policy at issue covered damage from 
falling objects, but excluded landslides and 
damage caused by underground or surface 
waters. Although the court found that 
water flow definitely played a part in the 
damage, the plaintiffs victory in the lower 
court was affirmed on appeal. The court 
decided that the jury could have found 
that the rocks came loose from the wall 
through deterioration, rather than through 
earth movement, and that, since the evi-
dence could support either the covered or 
the excluded theory of damage, the jury's 
verdict would stand undisturbed, and their 
judgment for the plaintiffs would be af-
firmed. 
Another case in which the presence of an 
excluded cause did not bar coverage when 
an included cause was also present is 
that of Phoenix Insurance Company v. 
Branch.49 A Florida court found coverage 
for a homeowner suffering a loss follow-
ing blasting and dredging operations in the 
construction of a nearby sewer system. 
While damage caused by dredging was ex-
cluded from coverage, damage from blast-
ing was included, and the plantiffs estab-
lished at trial that blasting was a cause of 
the building damage. The defendant in-
surer then failed its burden of proof to 
show that the loss arose instead from the 
cause which was excepted.50 
Other courts, not content with merely 
finding an included cause in the chain of 
causation, insist instead that, before cover-
age will be found, the included cause must 
be shown to be the one which set the 
whole chain of causation into motion. For 
example, the 1973 Massachusetts case of 
Standard Electric Supply Company, Inc. v. 
Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company51 found coverage in an all-risk 
policy which excluded subsurface water 
48446 F2d 1100 (7th Cir 1971). 
4S234 So2d 396 (Fla 1970). 
5o/d. at 399. 
51307 NE2d 11 (Mass Ct App 1973). 
damage when a water pipe in an adjacent 
basement broke, allowing water to seep in-
to the insured's basement and damage it. 
Citing Appleman's Insurance Law and 
Practice, the court referred to the "well 
established principle" that "recovery is 
allowed 'where the insured risk itself sets 
into operation a chain of causation in 
which the last step may have been an ex-
cepted risk.' "52 
The succinctly-worded opinion in the 
1980 New York case of Molycorp, Inc. v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company53 in-
dicates that a proximate causation analysis 
is still required in New York. Plaintiff had 
sought coverage for the loss of a power 
plant following a mudslide, which was an 
included risk. Defendants countered that 
the loss was "caused by, resulted from, 
contributed to,, or aggravated by" surface 
water, an excluded risk. When plaintiff 
argued that the burden was on the insurer 
to establish that the damage was caused 
solely by surface water, the court rejected 
this proposition outright: "Plaintiff's con-
struction would eliminate from the exclu-
sion the words 'contributed to or aggra-
vated by' and would limit the exclusionary 
clause to a case where damage was caused 
solely by surface water, contrary to the 
terms contained in the exclusion."54 
Further, the court found no merit in 
plaintiff's claim that the applicable law in 
New York would look to the cause nearest 
the loss. Rather, the court stated that "the 
operative test where damage results from 
two causes, one within and one without the 
scope of coverage, is to establish which was 
the proximate cause of the loss — what 
would the ordinary and reasonable busi-
nessman conclude was the cause of the 
loss?"55 Criticizing both parties for over-
looking the leading New York authorities 
on point,56 the court pointed out that the 
relevant inquiry is which of the causes was 
the dominant and efficient cause of the 
loss, usually a factual issue. The court con-
cluded that the approximate construction 
of the exclusion requires that the excluded 
risk be the direct, proximate, and efficient 
cause of the loss, and that the suggested 
proximate cause standard should apply 
52/d. (citing 3 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §3083, at 
311). 
5378 AD2d 510,, 431 NYS2d 824 (1980) . 
54431 NYS2d at 825. 
55/rf. 
seTonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 NY 326, 62 
NE2d 215 (1945); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 309 
NY 72, 127 NE2d 816 (1955) . 
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with respect to the terms "contributed to or 
aggravated by" so as to require that the 
excluded risk be properly related to the 
occurrence of the loss. 
At the opposite end of the continent, the 
Supreme Court of Washington echoed this 
New York decision and insisted on a proxi-
mate cause analysis in evaluating coverage 
for a multi-cause loss. In one of the more 
colorful factual situations in recent land-
slide litigation, the case of Graham v. 
Pennsylvania General Insurance Com-
pany57 arose from a dispute between two 
insurance companies and their insureds 
following the volcanic eruption of Mount 
St. Helens, in 1980. Hot materials flowing 
from the eruption began melting the snow 
and ice flanking the mountain and the 
glacial ice blocks within the Toutle River 
Valley. This water, combined with tor-
rential rains from the eruption cloud, 
existing ground water, water displaced 
from Spirit Lake, and ash and debris, 
created mudflows which moved through 
the valley, eventually destroying the homes 
of the appellants. The relevant policies ex-
cluded earth movement and water damage 
including flood, but did offer coverage for 
direct loss by explosion. The homeowners' 
claims were rejected under either or both 
of the exclusions. 
The trial court stated that even if a jury 
were to determine the volcanic eruption 
was an explosion, it would still be necessary 
to determine whether the loss was the 
direct result of that explosion. The trial 
court followed a causation analysis which 
precluded the plaintiffs claims by stating 
that the responsible cause of a loss is that 
which is the "direct, violent and efficient 
cause of the damage."58 
In reviewing the earlier case law support-
ing the trial court's decision, the Supreme 
Court of Washington concluded that the 
"immediate physical cause analysis" is no 
longer appropriate, is inconsistent with the 
rule in the majority of other jurisdictions, 
and should be discarded. The court defined 
the majority rule as "when loss is sus-
tained by the insured, it is necessary that 
the loss be proximately, rather than re-
motely, caused by the peril insured 
against."59 While this theory allows for 
57Nos. 47706-0, 47955-1, slip op. (Wash. Tan. 6, 
1983). 
Mid. (citing Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 
37 Wash2d 181, 222 P2d 833 (1950)). 
™Id. (citing 18 COUCH, INSURANCE §74:693 (2d ed 
1968)). 
multiple causes acting in combination, a 
finding of coverage would seem to require 
that it be the insured peril which set off 
the chain of causation and that chain re-
main as an unbroken sequence. "Where a 
peril specifically insured against sets other 
causes in motion which, in an unbroken 
sequence and connection between the act 
and final loss, produced the loss for which 
recovery is sought, the insured peril is re-
garded as the 'proximate cause' of the 
entire loss."80 
As proximate causation is a question of 
fact for the jury, the Washington court re-
manded the matter for determination of 
whether the movement of Mount St. 
Helens was an explosion within the terms 
of the policy, whether that explosion was 
preceded by earth movement, and whether 
the damages were proximately caused by 
the eruption of the volcano. 
The volcanic eruption of Mount St. 
Helens created monumental devastation 
and anguish. Nevertheless, the Washington 
Supreme Court clearly refused to stretch 
the law in any way to find coverage for the 
homeless of its state, even when those 
victims were specifically covered for losses 
arising from "explosion." Spurning not 
only the extreme liberality of the Cali-
fornia courts, but also the views of many 
other jurisdictions which find coverage 
whenever one of the concurrent causes is 
covered, the Washington Supreme Court 
demands that a jury perform a labored 
analysis of proximate causation. 
III. Conclusion 
With the recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Washington as an exception of 
almost startling character, the trend across 
the country is to find coverage for owners 
of property damaged by earthquakes, land-
slides, mudflows, subsidence, and similar 
disasters, regardless of policy exclusions. 
Insurance companies, faced with a financial 
drain neither accounted for through pre-
mium payments and reserves, nor even 
anticipated, may feel the earth slipping out 
from beneath their underpinnings just as 
surely as did their insured homeowners. 
What is necessary to counteract this trend 
is a case-by-case retrenchment with regard 
to the standard policy defenses and a search 
60/d. (citing Franklin Packaging Co. v. California 
Union Ins. Co., 171 NJ Supr 188, 408 A2d 448, 449 
(1979) (quoting 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §3083, at 
309-11)). 
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for concurrently responsible parties. Was 
there non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
as to the condition of the bui lding or the 
soil stability at the time the policy was 
entered? Has there been mitigation of 
damages? Can liability be passed on or at 
least shared with neighboring landowners, 
contractors, soil engineers, governmental 
entities, or any other party? Is there strict 
liability for defects in a manufactured lot? 
Did the builder and the seller disclose all 
material facts to the new homeowner be-
fore the policy was entered? Has there been 
nuisance or trespass? 
More extensive consultation with ex-
perts in the relevant engineering fields and 
more aggressive discovery into the possibil-
ity of cross-claims and counter-claims to 
assert subrogation rights may be the in-
surer's best strategy for coping with the 
current judicial trend for ignoring policy 
exclusions. After paying off the first-party 
claims of its insureds, the insurer may have 
to proceed either on its own or in the name 
of its insured, under its subrogation rights, 
to recoup as much as possible from all par-
ties who contr ibuted in some way to the 
insured's loss. In this regard, there may be 
statute of l imitation problems that may 
bar an effective recovery for the insurer. 
Insurance carriers who provide home-
owners' coverage in areas where earth 
movement or flood damages are likely to 
occur would undoubtedly profit by an in-
depth study and evaluation of the possibil-
ities and advantages of rewrit ing the type 
of homeowners' coverage they provide. T h e 
overly broad, multi-peril policy (rather 
than more limited coverage for specified 
perils) may leave the insurer in a far more 
vulnerable situation than it can handle, 
financially. In areas of major vulnerabil-
ity, writ ing homeowners ' policies on a 
specified-peril basis only, ra ther than on a 
multi-peril basis, may be indicated, as the 
exposure to the substantial damages in-
volved may be more than many carriers 
can handle no mat ter how high the rates 
are for premiums. 
One major carrier has already revised its 
homeowners' policy to provide in par t as 
follows: 
We do not insure for loss which would not 
have incurred in the absence of one or 
more of the following excluded events. We 
do not insure for such loss regardless of: 
(a) the cause of the excluded events; or 
(b) other causes of the loss; or (c) wheth-
er other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with the excluded event to pro-
duce the loss. . . . We do not insure for 
loss consisting of one or more of the items 
below. Further, we do not insure for loss 
contribute to or aggravate the loss; or 
described . . . immediately above regardless 
of whether one or more of the following: 
(a) directly or indirectly cause, contribute 
to or aggravate the loss; or (b) occur be-
fore, at the same time, or after the loss or 
any other cause of the loss. . . . 
A challenge to this language on the ba-
sis of ambiguity or confusion is expected, 
as the exclusionary language would remove 
coverage for a concurrent cause which 
would otherwise be covered under the pol-
icy. T h e exclusionary language would 
therefore have to be drawn artfully to ex-
clude coverage effectively for any damages 
caused by earth movement or water dam-
age or both. 
A totally different approach was used re-
cently by the authors of this article when 
asked to revise a standard homeowners' 
policy. Rather than deny any coverage for 
a loss where one of several causes of that 
loss is excluded, this newly proposed lan-
guage would exclude only that portion of 
the loss caused by the excluded risk: 
This policy do^ es not insure against loss . . . 
caused by, resulting from, contributing to, 
or aggravated by any of the events set forth 
[in those paragraphs containing the stan-
dard exclusions for earth movement, water 
damage, and the like] even if said event or 
events may not be the only cause of the 
loss. There is no coverage hereunder for 
that portion of any loss that is specifically 
excluded pursuant to the exclusionary 
paragraphs set forth hereinabove. 
While this approach will require the use 
of expert testimony to allocate what por-
tion of the loss was caused by covered risks, 
rather than by excluded risks, the cost of 
such expert testimony is expected to be 
minimal in comparison to the savings 
achieved by paying for only a port ion of 
the loss, rather than for the entire loss. 
Other proposed changes in the standard 
policy were adding "rainfall" to the stan-
dard exclusion for flood, surface water, 
waves, and the like and by adding "from 
any source whatsoever" to the usual exclu-
sions for water below the surface of the 
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ground. Finally, it was recommended that 
an additional exclusion be added for losses 
arising from faulty, inadequate or defective 
planning, construction, maintenance, engi-
neering, workmanship, excavation, mate-
rials used in construction, and the like. 
This exclusion would only apply if a peril 
otherwise excluded by the policy substan-
tially contributed to the loss. 
Some insurance carriers have suggested 
that they may be admitting that there was 
coverage for the major concurrent causes 
which heretofore had been specifically ex-
cluded, as a result of revising their policies 
to state specifically that they would not in-
sure a loss which would not have occurred 
in the absence of one or more excluded 
causes. The exposure the insurance car-
riers will face in the future may be so sub-
stantial that changes in their policies are 
required no matter what effect such 
changes may have on prior claims. The 
further the courts go with finding coverage 
for concurrent causes, even though the 
major causes were specifically excluded, 
the more disastrous the results for insurers 
if carriers do not take some positive action 
to stem the tide. 
As California courts become more and 
more likely to find coverage where none 
was thought to exist for earth movement 
and water damage claims, other progressive 
jurisdictions in the country are following 
closely. This could be extremely costly to 
the insurance carriers who provide home-
owners' coverage in areas where such dam-
ages are likely to occur. As a result, the 
current landslide of first-party claims un-
der homeowners' policies may be as disas-
trous for today's insurers as the San Fran-
cisco earthquake was to those insurers who 
thought they were protected by their earth-
quake exclusions, but who were faced with 
an earthquake of their own when the 
claims were successfully made under the 
coverage for fire damages. 
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CONCURRENT CAUSATION AND THE 
ART OF POLICY DRAFTING: 
NEW PERILS FOR PROPERTY INSURERS 
Michael E. Bragg 
Causation is a cornerstone of the propeny insurance contract. From the infancy of 
the profession, insurers have used causal relationships both to describe the insured 
event and to define under what circumstances coverage does not apply. The choice 
has not always been a happy one. 
Philosophers and linguists insist that language is merely man's meager attempt to 
describe the reality of the physical world. We talk of "causes" of an event as if there 
were such things physically "out there" waiting to be discovered. Thus, we send 
adjusters, engineers, and geologists to determine the "causes" of a mudslide. While 
this approach was adopted from the much-heralded scientific method and appeals to 
common sense, philosophers would laugh at the futility. For them causes are not 
physical forces waiting to be discovered; they are nebulous relational constructs 
waiting to be described. 
This philosophic premise has two very important corollaries: first, every event has 
an infinite number of causes; and second, each cause can be described in an infinite 
variety of ways. Although these statements are beyond serious philosophic chal-
lenge, they seem far removed from the practical considerations faced daily by policy 
drafters, underwriters, and claims persons. The demanding careers of such profes-
sionals leave litde time to ponder Aristode's or Bacon's notion of causation. Yet it is 
only when we come to grips with its philosophic underpinnings that we begin to 
fully appreciate the legal complexity of concurrent causation and the havoc it creates 
in the "real world" of claims handling. 
At its most elementary level, concurrent causation implies simply that more than 
one cause of loss or damage can have legal significance. This is hardly a startling 
revelation to tort scholars. The public policy underlying tort law has long endorsed 
Michael E. Bragg is assistant counsel of State Farm Insurance Companies, in Bloomtngton, Illi-
nois. 
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expanded notions of liability to compensate injured victims. Nor is the theory of 
concurrent causation novel to liability insurance carriers whose fortunes follow the 
legal liability of their insureds. 
A 1983 Missouri appellate court decision colorfully illustrates this point." The 
action arose when Terry Braxton was shot and injured by a drunken gas station 
attendant following a fight over the making of change. Braxton brought suit against 
the owner of the gas station alleging negligent supervision of the attendant. A judge-
ment of $ 100,000 was obtained but the station's liability insurance carrier denied 
coverage. In so doing it relied on a "firearm" exclusion in the policy which stated, 
"This insurance does not apply . . . to bodily injury and property damage arising out 
of the ownership or use of any firearm."2 
The court cited similar cases from a number of jurisdictions and concluded that 
the insured's own negligence in failing to properly supervise the attendant was a 
legally significant cause of the owner's liability. Therefore, under the doctrine of 
concurrent causation, coverage applied. 
Insurance lawyers may well disagree with the court's finding that the negligent 
supervision of the attendant was a "separate, concurrent and nonexciuded cause" of 
liability. Nevertheless, nearly all would agree that every basis of liability must be 
examined. If any nonexciuded basis rises to the dignity of an independent, concur-
rent proximate cause,* coverage under a liability policy will exist. 
Liability and corresponding coverage under a third-party insurance policy must be 
carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis applied in a first-party property 
contract. Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with estab-
lishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability. Thus, we discover that: 
. . . proximate cause has a different meaning in insurance cases than it has in tort cases. 
In tort cases the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing 
culpability, and for that reason the rules reach back of both the injury and the physical 
cause to fix the blame on those who created the situation in which the physical laws of 
nature operated; in insurance cases the concern is not with the question of culpability or 
why the injury occurred, but only with the nature of the injury and how it happened. 
Propeny insurance then is an agreement, a contract, in which the insurer agrees to 
indemnify the insured in the event that the insured property suffers a covered loss. 
Coverage, in turn, is commonly provided by reference to causation, e.g., "loss 
caused by . . ." certain enumerated perils. 
The term "perils" in traditional property insurance parlance refers to fortuitous, 
active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and explosion, which bring about the 
1. Braxton v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. App. 198 3). 
2. Wat 617. 
3. Accord Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Purdic, 145Cal.App. 3d57,193 Cal. Rptr. 248 (198 3); compart 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 406, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1983). 
4. See Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) applying Montana law; State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973). 
5. 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 463 (2d ed. 1982). 
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loss. Thus the "cause" of loss in the context of a property insurance contraa is to-
tally different from that in a liability policy. This distinction is critical to the resolu-
tion of losses involving multiple causes. 
Frequendy property losses occur which involve more than one peril that might be 
considered legally significant. If one of the causes (perils) arguably falls within the 
coverage grant—commonly either because it is specifically insured (as in a named 
peril policy) or not specifically excepted or excluded (as in an "all risks" policy)— 
disputes over coverage can arise. The task becomes one of identifying the most im-
portant cause of the loss and attributing the loss to that cause. As stated in Couch on 
Insurance: 
In determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concur-
rence of different causes, the efficient cause—the one that sets others in motion—is the 
cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it, and 
operate more immediately in producing the disaster.6 
In discussingthe most important cause of a property insurance loss, "efficient" cause 
is perhaps preferable to "proximate" cause because of the baggage that the latter 
term brings with it from the law of torts. But whether the courts and commentators 
refer to the most important cause as "proximate," "efficient," "dominant," "pre-
dominant," "operative," or "active," they have reached a consensus that one cause 
is to be so designated and the loss attributed to it.7 The selection of this single cause is 
not simply a random choice among an infinite number of competing events, but 
rather focuses upon the contraa and the parties. For it is the language of the contraa 
and the bargain of the parties that determine whether an event is significant.8 
To discuss whether a particular cause is significant without understanding the con-
text of the inquiry is jabberwocky. This was perhaps best illustrated by Professor Ni-
cholas St. John Green in an article written for the American Law Review over a century 
ago: 
6. 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE, Sec. 1466 (1st ed. 1930) as cited inSabellav Wisler, 59CaJ. 2d 21, 377 
P.2d 889, 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 695 (1963). 
7. Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV 1141, 1143 (1961). Levit, 
Proximate Cause—First Party Coverage, 1965 ABA SECTION INS., NEG. & COMP L PROCEEDINGS 157, 
reprinted 1966 INS. LJ. 340, 342. 
8. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 13 A.L.R. 875 (1918). 
The problem before us is not one of philosophy. . . . General definitions of a proximate cause give 
titde aid. Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when 
making an ordinary business contraa. It is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that 
counts. There are times when the law permits us to go far back in tracing events to causes The 
inquiry for us is how far the parties to this contraa intended us to go The causes within their 
contemplation are the only causes that concern us (Emphasis in original.) 
The question is not what men ought to think of as a cause. The question is what they do think of 
as a cause. We must put ourselves in the place of the average owner whose boat or building is 
damaged by the concussion of a distant explosion, l a us say a mile away Some glassware in his 
pantry is thrown down and broken. It would probably never occur to him that, within the mean-
ing of his policy of insurance, he had suffered loss by fire. A philosopher or a lawyer might per-
suade him that he had, but he would not believe it until they told him 
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For each different purpose with which we investigate we shall find a different circum-
stance, which we shall then intelligibly and properly call the cause. The man may have 
committed suicide; we say he himself was the cause of his death. He may have been 
pushed into the water by another; we say that other person was the cause. The 
drowned man may have been blind, and have fallen in while his attendant was wrong-
fully absent; we say the negligence of his attendant was the cause. Suppose him to have 
been drowned at a ford which was unexpectedly swollen by rain: we may properly say 
that the height of the water was the cause of his death. A medical man may say that the 
cause of his death was suffocation by water entering his lungs. A comparative anatomist 
may say that the cause of his death was the fact that he had lungs instead of gills like a 
fish. The illustration might be carried to an indefinite extent. From every point of view 
from which we look at the facts, a new cause appears.9 
Unfortunately Professor Green's lesson has not always been recalled by the courts. 
Perhaps due to the judicial fascination with proximate cause in the tort field or the 
infrequency with which judges encounter property insurance cases, tort causation 
language has found its way—bag and baggage—into the insurance cases. This unfor-
tunate blurring of distinctions between the law of torts and contracts is typified by 
the recent flurry of decisions applying the doctrine of concurrent causation to prop-
erty insurance contracts. 
Although a review of case law on a national basis would reveal that several jurisdic-
tions have struggled with issues of concurrent causation in the context of property 
insurance, California decisions have had particular impaa in this developing area of 
the law.n At the core of that state's causation analysis may be its demonstrated pas-
sion to find ways to compensate injured panies even at the expense of breaking 
down common law distinctions between ton and contract. Granting ton remedies 
Id, 120 N.E. at 87, 13 A.L.R. at 877. 
In last analysis, therefore, it is something in the minds of men, in the will of the contracting par-
ties, and not merely in the physical bond of union between events, which solves, at least for the 
jurist, this problem of causation. 
Id, 120 N.E. at 88, 13 A.L.R. at 879. 
9. Green, Proximate and Remote Came, 4 AM. L. REV. 201, 212 (1870) as quoted in Brewer, Concur-
rent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1166 (1961). 
10. See General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Sun Ins. Off., Ltd., 369 F.2d 906, 908 (6th Cir. \966)affg 239 
F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780, 785 (6th Cir. 1958) 
affg 140 F. Supp. 206 ( W D . Mich. 1956); Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas Const. Co., 114 F.2d 
702, 706 (6th Cir. 1940) applying Michigan law; Essex House v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 404 
F. Supp. 978, 991-92 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Milan v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp. 251, 253 
(E.D. La. 1964); Fogarty v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 188 A. 481, 483-84 (Conn. 1936), Mattis v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 118 IU. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1164(5th Dist., 1983); Vormelkerv. 
Oleksinski,40Mich. App. 618, 199 N.W.2d 287, 294(1972); Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 283 N . C 
142, 195 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1973); Benke v. Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co. 110 Wis. 2d 356, 329 
N.W.2d 243 (1982); Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 278 N.W.2d 
857 (1979); Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514, 521 (1976). For additional references 
see Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Landslide in Coverage, 50 INS. 
COUNSEL J. 418,421-25 (1983). 
11. Sabeila v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963); Strubble v. United 
States Auto. Assoc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1973); Giliis v. Sun Ins. Off., Ltd., 238 
Cal. App, 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965); Sauer v. General Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 303 (1964); Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962). 
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for the unlawful withholding of contractual benefits is one example of this judicial 
passion.12 The expansion of causation rules may well be another. 
The California Supreme Court has never held in a property insurance case that 
there can be more than one legally significant cause of loss.1 J In fact, the leading case 
oiSabella v. Wisler4 seems to hold just the opposite. Nevertheless, the recent opin-
ions of lower courts cannot be ignored. Moreover, the insurance industry has 
learned well its lesson that it must not rely on the California Supreme Court to calm 
troubled waters. 
The difficulty of the industry's task in combatting concurrent causation embraces 
two distina but related issues intertwined in the court decisions. First, the courts are 
creating new "causes" of loss never contemplated by propeny insurance policy 
drafters. Most important of these new causes are negligence and other human con-
duct. Such conduct may be active, passive, willful, negligent, imprudent, untimely, 
or any other word which describes how people act or fail to act. Second, the courts 
are telling us that the proper causation standard is no longer to attribute the loss to a 
single proximate cause, but rather to grant coverage if any of the causes of the loss has 
not been specifically excluded. 
This second prong of the judicial assault is pointedly illustrated by the instructions 
given to the jury in a well-publicized recent case: 
Under an all risk policy, no matter what the cause of damage, there will be coverage 
unless every cause of loss is excluded by the terms of the policy. 
That is to say, if two or more causes combined to produce a loss, that also will be cov-
ered if any cause is not specifically excluded." 
Through a judicial blending of these two distina notions, we now find that if a 
new cause (e.g., third-party negligence) joins with an excluded cause (e.g., earth-
quake), the resulting loss may be covered. This precise issue was litigated and lost by 
Safeco Insurance Company following the May 198 3 earthquake in Coalinga, Cali-
12. Gruenbregv. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 5lOP.2d 1032. 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (197 3). 
13. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, H4P.2d 12 3, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 
(197 3), which is often cited as applying concurrent causation principles to insurance contracts, does so 
only in the context of the liability portion of the policy. 
This distinction was clearly made by the California Supreme Court as noted. 
Although there may be some question whether either of the two causes in the instant case can be 
properly characterized as the "prime," "moving" or "efficient" cause of the accident we believe 
that coverage under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured whenever an 
insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries (Emphasis supplied 
for the term "liability" only.) 
Id at 105-06, 5 l4P.2dat 130, 109 Cal. Rptr at 818. 
14. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21. 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689(1963). 
15. Excerpt from jury instructions, Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No 760 224 (San Fran-
cisco County, Cal. Super. Ct. 1982). 
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fornia. * Safeco subsequently made a corporate decision not to appeal the case and 
paid earthquake-related losses resulting from the Coalinga incident. 
The language of the opinions is sweeping. Viewed collectively, the cases teach that 
no policy exclusion or exception is inviolable. While the decisions have thus far pri-
marily addressed the "earth movement" and "water damage" exclusions, concur-
rent causation finds perhaps even more fertile application in the context of the cata-
strophic exclusions of "war" and "nuclear hazard." Indeed it is difficult to imagine 
how a war or nuclear incident could occur in the absence of negligence or some 
other human "cause." 
For example, if the driver of a truck carrying nuclear waste negligendy collides 
with another vehicle resulting in the escape of nuclear radiation, would not resulting 
property damage be concurrently and proximately caused by the driver's negligence? 
Does it make a difference whether the loss was one caused by or resulting from "nu-
clear hazard"—a specifically excluded peril? Does it matter whether policy drafters did 
not intend to cover such losses? or; whether the insured paid no premium for this 
coverage? Perhaps not! 
If the insured has an "all risks" policy and the driver's negligence was not specifi-
cally excluded, it would seem to present an issue of concurrent causation as applied 
in the recent decisions. Moreover, the result may be the same had the loss occurred 
due to the negligent design of the truck, the improper maintenance of the road or the 
nuclear company's failure to transport the materials by rail. To repeat the words of 
Professor Green: "The illustration might be carried to an indefinite extent. From 
every point of view from which we look at the facts, a new cause appears." 
From the perspective of the insurance industry, these are not idle issues of intellec-
tual speculation. They jeopardize the very solvency of individual carriers and the 
ability to conduct the business of insurance. No principles are more deeply ingrained 
in the minds of underwriters than the selection of risk and the determination of pre-
16. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Motte, No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., July 1984). 
The "ail risks" policy at issure in Safeco included recendy added concurrent causation language. Safeco 
had mailed new policies to its insureds approximately fifty days before the Coalinga loss with an effective 
date three days prior to the May 2, 1983 earthquake. Safeco accompanied the new policy with a letter 
informing its insureds that there were changes in the new policy, but it did not describe them in detail. The 
judge ruled that Safeco had not provided sufficient notice to its policyholders and therefore the concur-
rent causation language was ineffective. 
Judge Dennis Caeton then turned to the traditional exclusionary language of the earlier policy. He held 
that the earth movement exclusion was clear and unambiguous. However, although the peril of earth-
quake was specifically excluded, he found that the causa of the earthquake were not. Expert testimony 
established that earthquakes are commonly caused by the slippage of tectonic plates underlying the earth's 
crust. Since the policy did not specifically exclude tectonic plate slippage, the judge held that coverage 
existed. 
Judge Caeton went on to find that even if the slippage of tectonic plates was encompassed within the 
exclusion for earth movement, the loss would still be covered. Judge Caeton cited the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Safeco v. Guyton—infra note 18—as controlling law in California. Since expert testimony had 
established that the design of the structure was inappropriate to withstand earthquakes, the judge con-
cluded that the negligent design was a concurrent proximate cause of the loss and therefore created cover-
age. 
17. As cited in Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1143 
(1961). 
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mium. Insurers must know with certainty that contract language will be judicially 
respected. Absent such certainty, only the most cavalier insurer would attempt to 
write business. 
Faced with several adverse California appellate rulings" as well as a rapidly devel-
oping number of trial court opinions,19 most companies took immediate and decisive 
measures. A few, apparendy believing that the handwriting on the wall may be a 
forgery, have taken a "wait and see" posture. 
It is to the credit of the insurance industry that the leading trade organizations, 
rating bureaus and independent writers acted swiftly and reponsibly. Despite the 
gravity of the developing California case law, there was no industry movement to 
halt property writings in that state. Rather the industry's effort focused on the policy 
and the legislature. 
REDRAFTING PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICIES 
The traditional response of insurers upon discovering that their contraa language is 
not being interpreted by the courts as the drafters intended is to rewrite the language. 
In fact this alternative is often judicially mandated. Courts have told the insurance 
industry coundess times that insuring agreements will be interpreted broadly and 
exclusions narrowly. If the insurer desires to exclude some event it must say so 
clearly and unequivocably.20 
The difficulty, of course, is usually not one of intention, but one of language. We 
humbly acknowledge the inherent artificiality, inadequacy, and imprecision of our 
language. Yet we ask the policy drafter to forge the magic words that are at once easy 
for the lay reader to comprehend and at the same time legally sufficient for the court 
18. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) rev'g 471 F. Supp. 1126 ( C D . Cal. 
1979); Premier Ins. Co. v.Wdch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (198 3); Ashling v. Unigard 
Mut. Ins. Co. (not released for publication), Cal. App., 4th Dist., Div 1 (1982); Moorehead v. Travelers 
Ins. Co. (not released for publication), Cal. App., 2nd Dist., Div. 3 (circa 1974). 
19. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Adams, No. A021020, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 3 (1984) on appeal 
from an order granting defendant's demurrer (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., Nov 2 3, 1982), State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Sheldon, No A0213 26. Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 4 (1984) on appeal from an 
order granting defendant's motion to dismiss (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 2, 1982); Garvey v. 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. A017879, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 4(1984) on appeal from a judg-
ment entered in favor of the plaintiff. No. 760 224 (San Francisco County, Cal. Super Ct., Feb 18, 
1982). For a discussion of this case, see Jordan, Proximate vs. Concurrent Cause: the California Syndrome, 1 
TEXAS INS. L.J. No. 6 (April 1984); McKibbin v Security Ins. Co., No. C 178 697 (Los Angeles County, 
Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 30, 1981). 
20. See Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 603, ruling on motion for summary judgment (Larimer 
County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 28, 1984). 
The Kane decision holds that the property losses resulting from the July 15,1982 failure of the "Lawn 
Lake dam" were not excluded by the water damage/flood exclusion. Rather the court decided that 
the "efficient cause of Plaintiffs' damages" was the failure of the dam and not a flood as 
contemplated within the insurance exclusion 
Lastly, the Defendant companies control the language of the policy and their exclusions, and if 
they wished to exclude damage from escaping "impounded waters," they could have easily speci-
fied and defined such an exclusion 
Id. at 4 
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to sanction. It is this challenge of writing for a dual audience (laymen and judge), and 
the often contrary demands of each, that leaves fertile ground for litigation. 
When policy drafters from individual companies began to examine concurrent 
causation, they quickly learned that the issue was overwhelmingly complex. The 
"solution," in the words of McGeorge Bundy, was as elusive as "picking up a jelly-
fish by the comers."" No consensus was reached by the industry on the precise 
language to be employed. Therefore, several approaches now exist, none of which 
has yet been judicially tested. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company introduced its revised homeowners poli-
cies in California on January 1, 198 3. As the first company to issue new policies, the 
language has been subject to close scrutiny and some criticism/' 
Nevertheless, the changes made by State Farm are typical of those made by other 
carriers and will be used here as illustrative of the industry response. 
State Farm made four basic changes in its homeowners policies. 
1. It removed the term "all risks" from the policy itself as well as all advertising 
and promotional materials. The insurance industry well understood that "all risks" 
referred merely to the format of the policy and not to the fact that it protected the 
insured from every conceivable loss. Unfortunately, the term carried a connotation 
for some laypersons that the policy contained no exceptions or exclusions. To avoid 
the injection of the doctrine of reasonable expectations into the controversy, it 
seemed prudent to stop referring to and selling the policy as "all risks"2' and to 
change the language of the coverage grant from "all risks of physical loss" to "acci-
dental direa physical loss." 4 The change merely attempts to reinstate the intent of 
the earlier coverage grant. 
2. It expanded the exclusionary definition of "earth movement" to enumerate a 
detailed listing of events including earthquake, volcanic eruption, subsidence, and 
mud flow. Ironically, the new listing closely resembles more historic versions of the 
industry homeowners policy. 
Public and regulatory pressures to develop "easy to read" policies had earlier re-
sulted in eliminating the litany of specific events in favor of the single term "earth 
Compare Bartlett v. Continental Divide Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 994, granting defendant's proposed order 
(Larimer County, Colo. Dist. C t , Jan. 5, 1984). In Bartlett, decided more than a month prior to Kane, a 
different judge of the same court held that losses from the same occurrence were unambiguously excluded 
by an identical flood exclusion. 
To hold the term "flood" ambiguous when applied to the great overflowing of water due to the 
failure of a dam would be a denial of common sense and reason. 
Id at 1. 
21. McGeorge Bundy quoted in NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1967. 
22. Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Landslide in Coverage, 50 
INS. COUNSELJ. 418, 426 (1983). 
23. Insurers have traditionally referred to expansive homeowners policies as "all risks" policies to dif-
ferentiate them from "named peril" policies. The removal of the term "all risks" has left insurers without 
a universally accepted industry substitute. The Insurance Services Office coined the term "open peril" 
policy which is perhaps the most descriptive. 
24. For a discussion of direa versus indirect loss, see Gorman, A Reply to "Proximate Cause—First Party 
Coverage,'' 34 INS. COUNSELJ. 98, 101-03 (1967). 
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movement." Gains in brevity, however, are almost always accomplished through a 
loss in precision. In light of judicial demands on insurers to say precisely what they 
mean, most carriers have returned to describing a dozen or more kinds of excluded 
activity. This well illustrates the dilemma of writing for the dual audience discussed 
above. 
3. It specifically provided that negligence or other conduct as well as defective or 
improper design, materials, etc. are not in themselves covered losses. Moreover, the 
presence or absence of these enumerated items has no effect on coverage. That is, the 
items neither affirmatively create coverage nor bar recovery if the claim is otherwise 
payable. 
To illustrate how this provision operates in the typical homeowners policy, con-
sider the following two hypothetical: 
a. A home is improperly designed and constructed to withstand heavy winds 
common to its geographic location. If the home is subsequently destroyed by a 
windstorm, the loss is paid because the peril of wind is not excluded in the pol-
icy. The fact that the improper design or construction of the home or that 
defective materials may also have been ''causes" of the loss is immaterial to the 
determination of coverage; and 
b. A home is negligendy constructed on a site extremely susceptible to mudslides 
without adequate structural precautions. If the home is subsequendy destroyed 
by mudslide, the loss is denied because the peril of mudslide (as well as other 
forms of earth movement) is specifically excluded. As in the above example, 
that improper design of the home or defective materials may also have been 
"causes" of the loss is unimportant to the issue of property insurance coverage. 
Note, however, that these "causes" are very important factors if the home-
owner attempts to recover for his loss directly from the contractor based on 
theories of negligence or warranty. Again, whether "causes" of a loss are signif-
icant depends gready on the context of and reason for the inquiry. 
The adopted language attempts to restore traditional property insurance principles. 
Coverage is determined by an examination of the fortuitous, active, physical perils 
involved. Negligence and other liability-related concepts are irrelevant."' The inten-
tion of the drafters is to eliminate the new "causes" of loss held to have legal signifi-
cance in such decisions as Safeco v. Guyton6 and Premier v. Welch.' 
4. And finally, it revised the lead-in language to the exclusions (i.e., ordinance or 
law, earth movement, water damage, neglect, war, and nuclear hazard). The new 
language establishes a purging effect by making the occurrence of any oi these ex-
cluded events an absolute prohibition to a finding of coverage. Thus, once a loss 
occurs which would not have happened in the absence of an excluded event, there is 
no coverage. The policy states that this is so "regardless of (a) the cause of the ex-
25. Set Brodskv v. Pnnccmont Construction Co., 30 Md. App 569, 3 54 A.2d 440, 44 3 (1976) 
26 Safeco Ins.'Co. v Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir 1982) w g 4 7 1 F Supp 1126 (CD Cal. 
1979) 
27 Premier Ins Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App Id 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657(1983) 
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eluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concur-
rently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss." 
Consideration was given to discussing the interaction of covered and excluded 
perils in terms of proximate or remote causation. While such terminology would 
parallel existing statutory and case law, attempts to crystalize such concepts in lan-
guage meaningful to the lay reader proved futile. Furthermore, the potential cata-
strophic potential of such excluded perils as war, nuclear incident, flood and earth-
quake demanded that such losses be outside the contract regardless of the interaction 
of other nonexcluded factors. Therefore, it was decided to structure the exclusions 
to apply in every situation where the loss would not have occurred "but for" the 
excluded peril. 
The Insurance Services Office (ISO), whose forms are widely used in the property 
insurance industry, introduced its revised homeowners forms and endorsements ef-
fective October 1983. Two substantive changes not incorporated in the State Farm 
policy are worthy of note. First, ISO added a new exclusion labeled "weather condi-
tions." Accordingto ISO's August 9, 1983 circular, this new exclusion is designed to 
operate similarly to its negligence language. That is, it only applies if a specifically 
excluded peril contributes in any way with weather conditions to produce the loss. 
"Therefore," according to the circular, "if the dwelling is damaged due to (the 
weather condition of) windstorm, coverage is provided; however, if (the weather 
condition of) heavy rainfall causes flood damage (an excluded peril), the loss is not 
covered." 
Another significant ISO revision is its treatment of "collapse." Previously, col-
lapse has been insured as a specifically named peril under both the personal property 
and dwelling coverage grants. ISO removed collapse from the list of covered perils 
and "excepted" it.2 
Two reasons precipitated ISO's change in treatment of collapse. First, the peril of 
collapse has always been somewhat anomalistic. Unlike traditional perils such as fire, 
wind, and theft, "collapse" more often describes the result of an occurrence, not the 
cause of one. Thus, it does not fit comfortably with other named perils and is more 
logically treated separately. Secondly, the adoption of concurrent causation made 
companies reexamine the drafting approach. They feared that if a massive earth-
quake occurred, courts might consider the resulting mass of nibble as "caused by" 
the named peril of collapse. While it is difficult to think of collapse as an indepen-
dent, concurrent proximate cause of an earthquake loss, there is concern that the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations has not yet been stretched to its ultimate bound-
aries. 
Therefore, ISO steered toward a safe harbor. It created a new paragraph under the 
heading, "Additional Coverages," to reincorporate coverage for "collapse" caused 
28. For a well-developed treatment of the difference between "exceptions" and "exdusions," see E. 
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1957). 
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by certain specified perils such as hidden decay, weight of people or personal prop-
erty, fire, and explosion. This change does result in a reduaion of coverage and has 
generated both industry and regulatory debate. 
Whether any version of the recent policy revisions will successfully ward off con-
current causation, only time will tell. Of panicular concern is whether the California 
courts will accept the admittedly complex language. Although the language repre-
sents the industry's best efforts to state its intent and has its genesis in the soundest of 
business principles, the California courts have been singularly unsympathetic with 
insurance industry attempts to limit coverage. 
Illustrative of this judicial mind set is the 198 3 California appellate decision of 
Ponder v. Blue Cross.29 The dispute in Ponder arose out of a health insurance policy 
which read in pan: "Blue Cross shall not furnish benefits for . . . treatment for or 
prevention of temporo-mandibular joint syndrome." 
Both parties agreed that Mrs. Ponder suffered from temporo-mandibular joint 
syndrome (a "clicking" of the lower jaw). The central issue was whether the lan-
guage in the Blue Cross policy effectively excluded coverage.0 The court held that 
the exclusionary language was too obscurely written and inconspicuously placed in 
the contract to be given effect. In so holding, the Ponder court summarized the appli-
cable contractual rules: 
1. Every contract is to be construed against the party who drafted it; 
2. An insurance contract imposes an even more stringent duty on the court to 
interpret in favor of the insured; 
3. An exclusion in an insurance contract is subject to the closest possible scrutiny; 
4. A health policy, like traditional property policies, is not just an insurance pol-
icy but a contract of adhesion offered to the insured on a "take it or leave it" 
basis; and 
5. An exclusion in an adhesion contract must be more than merely precise" and 
unambiguous, it must be (a) conspicuous and (b) stated in plain and clear lan-
guage. 
The court explained these last requirements as follows: 
First, the exclusion must be positioned in a place and printed in a form which would 
attract a reader's attention. Secondly, the substance of the exclusion must be stated in 
words that convey the proper meaning to persons expected to read the contract. 
The court concluded that the Blue Cross language failed both the conspicuous and 
29. Ponder v. Blue Cross of So. CaJ., 145 Cai. App. 3d 709, 193 Cai Rptr 632(1983) 
30. The court, not surprisingly, characterized the inquiry somewhat differently 
The central issue on appeal is whether a form insurance contract effectively excludes coverage 
through a clause couched in undefined technical language not highlighted by location, typesize or 
otherwise 
Id. at 714. 19? CaJ Rptr at 63 3 
31 The court went so far as to say that 
Because ot the nature of the contract and the contracting panics, the most precise language imag-
inable may prove insufficient to eliminate coverage 
Id at 718, 193 CaJ. Rptr at 635-36 
32. Id. at 719, 193 Cai Rptr at 637 
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the plain-and-clear requirements. Therefore, in the court's words, it "disappointed 
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder." Policy drafters can only approach 
such requirements with a deep sense of humility. 
As a final reflection on the an of policy drafting, a review of the policy language at 
issue in Guyton—the Palm Desert flood case—is instructive. The policy provided, all 
in capitals: 
ADDITIONAL EXCLUSIONS 
THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST LOSS 
1) CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRA-
VATED BY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: 
A. FLOOD, SURFACE WATER, WAVES. . ." 
Note that the very nature of the "caused by, resulting from, contributed to or 
aggravated by" language presupposes that other causes may intermix with the ex-
cluded events to produce the loss. The clear intent of the exclusionary language is to 
bar recovery regardless of the sequence or concurrency of other loss-producing fac-
tors. 
Most insurance experts believe that the insurance industry cannot draft language 
which more precisely, unambiguously, conspicuously, plainly and clearly tells in-
sureds that they have no coverage for flood losses. Judge Solomon, who authored 
the federal district court opinion in Guyton, agreed: 
There is no merit in the insureds' contention that policyholders and insurance compan-
ies generally believe that floods are covered. I do not believe that they do. But even if 
they did, the express language of the policies, written in clear, concise and simple lan-
guage, excludes floods from covered risks.5* 
Despite this language-—carefully drafted as it was—the Ninth Circuit, in reversing 
Judge Solomon's ruling, found the exclusion would not preclude the payment of 
flood losses if third-party negligence were also a proximate cause of the loss. Flady 
stated, an insurer's ability to contract—at least in California—is in serious jeopardy. 
THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE 
Having witnessed judicial rebuff of previous policy-drafting efforts in such cases as Pon-
der and Guyton, the insurance industry can ill afford to place total confidence in the 
most recent policy revisions. Most industry representatives firmly believe that their 
assets are not protected, at least in California, until salutary legislation has been passed. 
Numerous industry meetings were called to discuss the California judicial develop-
ments and to attempt to forge a legislative solution. Although every major trade 
organization and independent property insurance writer participated in the dia-
33. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, supra note 26, at 552-53. 
34. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 471 F.Supp. 1126, !130<C.D.Cal. 1979), rev'd, 692 F.2d 551 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
Concurrent Causation and Policy Drafting 397 
logue, a consensus position was difficult to develop. Each company brought to the 
discussions its own interests, policy forms and interpretation of the California judi-
cial mandate. 
Most felt that the policy drafters had successfully removed negligence and other judi-
cially created "causes" of loss from the contract. There was considerably less comfort, 
however, with the interplay between the contractual causation language and two exist-
ing sections of the California Insurance Code. Sections 530 and 532 provide: 
§ 530. Proximate cause 
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, 
although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the 
loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote 
cause. 
§ 532. Specially excepted peril 
If a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance and there is a loss which would 
not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though the 
immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted. 
These sections codify the long-standing English principles of marine insurance re-
lating to causation.'6 Despite their derivation from marine insurance, they have been 
frequendy cited by California courts in resolving both liability and property insur-
ance cases.'7 An open question remains whether sections 530 and 532 can be suc-
35. CAL INS. CODE §§ 530 and 532 (Deering 1972). 
These two statutes were originally enacted in 1872 as sections 2626 and 2628 of California's first Civil 
Code. They were derived from sections 1431 and 143 3 of David Dudley Field's draft of the New York 
Civil Code of 1865. Sections 1431 and 143 3 were subsequendy deleted from the New York draft and 
hence never enacted. This leaves California unique in its codification of insurance causation principles. 
Section 530 codifies the traditional marine insurance causation principle applicable to named peril poli-
cies. That being, when two perils join to produce a loss—one of which is specifically '' insured against'' and 
another of which is "not contemplated," i.e., unmentioned, neither specifically insured against nor spe-
cially excepted—coverage depends upon which of the two perils is "proximate." If the peril specifically 
insured against is found to be proximate, there is coverage; if the unmentioned peril is proximate, there is 
no coverage. For property subject to all risks protection, of course, all perils are "contemplated" by the 
coverage grant. Therefore in the absence of a relevant policy exception, coverage would apply regardless 
of the manner in which the perils combine to produce the loss. 
Seaion 532 provides the traditional marine rule for determining coverage under both named peril and 
all risks policies in instances quite distinct from section 530. Now one o( the perils is "specially 
excepted"—not simply unmentioned or "not contemplated." Seaion 532 unambiguously states that, if 
the loss would not have occurred "but for" the specially excepted peril, there is no coverage. Whaher the 
specially excepted peril is proximate or remote is unimportant. Similarly unimportant is whether the 
other operative peril is specifically insured against. As long as the specially excepted peril meets the "but 
for" (cause in faa) standard, the loss is not covered. 
Either the California courts have filed to recognize the above distinction or they have considered the 
results of literally applying section 5 3 2 too harsh. Regardless of the reasoning, chey have found the provi-
sions of the two seaions to be "directly contrary" to each other and have essentially emasculated section 
532[S«SabeUav. Wislcr, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P2d 889,896, 27 Cal. Rptr 689, 696(1963).] 
36. Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contrasts, 59 MICH. L REV 1141, 1145(1961) 
37. S« State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co. v. Partridge, lOCai. 3d 94. 514 P 2d 123. 109 Cal. Rptr 
811 (1973);Sabellav Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr 689 (196 3); Sauer v. General 
Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275,37 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964). Hughes v Potomac Ins Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 
2 39, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650(1962). 
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cessfully altered by contract language. However, section 3268 of the California Civil 
Code8 and the case law " interpreting that section persuasively support such con-
tractual freedom. 
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ignored that the courts will declare sections 
5 30 and 5 3 2 so entrenched in the law of property insurance that they now represent 
the public policy of the state and cannot be contractually circumscribed. Fearing 
such a judicial construction, the insurance industry introduced several bills during 
the 1982 and 1983 legislative sessions which would have either repealed or amended 
both sections. These efforts were strongly opposed by the California Trial Lawyers 
Association and each of the bills died early in the legislative process. 
Realizing that broad legislation to resolve concurrent causation had little chance of 
passage, the insurance industry focused its attention on the one peril whose cata-
strophic potential endangered its very solvency—the peril of earthquake. Unsuccess-
ful efforts were made during the 1983 session to legislatively exclude earthquake 
losses from property insurance policies which did not specifically cover earth-
quakes.40 Finally, some relief was achieved in 1984 with the passage of Assembly Bill 
2865, which became effective on January 1, 1985.41 This bill was sponsored by a 
substantial segment of the insurance industry and received the support, at least infor-
mally, of the California Insurance Department. 
A.B. 2865 has two significant portions. First, it intends to provide absolute protec-
tion for property insurers against the peril of earthquake and to resolve the applica-
tion of concurrent causation to this peril. The bill states that such protection applies 
regardless of sections 530 and 5 32 or any other existing laws. At least within this 
limited context, it should legislatively overrule the rationale employed in such cases 
as Guyton. 
As a trade-off for such protection, A.B. 2865 requires that each insurer affirma-
tively offer earthquake coverage to all existing and new residential property policy-
holders. This offer, which must be made in a prescribed written format, calls to the 
attention of the policyholder that the policy does not cover loss resulting from earth-
quake. If the insured desires such coverage, the insurer will either offer it directly or 
arrange for another insurance entity to offer it. 
Similar to earlier efforts, A.B. 2865 was introduced as a clarification measure to 
38. [Panics may waive provisions of code] Except where it is otherwise declared, the provisions of the 
foregoing titles of this part, in respect to the rights and obligations of panics to contracts, are subordinate 
to the intention of the panies, when ascenained in the manner prescribed by this chapter on the interpre-
tation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be waived by any party entided thereto, unless such 
waiver would be against public policy. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3268 (Deering 1972). 
39. See WiUiamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164F. 404,21 L.R.A..N.S., 103(9thCir. 1908). 
40. Set, e.g., Cal. S.B. 958, 1983 Reg. Sess. (as amended on Sept. 7, 1983). 
Existing California law prohibits fire and related insurance policies (induding homeowners policies) 
from affording coverage for nuclear loss or damage unless a specific nudear endorsement is attached. 
Absent such an endorsement there is no coverage for nudear loss "whether directly or indirectly resulting 
from an insured peril." [Cal. Ins. Code § 2079 (Deering 1972).] Unenacted S.B. 958 would have pro-
vided identical treatment for the peril of earthquake. 
41. Enactedasch. 916, LAWS 1984,Reg. Sess. (to be codified as ch. 8.5—commencingwith§ 10081— 
of the CAL. INS. CODE). 
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reinstate traditional insurer-intended coverage and to legislatively underscore the sig-
nificance of the earthquake exposure. If people desire earthquake protection, it is 
readily available for an additional premium. If people choose not to purchase such 
coverage, their property insurance policy furnishes; no coverage for earthquake-
regardless of other "causes." 
The enactment of A.B. 2865 hopefully will provide the insurance industry with 
much needed relief from the peril of earthquake. However, the bill may be cold 
comfort indeed should the California courts decide that the special legislative treat-
ment of eaahquake implies that all other "causes" of loss are covered regardless of 
policy language to the contrary. 
Moreover, the mandatory offer of earthquake insurance provisions of the bill are 
very troublesome. They have created a great deal of concern throughout the insur-
ance industry that the legislation may result in earthquake writings and correspond-
ing liabilities which exceed the prudent capacity levels established by individual in-
surers as well as the California Department of Insurance. Although it is not presendy 
known what the level of policyholder acceptance will be for this mandatory offer, a 
survey conducted by State Farm's research department suggests that earthquake in-
surance writings may well double. 
The added earthquake exposure resulting from the mandatory offer will force in-
surance companies to seriously reevaluate their underwriting and pricing guidelines. 
Since a homeowners policy cannot be written in an earthquake-prone area of Cali-
fornia without offering coverage against earthquake, insurers may be forced to de-
cline the risk entirely. Such action may result in areas of insurance unavailability or 
unaffordability, which in turn may spur further legislative action. 
CONCLUSION 
Final resolution of the concurrent causation issue remains elusive. As industry ef-
forts concentrate on California, the rationale of the California decisions has recendy 
surfaced in other jurisdictions.42 The jellyfish is entering new waters, leaving industry 
policy drafters, lobbyists and lawyers with the task of searching for the "corner" to 
extricate the property insurance industry from the most: significant and perplexing 
problems it has faced in decades. 
42. Sx Mams v State Farm Fire and Cas Co., 118 Hi. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156 (5th Dist , 
1983); memorandum brief in support of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, filed Jan. 17, 1983 in 
Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 693 (Larimer County, Colo. Dist. Ct.) at 13-18. 
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Darwin C. Hansen, Esq. 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: Village Inn Partners v, 
Civil No. C-87-01180 
State Farm Insurance Co 
Dear Darwin: 
Since we are about to embark on discovery, there is 
one matter I would like to bring to your attention. 
Your client denied this claim on the basis of two 
exclusions: repeated leakage and earth movementi With respect 
to the second exclusion, I have various arguments as to why 
that "earth movement" exclusion does not apply. You and I have 
discussed some of those theories. For example, I will argue 
that while earth movement itself is excluded, the efficient 
predominant cause was a covered cause, and therefore the loss 
is covered. Additionally, we discussed my position that earth 
movement only applies to natural phenomeiife. 
There is one additional position we will be taking 
when attacking the earth movement clause. I wanted you to be 
aware of this before the depositions started. We may argue 
that the earth movement exclusion does not apply because, 
technically, there was no earth movement which preceded the? 
loss} We have reason to believe that the soil, when saturated 
with water, does not actually sink or settle. Rather, it loses 
its weight-bearing ability. This allows the foundation to sink 
or shift. The soil would, of course, be displaced at that 
point, but the actual movement of earth is not what caused the 
foundation to shift. 
KRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Darwin C. Hansen, Esq, 
October 16, 1987 
Page 2 
At this time, I are not sure to what extent the facts 
will bear out this theory. However, in the interest of candor, 
I wanted you to be aware of this approach. My Amended 
Complaint may be technically incorrect because it references 
"soil settlement" in one allegation (1f 5). While there was 
indeed soil settlement or displacement, we intend to argue that 
such settlement or displacement was the result of (rather than 
the cause of) foundation shifting. I suppose I could amend the 
allegation accordingly, but I would hope that is not necessary 
in view of this letter. 
Sincerely, 
S"\ 
,V \ 
i 1J \ 
i , 
Thomas J. Erbin 
TJE/cs 
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TO: State Farm Counsel 
FROM: Craig Simon/Bill Hughes 
RECEIVED 
IAPRI mz 
fiKS&M 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
JAMES 3. MILLIKEN and 
JEANNIE S. MILLIKEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ex. al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 86-1284 
€ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of the alleged bad faith denial of 
insurance coverage and concomitant unreasonable conduct of 
defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (hereinafter 
nState Farm11) in its investigation of a property damage claim 
submitted by plaintiffs Jeannie and James Milliken. 
On June 3, 1985, the Millikens applied for an insurance 
package with State Farm (intending, according to their account, 
to secure "all-risk" or "all peril11 coverage for their home) . 
A "Homeowners Policy -- Extra Form 5" (No. 77-89-3958-1, here-
inafter "Policy") was then issued, effective June 23, 1985. 
Apparently the Millikens were not provided with a copy of the 
Policy at the time of their application, nor was their attention 
n\ ft 
called to any provisions which would defeat their purported 
desire to secure all-risk protection. 
Shortly after applying for the Policy, the Millikens depart 
ed on a two-month vacation. They had not received a copy of th 
executed Policy until they returned home on August 1, 1985. It 
was also at this time that they noticed cracking in the concrete 
slabs underlying their residence, garage and patio. 
On December 5, 1985, the Millikens submitted a claim for 
indemnification to State Farm, which received the claim on 
December 11 and on December 17 agreed to investigate the loss 
(under a full reservation of rights). State Farm claims examine 
Charles Garvin made a visual inspection of the Milliken residenc 
on January 17, 1986. He took fourteen photos of the damaged 
areas, which he forwarded to State Farm for its review. At no 
time did State Farm or Garvin arrange for a licensed geotechnica 
firm to conduct an independent investigation of the site. 
State Farm denied the Millikens1 claim on February 6, 1986. 
Garvin's letter of denial cited language in the Policy purportin 
to exclude coverage for damage caused by "earth movement'1 (and 
related phenomena that could have caused the cracking) . Speci.fi 
cally, the following exclusionary language was noted: 
Section I -- Losses Not Insured 
We do not insure under any coverage for loss (including 
collapse of an insured building or part of' a building) 
which would not have occurred in the absence of one or 
more of the following excluded events. We do not 
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or b) other cause of the loss; or 
c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss: 
b. Earth Movement, meaning any loss caused by,' 
resulting from, contributed to or aggravated 
by earthquakes; landslides; mud flow; sink-
hole; erosion; the sinking, rising, shifting, 
expanding or contraction of the earth. Earth 
movement also means volcanic eruption, explo-
sion or effusion, except as provided in Addi-
tional Coverages for Volcanic Action. 
We do insure for direct loss by fire, explo-
sion other than explosion of a volcano, 
theft, or breakage of glass or safety glazing 
materials resulting from earth movement. 
c. Water Damage, meaning: 
(3) natural water below the surface of the 
ground. This includes water which exerts 
pressure on or seeps or leaks through a 
building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, 
swimming pool or other structure. 
However, we do insure for direct loss by 
fire, explosion, or theft resulting from 
water damage. 
We do not insure under any coverage for loss consisting 
of one or more of the items below: 
a. conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of 
any person, group, organization or govern-
mental body whether intentional, wrongful, 
negligent, or without fault; 
b. defect, weakness, inadequacy, fault or 
unsoundness in: 
(1) planning, zoning, development surveying, 
siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, 
construction, grading, compaction; 
(3) materials used in construction or repair; 
(4) maintenance; 
of any property (including land, structures, 
or improvements of any kind) whether on or 
off the residence premises. 
]| However, we do insure for any ensuing loss from items a 
2 | and b unless the ensuing loss is itself a Loss Not 
Insured by this Section. 
3 
4. We do not insure for loss described in paragraphs 1 and 
i 2 immediately above regardless of whether one or more 
of the items listed in paragraph 3 above: 
5II 
a. directly or indirectly cause, contribute to 
g or aggravate the loss; or 
19 
20 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
b. occur before, at the same time, or after the 
loss or any other cause of the loss. 
However, we do insure for ensuing loss from items 3a 
gjl and 3b unless the ensuing loss is itself a Loss Not 
Insured by this Section. 
The letter then stated: 10 
II Our observations of the cracking in the slab of the |9; sort we observed at your home can only be a result of 
~j some type of earth movement, of a sinking, rising, 
in shifting, expanding or contracting of the earth. As 
you can see from the terms of your policy quoted above 
2411 this sort of earth movement is excluded. 
2&11 The disappointment of the Millikens in having their claim denied 
2Q|| was compounded by their suspicion that Garvin, not a licensed 
27|| geotechnical engineer, did not give them a fair evaluation. 
2g! Through their attorney they wrote to Garvin on February 12, 19S6 
and "beseeched11 him to undertake a more complete inquiry into the 
causes of the damage. Garvin's response was a reaffirmation of 
nil) coverage denial. 
22 The Millikens filed the instant suit in San Diego Superior 
23 Court on April 10, 1986. Their.complaint sets out eight causes 
of action: 
1) breach of contract; 
2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and breach of State Farm's fiduciary 
duties; 
3) fraud; 
4) negligent misrepresentation; 
5) violation of the California Insurance Code 
(sections 790.02 and 790.03); 
- 4 -
271 
State Farm petitioned for removal of the action on June 5, 19S6 
and the Millikens then moved for remand. Pursuant to a Memorandum 
Decision dated November 5, 1986, this court denied the motion 
for remand. State Farm then moved for summary judgment on 
February 13, 1987. Summary judgment on the first through fifth 
causes of action is sought on grounds that the Policy excludes 
the Millikens' loss from coverage, and summary judgment on the 
seventh and eighth causes is sought on grounds of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. State Farm 
inadvertently failed to request summary judgment on the sixth 
(,fnegligencelf) • cause of action, but at hearing the court agreed 
to entertain an oral motion on that cause. For the reasons set 
forth below, the court now finds the arguments of State Farm to 
be well-taken and therefore grants summary judgment in its favor 
as to all eight causes of action. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Summary Judgment Standards 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows for the entry 
of summary judgment where: 
23! 
jj the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
241 interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
25 that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
25 entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In a recent discussion of this standard 
281 the Supreme Court stated that Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 
- 5 -
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
61 
1\ 
8 
9 
10j 
11 
12i 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
221 
23 
24 
251 
261 
27 
28 
summary judgment against a party who "fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential tc 
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 
2553 (1986). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of 
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that judgment may be entered as a matter of law. International 
Union of Bricklavers & Allied Craftsmen Lcccl Union No. 20, 
AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 
1985). Once that burden has been met, however, the opponent 
must answer with factual allegations revealing a genuine dispute 
of fact. I^d. . . 
A dispute over a material fact is "genuine," according to 
a recent Supreme Court pronouncement, if "the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 
(1986). If a nonmoving party's evidence is "merely colorable" 
or "not significantly probative," summary judgment may be 
granted. Jd. at 2511. 
Furthermore, the "substantive evidentiary standards that 
apply to the case" must guide a judge in determining whether a 
factual dispute requires submission to a jury. Ld. at 2514. 
The Court in Anderson, supra, went on to point out that "at 
the summary judgment stage the judgefs function is not himself 
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but 
to determine whether .there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
at 2511. 
- 6 -
that certain facts or issues do not present a genuine dispute. 
In such a case a court may enter an order specifying the facts 
that are not subject to substantial controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(d). Here, State Farm has requested that such an order be 
entered if summary judgment is denied. 
Although Rule 56 presents only one standard for summary 
judgment, application of the standard over the years has pro-
duced certain rules of thumb. For instance, summary judgment 
is usually denied where a case turns on issues of intent or 
motive. In this spirit, the Millikens argue that "summary 
judgment is generally denied in cases involving insurance 
contracts because issues of -fact are present concerning whether 
the damages involved are within the scope of the insurance 
policy.11 Citing Wright and Miller, 10A Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2730.1, p. 293 (1983). The Millikens further argue 
that resolution of these factual issues requires that a policy 
be construed in light of the parties' reasonable expectations 
of coverage. Finally, the Millikens suggest that summary 
judgment is usually inappropriate in insurance coverage cases 
because such cases typically present thie factual issues of 
whether the insurer breached its obligations under the policy 
and whether the insurer made certain representations regarding 
coverage. These propositions notwithstanding, however, summary 
judgment is just as appropriate in insurance cases as it is in 
other cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, 
- 7 -
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as mentioned above and discussed below, summary judgment may be 
entered in favor of State Farm in the instant case. 
II. 
Coverage Issues Relating to the 
First Five Causes of Action 
6 ^* Ambiguity of the Policy 
7 I Both parties spend a considerable amount of their discussion 
g on the issue of the Policy's ambiguity before they address wheth* 
oil the damage claimed by the Millikens is covered. State Farm's 
2Q( firm assertion that the Policy is not ambiguous is central to its 
argument for summary judgment. This is because construction of 
I2i an unambiguous policy may be undertaken by the court as a legal 
jo I matter suitable for resolution on a motion for summary judgment. 
See Sanrota v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 472 (1963). 
In developing its argument here, State Farm restates some 
jgjl familiar maxims. The language of a policy prevails over any 
j- inconsistent or general description of that policy. C & H Foods 
lg v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064 (1984). Words 
ion must be given their plain meaning, and if a policy is unambiguous 
2Q a court must give effect to that plain meaning and must not 
create an artificial ambiguity. See Matsuo Yoshida v. Liberty ' 
Mutual Ins. Co,, 240 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1957). An 
exclusionary clause must be conspicuous, plain and clear. 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 187 Cal. App. 3d 169, 184 (1986). 
State Farm avers that the Policy exclusions are abundantly 
clear. Clauses affording coverage are located under the boldface 
heading "Losses Insured,11 while exclusions comprise the separate-
ly titled section of'"Losses Not Insured.11 Furthermore, the 
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numbered exclusionary subsections all begin with the simple 
declaration, "We do not insure...." What is more, there is a 
separate, boldfaced "Earth Movement" exclusion which, according 
to State Farm, applies neatly in the instant case. 
The Millikens argue, contrariwise, that the policy _is_ ambig-
uous and that summary judgment therefore cannot be entered. A 
policy provision is ambiguous when it is susceptible to two or 
more constructions, both of which are reasonable. Furthermore, 
according to the Millikens, ambiguity must be "viewed from the 
perspective of a reasonable lay person." Delgado v. Heritage 
Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 272 (1984). A policy should 
not be subjected to the fine-toothed inspection of an attorney or 
insurance specialist, but instead should be read in its plain, 
everyday sense. 
The Millikens charge that the Policy is ambiguous in several 
fundamental respects. An initial ambiguity arises out of the 
provision, "We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the 
property described in Coverage A except as provided in SECTION 1-
LOSSES NOT INSURED." According to the Millikens, the operative 
phrase "accidental direct physical loss" is never defined in the 
Policy. Nor is the term "loss" itself defined. This is important 
because the Millikens allegedly assumed that they had taken out 
an "all-risk" policy. This assumption, they contend, is borne 
out by the presence in the Policy of some 60 individual exclu-
sions. The Millikens reason that only an "all-risk" policy would 
have such a comprehensive list of exclusions. Thus the structure 
of the Policy is ambiguous; the Policy is internally inconsist-
ent. In addition, the Millikens posit that the "Losses Not 
- 9 -
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Insured11 terminology is unclear. Each of the numbered exclu-
sions is followed with the declaration that "we do insure for 
any ensuing loss...." The term "ensuing loss1' is not defined 
in the Policy. And, more importantly, the Millikens assert that 
the diminution in value of their residence is just the sort of 
"ensuing loss" that a reasonable person would expect to be 
covered under this exception to the exclusion. Finally, the 
Millikens allege that State Farm apparently admitted the ambi-
guity of some of its own terms in responding to several pro-
pounded requests to admit. 
Having considered the arguments set out above, the court 
now finds that the Policy is sufficiently unambiguous to warrant 
reading it on its own terms. The Millikens1 objections are not 
persuasive; the Policyfs coverages and exclusions are clearly 
categorized, labeled and (to a reasonable degree) defined. It 
is an easy task to quibble over definitions and undefined terms, 
and it seems to the court that an approach like that taken by 
the Millikens could render any policy or provision arguably 
unintelligible. The fact that the coverage term "accidental 
direct physical loss" is undefined does not reveal a fatal 
ambiguity in the Policy, because in this case the operative term 
is the "earth movement" exclusion (which' is clearly set out). 
Thus, even assuming that the coverage term is unclear, the 
exclusion term is not. Moreover, the Policy is not internally 
inconsistent. The Millikens' argument here relies upon a good 
deal of bootstrapping in its effort to establish that just 
because an all-risk policy was sought, the presence of exclusions 
renders the Policy ambiguous. As admitted by Mr. Milliken 
- 10 -
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at his deposition, the Policy says what it says. (Milliken Dep., 
p. 71) If what the Policy says differs from that which it was 
expected to say, that discrepancy goes more to reasonableness 
of expectations or bad faith than to ambiguity (see below, 
pp. 11-13). Furthermore, although the Policy does not define 
"ensuing loss," it does indicate at the outset that only 
"physical" losses are covered. Diminution in value would there-
fore not be within a reasonable reading of "ensuing loss." 
Finally, having examined State Farm's responses to the Millikens1 
requests to admit, the court is satisfied that State Farm was not 
admitting in any way the ambiguity of the Policy. Moreover, as 
shown herein, the court is further satisfied that the Policy is 
not ambiguous. 
B. Reasonable Expectations 
Although in some senses it is true, as State Farm contends, 
that reasonableness of expectations is only an issue if the 
Policy is found to be ambiguous, the unusual facts of this case 
recommend that the issue be considered apart from the Policy's 
ambiguity. The gist of the Millikens1 argument here is that they 
applied for an "all-risk" or "all peril" policy but that they 
received a policy riddled with exclusions. When the Millikens 
submitted their application, they checked a box reading "all 
peril." They now maintain that by doing so they expected a more 
comprehensive policy than that which was issued. And because the 
actual Policy was mailed to their home while they were away on 
vacation, they could not inspect and object to the Policy until 
they returned. But by the time of their return the damage had 
occurred. Therefore, according to the Millikens, the scope of 
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coverage should be determined by their expectations at the tine 
of application, and not by the limited terms of the Policy. 
With respect to the first contention, the court is not con-
vinced that the Millikensf application did evince an intent to 
secure all-risk coverage. The box on the application which was 
marked for "all peril11 is included in the deductibles section, 
not the coverage section. Thus, it appears to the court that the 
Millikens were not indicating that they wanted all-risk coverage, 
but instead were simply agreeing to a certain deductible on all 
"perils" -- on all risks and occurrences which would otherwise 
give rise to claims. 
Moreover, State Farm points out that Mr. Milliken is an 
insurance lawyer who has prosecuted bad faith actions and is 
somewhat acquainted with soil mechanics, and then argues that he 
did get exactly what he bargained for in the Policy. In other 
words, he had no expectation of receiving all-risk coverage. In 
an excerpt from his recent deposition, Mr. Milliken indicates 
that he knew that some insurers were attempting to exclude con-
current causation coverage from their policies (in the aftermath 
of the Coalinga earthquake). (Milliken Dep., p. 70) From this 
knowledge, State Farm deduces that Mr. Milliken "is a very, very 
sophisticated individual who knew more than the insurance agent 
selling the policy." In another deposition excerpt, Milliken 
states: 
I mean, the policy speaks for itself. Whatever it says, 
it says. There was no collateral conversation about 
the meaning of the policy. I expected the policy to 
cover whatever it says it covered and we didn't discuss 
what their intent, was in doing it or what my intent was 
in buying it. I'bought the policy as it was sold. The 
product is the policy form and that's what I bought. 
- 12 -
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(Milliken Dep., p. 70) In light of this and other evidence, 
State Farm concludes that Mr. Milliken did not have a reasonable 
expectation of coverage for loss due to earth movement. The fact 
that he did not actually read the Policy until after the loss is 
therefore beside the point. To find otherwise, and to protect 
the Millikens on expectation grounds, would be to conjure up an 
untenable principle that exclusions will not be enforced until 
they are actually received and read by the insured. 
In light of the revealing deposition testimony quoted above, 
the court finds that the Millikens did not have a reasonable 
expectation of coverage for losses due to earth movement. The 
Millikens have not shown both that they intended to secure all-
risk coverage and that they communicated that intent to State 
Farm. And State Farm has shown that Mr. Milliken" (at least) 
expected only to be covered by the terms of the Policy as 
written. The court declines the Millikens' invitation to fashion 
a rule that premises the effectiveness of policy terms upon the 
condition that they are read. Such a novel rule would burden 
insurers with uncertain expectations and ultimately reward ignor-
ance and sloth on the part of policyholders. 
C. Reasonableness of Investigation 
A related reasonableness issue concerns whether State Farm's 
investigation of the Milliken claim was reasonable -- complete, 
accurate and undertaken in good faith. The Millikens assert 
strongly that State Farm's investigation was inadequate. That 
investigation, which consisted of a visual inspection by Garvin, 
an interview of the Millikens, and State Farm's later analysis of 
Garvin's site map and photos, was allegedly too cursory to have 
- 13 -
1 
2! 
3| 
4 
6 
mm 
i 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
been made in good faith. The Millikens challenge the competency 
of Garvin and fellow State Farm examiner Thomas O'Mahoney and 
allege that the Policy's implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing required at least a thorough study by a qualified civil 
5 1/ 
11
 engineer before coverage was denied.— According to the 
Millikens, a finding that earth movement has caused the subject 
property damage must be based upon a complete investigation by a 
civil engineer. Such an investigation, moreover, must be under-
taken in order to comport with an insurer's express and implied 
contractual duties (including its fiduciary duty). Here, say the 
Millikens, the failure of State Farm to consult with earth 
movement specialists constitutes an unreasonable investigation 
2/ 
and a breach of contractual duties.— 
State Farm argues that its investigation of the Milliken 
claim was reasonable, and it is with this argument that the court 
is in accord. Surely further studies by expert geologists would 
p ; 
The Millikens cite the fact that neither Garvin nor O'Mahoney 
is an engineer in support of a collateral accusation that the two 
examiners are practicing civil engineering without a license, in 
violation of California Business and Professions Code § 6730. 
This charge, in the court's estimation and in agreement with 
State Farm's reply, "borders on the ludicrous." Neither Garvin* 
nor O'Mahoney purports to be a civil engineer, and neither has 
held himself out so as to raise such a suspicion. By contrast, 
both do have experience in evaluating earth movement loss claims. 
And the opinion of an insurance examiner ought not to be discred-
ited merely because the subject about which he makes a determina-
tion lies within the special expertise of another professional 
such as an engineer. To hold otherwise would be to disqualify 
most examiners from rendering opinions on any subject except 
insurance -- an absurd result. 
2/ 
The Millikens here rely on the declaration of Jack Eagan,^  
a certified engineering geologist who has reviewed this case and 
has concluded: "I do not believe a sufficiently thorough investi-
gation was performed to cause anyone to render an opinion that 
the damage described was as a consequence of earth movement." 
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have lent credence to whatever conclusion was ultimately drawn by 
State Farm. But there is insufficient proof that State Farm's ov 
investigation was either too cursory or conducted in an incompe-
tent manner. Garvin was an experienced claims examiner who had 
"years of experience in investigating property losses resulting 
from earth movement." His on-site review of the damaged property 
together with his discussion with the Millikens and other State 
Farm examiners, led him to the reasonable conclusion that the 
damage would not have occurred absent some movement of the earth. 
D. Coverage 
The backbone of State Farm's summary judgment argument is 
its assertion that "NO COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS TO THE MILLIKENS 
[sic] PROPERTY EXISTS SINCE THE LOSS RESULTED FROM A PERIL 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE POLICY." After noting that an 
insurer has a right to limit coverage (see Continental Casualty 
Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 432 (1956)), 
State Farm argues that its investigation was not only reasonably 
carried out, it was also accurate. That is, the property damage 
at the Millikens' residence was caused by earth movement. 
37 ' 
In reaching this conclusion the court need not rely on the 
reports of the Milliken property prepared by the Santa Fe Soils 
Company and submitted by State Farm with its reply memo. These 
reports, which establish the probability that earth movement did 
cause the Millikens1 damage, would not be admissible for the pur-
pose of showing that State Farm's investigation was reasonable. 
Both parties have properly noted that the reasonableness of an 
insurer's denial of coverage must be determined on the basis of 
the facts known to the insurer at the time of the denial. Austero 
v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32 (1978). An 
insurer cannot use hindsight to justify its denial, and cannot 
justify its denial on grounds which differ from those originally 
invoked. As discussed above, however, the court finds the State 
Farm investigation to have been reasonable, even without having 
considered the Santa Fe reports. (See the discussion below on 
use of the reports to show coverage,) 
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State Farm's finding is corroborated by reports of soil 
tests conducted by Santa Fe Soils, Inc. in August and December 
of 1986. Those reports, released by Magistrate McKee only last 
Wednesday, were submitted with State Farm's reply memo.- The 
August report states: "Based upon our preliminary observations, 
it is our judgment that the indicated site distress is in response 
to differential settlement of the underlying fill soils." The 
December report includes, among its conclusions, the statement 
that "the noted site distress is a result of adverse local condi-
tions. The crack in the garage footings may reflect local consol-
idation of the utility trench backfills in that vicinity." It is 
the court's opinion that the observed "settlement" and "consoli-
dation" constitute "earth movement." 
Because Policy exclusion 2(b) of "Losses Not Insured" explic-
itly denies coverage for damages which would not have resulted but 
for earth movement, State Farm proposes that the question of cover 
age is easily resolved: no coverage. State Farm points out that' 
the earth movement exclusion is couched in broad terms. Any loss 
which would not have resulted but for earth movement is excluded, 
regardless of either the cause of the movement or whether some 
other force combined with the movement to cause the damage.— 
47 
Although, as mentioned in note 3 above, the reports may not 
be used to establish the reasonableness of State Farm's investi-
gation, they may be used to establish the cause of the damage to 
the Milliken property. There is no requirement that a court 
confine its inquiry to the evidence which is known to an insurer 
at the time that a claims decision is made. 
5/ 
Compare Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21 (1963) (coverage 
exists where included peril is efficient cause which sets in 
motion other excluded' perils, where the combination of perils 
causes loss) . 
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State Farm goes on to argue that the Millikens have not 
presented any facts which indicate a possibility of coverage. I 
a letter to Garvin shortly after State Farm's denial of coverage 
counsel for the Millikens speculated about some possible alter-
native explanations for the damage, which might have been covere* 
by the Policy. Examples included: 1) negligent placing and com-
pacting of fill material prior to construction of the Millikens1 
residence; 2) the introduction of water into weak or unstable 
formational material; and 3) the use of inadequate grading 
equipment. State Farm insists, however, that each of these 
scenarios would result in a similar denial of coverage. The 
first is excluded by sections 3(b) and 4 of "Losses Not Insured,f 
the second by sections 2(b), 2(c), 3 and 4, and the third by 
section 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(3). State Farm concludes: 
In short, there are no facts before this Court indicat-
ing any possibility that the applicable insurance policy 
issued to plaintiffs by State Farm provided coverage for |-}| any "direct accidental physical loss" not excluded by 
I Section I -- Losses Not Insured. Indeed, every cause 
-jo I posited by plaintiffs reflects an absence of coverage. 
On the strength of this conclusion State Farm requests the 
entry of summary judgment on the Millikens1 first five causes of 
action. The Millikens have not directly confronted State Farm's 
assertion that the damage was caused by earth movement. That 
is, the Millikens have not come forward with facts sufficient to 
€%A\\ overcome the proof that State Farm has offered (especially in the 
95 form of the Santa Fe soils reports). Rather, the Millikens have 
26 Proposed various alternative forces that could have caused the 
97 damage. None of these has been supported by the facts, however, 
23 and several have been shown to fall within Policy exclusions any-
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way. The court is therefore satisfied both that there no longe 
remains a genuine dispute over the facts of causation and that t 
explicit Policy exclusion for earth movement losses operates tc 
deny coverage. 
E. Validity of the Exclusions 
As if to anticipate one of the Millikens1 objections, Stat 
Farm included in its moving papers an argument that the Policy*, 
exclusions are not contrary to public policy. According to Stat 
Farm, an insurer need not cover all risks, and certain risks ma: 
be excluded at the insurer's behest. If the court were to find 
the subject exclusions to violate public policy, then a parade 
of horribles would follow: State Farm "will become insolvent:" 
and premiums "will have to be increased to a point that they wil 
be out of reach to virtually all homeowners.11 The private con-* 
tractual agreement will have been tampered with, and financial 
interests of State Farm's prior insureds' will be jeopardized. 
So as not to disappoint, the Millikens do argue that the 
subject exclusions are void as against public policy. But even 
if the presence of their argument was expected, its substance is 
somewhat inventive. Rather than positing policy grounds for 
invalidating the exclusions, the Millikens here revive their 
"reasonable expectations" analysis (presented above). Because, 
they argue, standard-form insurance policies are adhesion con-
tracts, an insurer must bring to the insured's attention any 
provisions that would frustrate the coverage that is sought. 
Exclusions must be conspicuous, plain and clear. Gray v. Zurich,< 
65 Cal. 2d 263, 271 (1966). Moreover, say the Millikens, even 
clear exclusions are not effective until the policy is delivered. 
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unless they were adequately explained at the time of applicatior 
Logan v, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988 
995 (1974)• In this case, the earth movement exclusion (which i 
apparently a recent addition to such policies) was not explainei 
to the Millikens at the time of their application. Therefore, 
because the Millikens presumed they were securing all-risk cover 
age and because State Farm had only recently rewritten its 
policies to exclude earth movement losses, the Millikens assert 
that their reasonable expectation was that the Policy to be issue 
would cover the sort of loss incurred. At the very least, State 
Farm had a duty to inform the Millikens that earth movement woulc 
not be covered. 
These arguments merely restate the "expectations1' claims dis 
cussed above, and for the reasons previously explained the court 
finds them to be unmeritorious. The record does not reflect any 
evidence of overreaching on the part of State Farm. Instead, it 
reveals that Mr. Milliken was a sophisticated buyer who was aware 
of certain restrictive trends in insurance policy writing and who 
therefore probably expected less than complete coverage for such 
occurrences as earth movements. Furthermore, because the precise 
date of the damage is unknown, the facts could support an infer-
ence that the Policy was delivered by the time of the damage. 
Then the exclusion would have been effective even though it had 
not been explained at the time of application and even though the 
Millikens had not yet read the Policy. State Farm would then have 
done all possible to put the Millikens on notice of the exclusions 
In any case, no authority has been brought to the court's atten-
tion for striking down the earth movement exclusion on its face. 
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F. The Milliken Claims 
On the basis of the above discussion, the court finds the 
first five Milliken causes of action to be unmeritorious and 
vulnerable to State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Becaus 
the discussion proceeded along general lines and did not addres 
the counts individually, the causes of action are again set out 
and briefly commented upon below. 
1. Breach of Contract 
The claim for breach of contract must fail because, as 
developed at length, the court finds that earth movement did cau: 
the damage to the Millikens' property, that claims for earth 
movement were excluded from the Policy, and that State Farm's 
investigation of the claim was reasonable and sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the contract. 
2. Breach of the Implied Covenant 
-tgll of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
I*- ' The Millikens argue that State Farm's denial of coverage 
after only a cursory inspection of the damaged property, where 
such inspection was conducted by a claims agent who "hasn't 
even taken a basic geology course,11 constituted a breach of 
the Policy's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is read 
into every contract of insurance. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818 (1979), cert, denied and appeal 
dismissed, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Egan, 445 U.S. 912 
(1980). The covenant requires the insurer to act fairly and 
9711 reasonably with respect to claims of its insureds. According 
2g|i to the Millikens, an insurer must not seek to deny claims, but 
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muse act so as to find a basis for paying a portion of a claim, 
even if the insurer believes there to be no coverage. Further-
more, good faith requires an insurer to make a thorough investi-
gation of the grounds for a denial of coverage. Egan, supra, 
at 819. 
State Farm argues, and this court has found, that the inves 
tigation of the Milliken claim was reasonable and undertaken in 
good faith. Garvin was an experienced claims agent who had oftei 
investigated cases involving property damage caused by earth 
movement. There has been no breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
2A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
The Millikens rely again on Egan, supra, for the propositior 
that insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries and therefore 
owe their insureds a special duty of care. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 
820; Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656 
(1979). In the instant case, the Millikens have alleged three 
breaches of this special duty: 1) the failure to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the possible causes of the damage; 
2) the failure to point out the "earth movement" exclusion in 
the Policy (a recent addition to such policies); and 3) the 
failure to point out that an "accidental direct physical loss" 
policy is not the same as an all-risk policy. 
The court finds that State Farm has not breached its fiduc-
iary duties because: 1) its investigation was sufficient, 2) the 
"earth movement" exception was communicated to the Millikens via 
the clear Policy language; and 3) the Millikens did not have a 
reasonable expectation of all-risk coverage. . 
- 21 -
3f 4^  Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation 
The Millikens' third and fourth causes of action are for 
fraud anci negligent misrepresentation. These claims purported!: 
encompass the triable fact issues of whether or not oral misrej?-
II resentati-ons were made to the Millikens and whether the Millikefl 
justifiably relied on those representations. Furthermore, the$* 
7 I] claims (which are identical, except that the latter does not 
require proof of intent to defraud) will be cognizable regard-" 1 
less of how the coverage issue is resolved. If coverage is 
denied, Che Millikens will assert that they were led to believe 
that the Policy would cover all risks. And if coverage is foun<ii 
the Millikens will retain their action on the basis of the 
implied Representation that State Farm would conduct a thorough 
investigation of all possible bases for coverage and pay any 
relief due. According to the Millikens, there is a triable 
issue he^e in any event. 
*'|| Consistent with the findings made above, however, the 
court is convinced that State Farm did not misrepresent either 
the Policy's coverage or the extent of the investigation whicfr 
would be provided upon the bringing of a claim for indemni-
fication/ Neither does the court find evidence that the 
Millikens reasonably relied to tYieir detriment on represen-
tations made by State Farm. 
5. Violation of Insurance Code Sections 790.02 and 790.03 
The Millikens further allege that State Farm's unreasonable 
procedures for investigating claims of its policyholders violate 
California Insurance Code sections 790.02 and 790.03 (especially 
sections 790.03(h)(3) and 790.03(h)(5)). Section 790.02" prohibits 
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the commission of "an unfair or deceptive act or practice in th< 
business of insurance." Sections 790.03(h)(3) and 790.03(h)(5) 
prohibit "[fjailing to adopt and implement reasonable standards 
for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising 
under insurance policies" and "[njot attempting in good faith tc 
effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in 
which liability has become reasonably clear." West's Ann. Cal. 
Ins. Code §§ 790.02, 790.03 (1972 and 1986 S u p p . ) . 
Because the court has found that the State Farm procedures 
are reasonable and have been implemented in good faith in the 
instant case, and in the absence of any showing of an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice, summary judgment on the Millikens' 
fifth cause of action is warranted. 
III. 
The Sixth Cause of Action 
The Millikens' sixth cause of action is for "negligence." 
Inasmuch as this cause cannot be sustained unless the court 
determines that State Farm has breached some duty, and given 
the above discussion which establishes that State Farm has not 
breached any of its duties, the court now finds that State 
Farm's oral motion for summary judgment on this cause of action 
is well taken. 
IV. 
The Emotional Distress Claim 
As their seventh cause of action, the Millikens allege that 
"State Farm pursued an outrageous course of conduct, intention-
ally and/or recklessly, proximately causing plaintiffs' severe 
emotional distress, shock and other highly unpleasant emotions." 
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As their eighth cause of action, the Millikens allege that it was 
foreseeable that they would suffer severe emotional distress and 
shock if State Farm improperly handled their claim. What is 
more, such "severe emotional distress, shock and other highly 
unpleasant emotions" were suffered by the Millikens. 
State Farm has separately argued for summary judgment on 
these causes of action. Regarding the claim for intentional 
infliction, State Farm argues that its conduct (i.e. the conduct 
of everyone at State Farm who was associated with the Millikens' 
Policy and claim) was not "so outrageous that no person in a 
civilized society should be required to bear it." Soto v. Roval 
Globe Ins. Corp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 420, 430 (1986). The viola-
tion of statutory duties alone (if such violation were found) 
would not constitute the sort of conduct which is actionable 
as an intentional infliction of emotional distress. I_d. at 
431. Because, according to State Farm, this court may find as 
a matter of law that the conduct was not outrageous, summary 
judgment is appropriate. 
The Millikens oppose summary judgment on the intentional 
infliction count on two grounds. First, they note that abuse of 
a protected relationship by one in a relative position of power 
may amount to outrageous conduct. Second, they urge that the 
outrageousness of State Farm's conduct is a question for the 
jury in any case. 
As State Farm has pointed out in its reply, however, the 
issue goes to the jury only if the situation presented is one 
"[w]here reasonable men may differ." See Alcorn v. Anbro 
Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499 (1970). And in the 
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instant case the court is not satisfied that reasonable people 
could differ. State Farm's conduct, although perhaps falling 
short of an ideal of informativeness or thoroughness, was not 
sufficiently outrageous that a jury could find for the Milliken 
on this issue. Summary judgment may therefore be entered on th 
seventh cause of action. 
In moving for summary judgment on the eighth cause of 
action, State Farm summarizes the standard recently discussed 
by the California Supreme Court in Ochoa v. Superior Court, 
39 Cal. 3d 159 (1985): a cause of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress lies where it is foreseeable that 
emotional shock would result from an abnormal event. See also 
Soto, supra, at 433. The court in Soto found that a failure 
timely to pay workers'' compensation benefits was not an "abnormal 
event." Similarly in the instant case the failure to indemnify 
the Millikens would not support .a claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress. 
The Millikens attempt to rehabilitate their claim by argu-
ing that State Farm's mishandling of the instant claim was a 
breach of the parties' special relationship of trust and confi-
dence. Although there may have been such a trust relationship 
between State Farm and the Millikens in this case, the court 
finds that the facts simply do not support a finding of a breach 
of that relationship. Nor do the facts show either that the 
Millikens' purported emotional shock was foreseeable or that 
the shock resulted from an abnormal event. Summary judgment 
must therefore be entered in favor of State Farm on the 
Millikens' eighth cause of action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Upon due consideration of the parries' memoranda and 
exhibits, the arguments advanced at hearing and for the reasons 
set forth above, this court hereby grants the motion of defendant 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company for summary judgment on all 
eight of the causes of action stated in the complaint of plain-
tiffs Jeannie and James Milliken. 
DATED: March 26, 1987. 
'WILLIAM «. ENRIGHT, JuSge 
United States District Court 
Copies to: 
Plaintiffs 
Defendants 
- 9A _ 
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KNAPP. PETERSEN * CLARKE 
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UNIVCRSAL CITY, CALIFORNIA 91608 
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ORIGINAL FILEO 
DEC 3 1 1933 
COUNTY CLERK 
Attorneys forPlaintiff and Defendant STATE FARM FIRE AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois corporation 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
JOHN R. BAYLESS, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY,- etc. , 
Defendants. 
AND ALL CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS. 
CASE NO. WEC 8 713 5 
(Consolidated with 
WEC 090135) 
PftQPQQCP ORDER £i 
On December 5, 1986, defendant State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company1s (State Farm) motion for summary judgment, 
or in the alternative, for summary adjudication of issues, came 
on regularly for hearing in Department R of the above-entitled 
court, before the Honorable David M. Rothman, Judge presiding. 
Barry Bartholomew appeared on behalf of plaintiff and 
defendant State Farm. Neil Rockwood appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs and defendants John R. Bayless and Monica R. Bayless. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion for summary 
adjudication of issues is granted as to issues 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
as follows: 
1. The applicable insurance policy excludes coverage 
for earth movement; 
2. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless 
of the cause of the earth movement; 
3. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless 
of whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence 
with earth movement to cause the loss, said causes including 
but not being limited to, surface water, sub-surface water, 
settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion of the residence or 
foundation thereof, or the conduct, act, failure to act or 
decision of any person, group, organization or governmental 
body whether such be intentional, wrongful, negligent or without 
fault; 
4. There is no coverage under the applicable policy 
of insurance for property damage ensuing from the Big Rock Mesa 
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landslide, save for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided 
for in the policy. 
The above four issues are deemed established and the 
action shall proceed as to the issues remaining. 
The court denied State Farm's issue number five on 
the grounds that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether 
there was any misrepresentation made to the Baylesses concerning 
whether the policy issued on the Seaboard residence was similar 
to those issued to the Baylesses on other properties owned by 
them, and whether there was a misrepresentation as to the coverage 
afforded by the policy issued on the Seaboard residence. 
DEC 3 1 1986 
DATED. mj&&m {&• LnvlO M. flU'iHulAN 
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
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(818) 508- -5000 
ORIGINAL FILED 
Attorneys for D e f e n d a n t STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUAIifl^qpgDAfiUf 
COUNTY CLEBIS 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Case No. WEC 104 457 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES 
E^ MRQPODDD ] 
ROBERT 
vs. 
SCOTT TURRILL, etc., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
STATE FARM FIRE AND ) 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
i On April 17, 1987, in Department 7*K" of the above-entitled 
court V\ defendant STATE FARM F^RE P&V //CASUALTY COMPANY'S 
Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary 
Adjudication of Issues came on regularly for hearing. Based 
on the moving, opposing and reply papers, and oral arguments 
by both parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
The motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Summary Adjudication is granted as to the following 
ten issues. At any trial of this action, the below specified 
issues shall be deemed established and the action 'shall proceed 
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as to the issues remaining. 
1. The insurance policy applicable from 7/25/85 to 
7/25/86 excludes coverage for earth movement; 
2. Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable 
from 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 regardless of the cause of the earth 
movement; 
3. Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable 
from 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 regardless of whether other causes 
acted concurrently or in any sequence with earth movement 
to cause the loss, said causes including but not being limited 
to, surface water, subsurface water, settling, shrinking, 
bulging or expansion of the residence or foundation thereof, 
or the conduct, act, failure to act or decision of any person, 
group, organization or governmental body whether such be 
intentional, wrongful, negligent or without fault, 
4. There is no coverage under the policy applicable 
form 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 of insurance for property damage 
ensuing from landslides in Potrero Canyon, if any, save 
for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided for in the 
policy. 
5. The insurance policy applicable from 7/25/83 to 
7/25/85 excludes coverage for earth movement; 
6. Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable 
from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85 regardless of the cause of the 
earth movement; 
7. Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable 
from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85 regardless of whether other causes 
acted concurrently or in any sequence with earth movement 
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to cause the loss, said causes including but not being limited 
to, surface water, subsurface water, settling, shrinking, 
bulging or expansion of the residence or foundation thereof, 
or the conduct, act, failure to act or decision of any person, 
group, organization or governmental body whether such be 
intentional, wrongful, negligent or without fault; 
8. There is no coverage under the policy applicable 
from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85 of insurance for property damage 
ensuing from landslides in Potrero Canyon, if any, save 
for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided for in the 
policy; 
9. The policies in effect from July 25, 1983 through 
July 25, 1986, do no insure against loss caused by the actions 
of third parties. Where a proximate cause of damage is 
third party acts or inaction, such acts are not an insured 
risk within these policies. 
10. There is no coverage under the policies in effect 
from July 25, 1983 through July 25, 1986 for losses, if 
any, proximately caused by the actions of third parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above ruling is made 
without prejudice to defendant bringing another motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that the only policy sued 
on was for the policy periods July 25, 1983 through July 
25, 1986, and summary judgment should be granted by reason 
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of the above adjudication of issues. Plaintiff is directed 
in any opposition to address whether the July 25, 1978 through 
July 24, 1983 policies are a part of this lawsuit. 
DATED: WW * 1987 
RICHARD G. KAR319 
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
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6. plaintiffs' attorney shall be awarded 
a reasonable attorney's fee under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Adjudication of Plaintiff Crawford 
With respect to plaintiff Crawford's 
claim. This Court grants summary judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff Crawford with 
respect to his claim regarding DISCO's re-
fusal to grant his clearance because of his 
"homosexual activity and susceptibility to 
coercion." Use of these factors alone vio-
lates Crawford's rights under the equal 
protection clause. With respect to Craw-
ford's other claims, the Court grants sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants. 
Defense Central Index of Investigations 
Claim 
Because this claim is not included in 
plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, the 
Court may not consider it. 
Accordingly, good cause appearing, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment is granted in part and denied in part 
and defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment is granted in part and denied in part 
2. defendants' policy of subjecting 
plaintiffs to expanded investigations and 
mandatory adjudications is declared to vio-
late plaintiffs' rights under the first and 
fifth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution; 
3. defendants' reasons for denying 
plaintiff Dooling a Secret clearance and 
subjecting him to further investigation and 
adjudication is declared to violate plaintiff 
Dooling's rights under the first and fifth 
amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion; 
4. defendants' reasons concerning ho-
mosexuality for denying plaintiff Crawford 
a Secret clearance are declared to violate 
plaintiff Crawford's rights under the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion; 
5. defendants are enjoined from sub-
jecting plaintiffs to expanded investiga-
tions, mandatory adjudications, or any oth-
er procedures based on plaintiffs' sexual 
orientation, homosexual activity, or mem-
bership in a gay organization; 
(O i«YNUMBt*SYSTEM> 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Steven M. MARTIN and Peggy D. 
Martin, individuals, Defendants. 
Steven M. MARTIN and Peggy D. 
Martin, individuals, 
Counter-claimants, 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Counter-defendants. 
No. CV 86-6672 (CBM). 
United States District Court, 
CD. California. 
July 9, 1987. 
Memorandum Order Granting Summary 
Judgment Oct 20,1987. 
Homeowners' insurer sued for declara-
tory judgment that damage to insureds' 
home was not covered by policy. Insureds 
counterclaimed for insurer's alleged refus-
al to pay under terms of policy, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and violations of California Insur-
ance Code. The District Court, Consuelo 
Bland Marshall, J., held that: (1) language 
in homeowners' policy, providing that poli-
cy provided no coverage for any loss that 
would not have occurred "but for" an ex-
cluded event regardless of whether covered 
events may have contributed thereto, did 
not violate any provision of California In-
surance Code, so as to be enforceable as 
written, and (2) insurer did not breach duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment granted. 
1380 668 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
1. Insurance <3=>146.7(8) 
Absent some ambiguity, court could 
not "construe" exclusions in homeowners' 
policy so as to provide coverage, but had to 
enforce exclusions as written. 
2. Insurance <£=»427 
Language in homeowners' policy, pro-
viding that policy provided no coverage for 
loss that would not have occurred "but 
for" excluded event, regardless of whether 
covered events may have contributed there-
to, did not violate any provision of Califor-
nia Insurance Code, so as to be enforceable 
as written. West's Ann.Cal.Ins.Code 
§ 530. 
3. Insurance «=>602.2(1) 
Homeowners' insurer which denied 
coverage when covered home began to 
crack and bulge, on ground that damage 
would not have occurred but for excluded 
events such as earth movement, did not 
breach its duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, where there was no indication that 
insurer's investigation was inadequate or 
substandard or that insurer unduly delayed 
by waiting three months in order to investi-
gate claim. 
Jeffrey H. Leo, Daniel L. Gardner, Doug-
las R. Irvine, Parkinson, Wolf, Lazar & Leo, 
Los Angeles, CaL, for plaintiff. 
Paul B. Witmer, Jr., P.C., Santa Ana, 
CaL, for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF PLAINTIFF 
CONSUELO BLAND MARSHALL, Dis-
trict Judge. 
This matter is before the Court on plain-
tiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Compa-
ny's motion for summary judgment A 
hearing was held on June 1, 1987 before 
Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United 
States District Judge, presiding. The 
Court having reviewed the pleadings, mov-
ing papers, oppositions, replies, all exhibits 
presented by the parties, all pertinent au-
thority and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, hereby issues the following memo-
randum order. 
I. FACTS 
This action is based on denial by plaintiff 
State Farm of a claim by defendants under 
their homeowners insurance policy. 
Defendants Steven and Peggy Martin 
purchased the residential property that is 
the subject of the insurance claim in early 
January, 1984. On January 4, 1984, de-
fendants purchased a homeowners insur-
ance policy from State Farm insurance. 
The policy issued was contained in Form 
Policy 7175. 
Sometime between May 5, 1984 and Au-
gust 6, 1985, defendants noticed cracking 
and other related problems on their proper-
ty, including bulging, corrosion and tilting. 
On January 4, 1985, the policy was re-
newed as contained in Form Policy 7185. 
On August 6,1985, defendants submitted 
a claim to State Farm for cracking and 
related problems on their property, and on 
September 4, 1985 they met with Chiquita 
Ector, State Farm claims representative, in 
their home, and Ector inspected the premis-
es. 
On October 16, 1985, Jim Damm, State 
Farm claims superintendent sent defend-
ants a "reservation of rights" letter setting 
forth possible exclusions under the policy. 
Sometime in October of 1985, Tim Welch, 
a senior engineering geologist at the time 
employed by American Earth Technologies, 
investigated the cause of damage to de-
fendants' property at the request of State 
Farm. 
In his report to State Farm, dated Octo-
ber 21, 1985, Welch stated the potential 
causes of distress to be one or more of the 
following: 
1. Settlement of subgrade soil; 
2. Expansion of subgrade soil; 
3. Sulfate crystaKzation within the sub-
grade soil; 
4. Sulfate attack to the cement founda-
tions; 
5. Poor foundation construction. 
STATE FARM FIRfi AND CAS. CO. v. MARTIN 
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State Farm sent a copy of this report to 
the defendants' attorney on September 15, 
1986. 
Subsequently, Welch states in his decla-
ration, further tests were conducted and 
further investigative work done, which led 
him to conclude that sulfate crystalization 
was not, in fact, a potential cause of the 
damage to the Martin's property. 
State Farm filed the complaint in this 
action on October 15,1986, seeking declara-
tory relief, including a ruling that the in-
surance contract does not provide coverage 
for the losses contained in defendants claim 
against the insurance policy. 
Defendants filed an answer and counter-
claim on November 4, 1986. The counter-
claims included the following: 
1. Refusal to pay under terms of the 
policy; 
2. Breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; 
3. Violation of California Insurance 
Code Section 530; 
4. Bad faith conduct in violation of Cali-
fornia Insurance Code Section 790.03(h). 
II. PARTIES' CONTENTIONS 
Plaintiff contends that all potential 
causes of the trauma to the defendants' 
property were expressly excluded under 
their insurance policy. Plaintiff specifical-
ly cites in its moving papers to Form Policy 
7175, section I, at 1(f), 2(b), (c)(3), and 3; 
and Form Policy 7185 Section I, at 1(f), (h), 
(i), 2(b), (cX3), 3(aXb), and 4(a), (b). These 
restrictions are essentially the same in both 
years. 
Plaintiff argues that the language con-
tained in these sections of the policy is 
explicit and lists earth movement, under-
ground water, contamination and deteriora-
tion as causative events which are express-
ly excluded. Plaintiff further argues that 
the contract is unambiguous in its explana-
tion that resulting damage which would not 
have occurred in the absence of one of 
these excluded events is also excluded from 
coverage, no matter whether or not other 
concurrent causes exist Plaintiff contends 
that under California caselaw it has an 
absolute right to limit coverage under an 
insurance policy and that because defend-
ants had a copy of the policy at all times 
herein, they are charged with knowledge of 
the terms of that policy. Moreover, plain-
tiff explains that defendants did not pay 
for an "all-risk" policy; to require plaintiff 
State Farm to pay for excluded perils 
would, in turn, require the company to 
raise the premimums on all such restrictive 
policies in order to stay financially sound; 
this would harm the group of all insureds. 
Plaintiff contends that because it did not 
unreasonably delay in investigating defend-
ants' insurance claim, and because there 
was a reasonable basis for denial of plain-
tiffs claim, it is not in violation of Califor-
nia Insurance Code § 790.03. 
Plaintiff asserts that in drafting the in-
surance policy in question, the company did 
not disregard or violate California Insur-
ance Code § 530. Finally, plaintiff con-
tends that all counterclaims are time 
barred by the one-year limitations period 
imposed by the policy. 
Defendants, in opposition, contend that 
based on California law, the policy must be 
construed narrowly against the insurer and 
so as, if semantically possible, to provide 
indemnity to the insured. 
Moreover, defendants contend that this 
is a situation where coverage should exist 
pursuant to California Insurance Code 
§ 530 because the earth movement and oth-
er excluded causes were concurrent with a 
non-excluded cause of damage—sulfate 
crystalization. 
Defendants claim that summary judg-
ment against their counter-claims based on 
the one-year contractual limitations period 
is improper because theere is a triable issue 
of fact as to what losses are affected by 
the limitation, when the limitations period 
commenced, and whether State Farm is 
estopped to assert or has waived the limita-
tions defense. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Ambiguity 
[1] Defendants cite Safeco Insurance 
Co. v. Guy ton, 471 F.Supp. 1126 (C.D.Cal 
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1979) for the rule of strict construction 
against insurers, i.e., the proposition that 
"[ijf any ambiguity or uncertainty exists an 
insurnce policy is construed strictly against 
the insurer and most liberally in favor of the 
insured." Safeco, 471 F.Supp. at 1129. 
However, what plaintiff fails to note is that 
the case goes on to explain that the rule 
. . . is subject to an important limitation, 
. . . it is applicable only when the policy 
actually presents such uncertainty, ambi-
guity, inconsistence or doubt. In the ab-
sence thereof, the courts have no alterna-
tive but to give effect to the contract of 
insurance as executed by the parties. 
Accordingly, when the terms of the pol-
icy are plain and explicit the courts 
will not indulge in a forced construc-
tion so as to fasten a liability on the 
insurance company which it has not 
assumed. Safeco, 1471 F.Supp. at 1130. 
In Safeco, the Court, in fact, found that 
there was no coverage. Moreover, the poli-
cy involved in Safeco was what is termed 
an "all-risk" policy; its coverage was more 
broad, in general, than that under the poli-
cy currently at issue. 
The language of the policy herein is ex-
plicit as to exduwons. The Court must 
give full effect to the policy as written. 
Defendants tore presented no evidence 
to dispute plaintiffs allegations and sup-
porting declarations that defendants had 
timely received copies of the reservation of 
rights letter, detailing exclusions, following 
submission of their claim. Nor have de-
fendants made allegations or provided any 
evidence that representations were ever 
made by plaintiff that the policy purchased 
would be an all-risk policy. 
B. Coverage 
[2] The language of this policy form is 
unambiguous as to the sections limiting 
coverage. In Form 7175, effective from 
January 1984 to January 1985, the policy 
specifically states in "Section I," "Loss not 
insured" at 1(f) that there is no coverage 
for loss "consisting of, or directly and im-
mediately caused by, one or more of the 
following: 
f. wear and tear, marring; . . . deterio-
ration; . . . contamination; . . . settling, 
cracking, shrinking, bulging, or expan-
sion of pavements, patios, foundations, 
walls, floors, roof, or ceiling; .. ." (Ector 
Decl., Exh. 12 at 0023). 
Moreover, the policy specifically states 
that it does not insure for any loss that 
would not have occurred in the absence of 
certain events, including earth movement 
and water damage (Section I, 2(b)f, (c), 
"regardless of . . . any other causes, or 
whether other causes acted concurrently or 
in any sequence with the excluded event to 
produce the loss." (Id.) 
Defendants, in opposition, cite Sabella z>. 
Wisler, 59 Cal.2d 21, 27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 
P.2d 889 (1963), for the proposition that 
this language is violative of California In-
surance Code § 530. However, in Sabella 
the insurer attempted to rely on California 
Insurance Code § 532, alone, to argue that 
because one cause or "peril" was excluded, 
the loss would not have occurred in the 
absence of that peril, the loss is automati-
cally exempted, even if another covered 
cause directly led to the loss. The Court in 
Sabella was focusing on interpretation of 
Cal.Ins.Code § 530, and held that the insur-
er could not rely on section 532 alone, but 
must read that section in conjunction with 
section 530, which provides: 
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a 
peril insured against was the proximate 
cause, although a peril not contemplated 
by the contract may have been a remote 
cause of the loss; but he is not liable for 
a loss of which the peril insured against 
was only a remote cause. 
The court in Sabella was addressing the 
construction and applicability of section 532 
of the statute. Here, the insurance policy 
itself expressly and explicitly includes in its 
language a provision which states that for 
certain causes, the "but for" argument 
raised by the insurer in Sabella wiH apply^ 
to limit coverage. While the court in
 r'B&*!' 
bella would not extend the statute so as tfr 
imply such restrictions on coverage of coif1 
current causes, there is nothing m th'elft^ " 
denying the insurer the right to indu8&J 
such language as a term of the contract 
itself. The insurer, here State Farm, haff1 
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an absolute right to limit the coverage con-
tained in the language of the policy itself. 
"An insurance company has the right to 
limit the coverage of a policy issued by it 
and when it has done so, the plain language 
of the limitation must be respected." Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Con-
struction Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 432, 296 P.2d 
801 (1956). 
The only evidence provided by defend-
ants in opposition to the motion for summa-
ry judgemnt are portions of the transcript 
of the deposition of Tim Welch, the geo-
technical expert who investigated the prem-
ises for State Farm and who supplied a 
declaration in support of State Farm's mo-
tion. These portions of the deposition only 
show that sulfates were considered at the 
time of the intital investigation to have 
been a potential contributing factor. This 
does not impeach or contradict the declara-
tion of Welch, who stated that sulfate crys-
talization was, at first, listed as a potential 
cause. Moreover, this evidence in no way 
negates the fact that even if sulfate crys-
talization was a potential cause, the broad 
exclusionary language of the contract 
would disallow coverage. Defendants have 
provided no independent evidence of their 
own which in any way negates the evidence 
presented by plaintiff that excluded perils, 
including earth movement, settling and de-
terioration, were the primary causes of the 
damage. 
In Celotex v. Myrtle Nell Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
(1986), the Supreme Court clarified the 
standard to be used in analyzing motions 
for summary judgment brought pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The 
Supreme Court held that the language of 
Rule 56(c) requires entry of summary judg-
ment "against a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial", assuming that 
party has had adequate time for discovery. 
106 S.Ct at 2552-53. The Supreme Court 
explained its reasoning by stating that "a 
complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's 
case necessarily renders all other facts im-
material." Id. at 2552. 
668 F.Supp.—31 
Here, defendants' complete failure to 
provide any evidence in support of its dis-
pute as to the causes of damage to their 
home, coupled with the Court's duty to give 
effect to the unambiguous contractual lan-
guage, necessitates that the Court grant 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on 
these issues. 
C. Counterclaims 
Based on the foregoing analysis, includ-
ing inter alia,, the fact that the language 
of the insurance policy is unambiguous as 
to exclusions and the fact that defendants 
have failed in their burden of proof to 
provide any evidence to negate the alleged 
fact that earth movement was proximate 
cause of the damage to defendants' dwell-
ing, the Court finds that under the Celotex 
standard defendants have failed to provide 
any evidence that State Farm's failure to 
pay on defendants' claim was a breach of 
the policy or that in drafting the language 
of the policy in question State Farm 
breached California Insurance Code § 530. 
1. Bad Faith; California Insurance 
Code § 790.03(h) 
California Insurance Code § 790.03 pro-
vides a list of descriptions of prohibited 
actions by insurance companies; commis-
sion of these acts is statutorily defined as 
unfair and deceptive act or practice. Sec-
tion (h) provides a list of fifteen activities 
considered to be unfair claims settlement 
practices. 
Defendants have provided the Court with 
no evidence that State Farm has violated 
any of these provisions or has otherwise 
acted in bad faith. 
2. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Deal-
ing 
[3] In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance 
Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal Rptr. 480, 510 
P.2d 1032 (1973), the California Supreme 
Court explained when a cause of action for 
breach of duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing would lie. 
That responsibility [the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing] is not the require-
ment mandated by the terms of the poli-
1384 668 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
cy itself—to defend, settle, or pay. It is 
the obligation, deemed to be imposed by 
the law, under which the insurer must 
act fairly and in good faith discharging 
its contractual responsibilities. Where in 
doing so, it fails to deal fairly and in 
good faith with its insured by refusing, 
without proper cause, to compensate its 
insured for a loss covered by the policy, 
such conduct may give rise to a cause of 
action in tort for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. at 574, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 
1032. 
Defendants have provided no evidence 
that State Fair breached its duty in the 
process of investigating and ultimately de-
nying defendants' claim. Based on the evi-
dence and the allegations before the Court, 
there is no indication that the investigation 
by State Farm was inadequate or substand-
ard or that State Farm unduly delayed in 
the investigation process. 
3. Contractual Limitations Period 
In support of its motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiff State Farm has argued 
that defendants' counterclaims are untime-
ly under the one-year limitations period im-
posed by the language of the insurance 
policy. Defendants essentially raise an eq-
uiiatte-argument that plaintiff is estopped 
from raising this defense because it did not 
inform defendants that their claim was de-
nied until after the one-year period had, 
based on plaintiffs argument, already 
passed. Defendants argue, moreover, that 
this creates a question of fact as to wheth-
er, under the policy, the limitations period 
should be tolled, based on equitable consid-
erations. The Court does not address this 
issue because summary judgment is hereby 
granted against the counterclaims based on 
the unambiguous language of the contract, 
irrespective of whether the counterclaims 
were timely. 
For the foregoing reasons, summary 
judgment is GRANTED in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendants. 
Terry Dean ROGAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal 
corporation; Richard Crotsley and Les-
ter Slack, individually and in their offi-
cial capacities as detectives of the L.A. 
P.D., Defendants. 
No. CV 85-0989 RJK (Mcx). 
United States District Court, 
CD. California. 
July 20, 1987. 
Arrestee brought action against city 
and two police officers, after being arrest* 
ed five separate times on basis of informa-
tion contained in record entered in national 
computer arrest warrant notification sys-
tem by officers, concerning robbery-mur-
der arrest warrant issued in arrestee's 
name. Suspect in robbery-murders had 
been using arrestee's name after obtaining 
arrestee's birth certificate. On cross mo-
tions for summary judgment on issue of 
liability, the District Court, Kelleher, Sen-
ior District Judge, held that (1) arrestee 
was unconstitutionally deprived of his liber-
ty during four arrests and detentions due 
to lack of particular description in record 
and maintenance and multiple reentry of 
record without amendment after arrestee's 
initial misidentification as suspect; (2) 
city's failure to adopt policy or train and 
supervise its officers concerning particular 
description requirement and necessity of 
amendment of record involved pattern of 
gross negligence;, and (3) officers were en-
titled to qualified immunity. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Civil Rights <*»13.7 
Plaintiff must show* in order to states 
civil rights deprivation claim against munic-> 
ipality, that he suffered deprivation of con^ 
8titutionally protected interest arid that1 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
STEVEN M. MARTIN; PEGGY D. 
MARTIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 87-6109 
D.C. No. 
CV-86-6672-CBM 
OPINION 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California 
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding 
Argued and Submitted 
January 12, 1989—Pasadena, California 
Filed April 10, 1989 
Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William C. Canby, Jr. and 
Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges. 
Per Curiam 
SUMMARY 
Insurance 
Affirming a summary judgment for an insurer, the court 
held that the Insurance Code does not prohibit inclusion of a 
concurrent causation provision that excludes coverage. 
3611 
3612 STATE FARM V. MARTIN 
A provision of a policy issued by appellee State Farm Fire 
and Casualty excluded from coverage losses occurring as a 
result of earth movement, whether or not other causes acted 
concurrently to produce the loss. Appellants Steven and 
Peggy Martin argued that such a provision in their policy vio-
lated Insurance Code § 530, which provides that an insurer is 
liable for losses caused concurrently by proximate and remote 
causes. 
[1] An insurance company has the right to limit the cover-
age in a policy it issues. Insurance Code section 530 provides 
guidance when a policy is silent on concurrent causation; it 
does not prohibit inclusion of a provision similar to the con-
current causation provision in the State Farm policy. 
COUNSEL 
Paul B. Witmer, Santa Ana, California, for the defendants-
appellants. 
Peter Abrahams, Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, Encino, Califor-
nia, for the plaintiff-appellee. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
Steven and Peggy Martin (the Martins) appeal the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. (State Farm) in its action for declaratory relief. State 
Farm sought and obtained a declaration that certain damage 
to the Martins' home was excluded from coverage under a 
State Farm homeowner's insurance policy issued to the Mar-
tins. On appeal, the Martins argue that (1) the exclusions in 
their policy are ambiguous and a genuine issue of material 
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fact existed over whether the damage to their home was cov-
ered; (2) the district court erred in crediting a concurrent cau-
sation provision in the policy since that provision was 
contrary to California law; and (3) the district court improp-
erly granted summary judgment to State Farm on various 
counterclaims of the Martins. The district court had jurisdic-
tion of this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have 
jurisdiction of this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
The district court set forth the undisputed facts. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379, 1380-81 
(CD. Cal. 1987). We review a summary judgment indepen-
dently. Barring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 
1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court 
correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Ashton v. Cory, 
780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court's inter-
pretation and application of state-law is entitled to no special 
deference but is reviewed independently. Matter ofMcLinn, 
739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
The Martins first argue that the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment because the policy's exclusions are 
ambiguous and there existed a genuine issue of fact whether 
the policy covered the damage to their home. We agree with 
the district court that the policy exclusions are unambiguous 
and the Martins failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding coverage. 668 F. Supp. at 1381-83. However, one 
part of the district court opinion requires clarification. 
Because the insurer bears the burden of proving an 
excepted risk or the applicability of an exclusion, see Searle v. 
Allstate Life Insurance Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425,437-38 (1985), the 
district court erroneously relied on Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
411 U.S. 317 (1986), in holding that the Martins failed to 
make a sufficient showing on this element. 668 F. Supp. at 
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1383. In fact, State Farm and not the Martins bore the burden 
on this element. Nonetheless, this does not require reversal. 
Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable 
to the Martins, we do not believe that "a fair-minded jury 
could return a verdict for [the Martins] on the evidence 
presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
252(1986). 
The Martins next argue that the district court erred in 
enforcing a concurrent causation provision in State Farm's 
homeowner's policies. Paragraph Two of the State Farm pol-
icy excluded from coverage 
loss which would not have occurred in the absence of 
one or more of the following excluded events. We do 
not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss; or 
c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss. 
b. Earth Movement, whether combined with water 
or not, including but not limited to earthquake, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, subsidence, mud-
flow, sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking, rising, 
shifting, expanding, or contracting of earth. 
(Emphasis added.) The Martins argue that State Farm may 
not exclude concurrent causation from policy coverage 
because such exclusion violates California Insurance Code 
§ 530. Section 530 provides: 
An insurer is liable for a loss of which § peril insured 
against was the proximate cause, although a peril not 
contemplated by the contract may have been a 
remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss 
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of which the peril insured against was only a remote 
cause. 
Cal. Ins. Code § 530 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). 
[1] We agree with the district court that "[a]n insurance 
company has the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued 
by it and when it has done so, the plain language of the limita-
tion must be respected." Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix 
Construction Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 432, 296 P.2d 801, 806 
(1956): State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. MacKenzie, 
85 Cal. App. 3d 727, 732, 149 Cal. Rptr. 747, 750 (1978). Cal-
ifornia Insurance Code § 530 provides guidance when a pol-
icy is silent on concurrent causation; it does not prohibit 
inclusion of a provision similar to the concurrent causation 
provision in the State Farm policy. See National Insurance 
Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362, 
367, 131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (1976) ("[I]n the absence of any 
general declaration of public policy mandating coverage . . . 
[the court will not] interfere with the parties' full freedom to 
contract for coverage on any terms not specifically prohibited 
by statute."). 
The Martins lastly challenge the summary judgment based 
on their counterclaims for (1) breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) bad faith investigation 
of their claim in violation of California Insurance Code 
§ 790.03(h). 668 F. Supp. at 1381. We agree with the district 
court that the Martins presented "no evidence" to support 
these counterclaims. Id. at 1379; see also Kopczynski v. Pru-
dential Insurance Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 846, 849, 211 Cal. 
Rptr. 12,14-15 (1985) (since insurance company's interpreta-
tion of policy was correct, there clearly was no bad faith). 
AFFIRMED. 
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STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, Appellant (Defendant), 
v. 
Herb J. PAULSON, Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Herb J. PAULSON, Appellant 
(Plaintiff), 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant). 
Nos. 87-259, 87-260. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
June 3, 1988. 
Insured sought to recover for damage 
to his home which resulted from entrance 
of water and hail into basement of house 
after severe storm. The District Court, 
Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J., en-
tered judgment for insured, and insured 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Rooney, J., 
Retired, held that loss sustained was ex-
cluded from coverage under exclusion for 
water damage resulting from surface wa-
ter. 
Reversed. 
Cardine, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Insurance «=>146.7(1) 
Only exception to construing insurance 
contracts as other contracts are construed 
is requirement that ambiguous language in 
insurance contract be liberally construed in 
favor of insured. 
2. Insurance «3=>417.5(1) 
Damage resulting from entrance of 
water and hail into basement of insured's 
house after severe storm was excluded 
from coverage under exclusion for loss 
from water damage resulting from surface 
water. 
John A. Sundahl of Godfrey, Sundahl & 
Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for State Farm Fire 
and Cas. Co. 
Stanley K. Hathaway and Blair J. Traut-
wein of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Chey-
enne, for Herb J. Paulson. 
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, 
CARDINE and MACY, JJ.t and 
ROONEY, Retired Justice. 
ROONEY, Retired Justice. 
This appeal in Case No. 87-259, by State 
Farm Fire and Casualty company (hereaf-
ter referred to as "appellant") is from a 
judgment entered against appellant after a 
non-jury trial declaring that an insurance 
policy issued to Herb J. Paulson (hereafter 
referred to as "appellee") covered damage 
resulting from the entrance of water and 
hail into the basement of appellee's house 
after a severe storm. The basic issue 
presented on appeal is whether or not the 
trial court erred in declaring the existence 
of such coverage. 
We reverse. 
Uncontroverted are the facts that hail, 
followed by hail and rain, fell in Cheyenne 
on August 1, 1985; that the storm was 
severe; that hail broke sections of three 
basement windows on the east side of ap-
pellee's residence in Cheyenne; that water 
and hail, which were generated within a 
few blocks of the residence (a 62-acre 
drainage area), entered the basement 
through the windows; that the high water 
line was several inches above the basement 
and water completely filled the basement; 
that less water would have entered had the 
windows not been broken; and that the 
policy in question was in force at the time 
and provided in pertinent part: 
"SECTION 1—LOSSES INSURED 
"COVERAGE A—DWELLING 
"We insure for accidental direct physical 
#loss to the property described in Cover-
age A except as provided in SECTION 
I-LOSSES NOT INSURED. 
"COVERAGE B—PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
"We insure for accidental direct physical 
loss to property described in Coverage B 
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caused by the following perils except as 
provided in SECTION I-LOSSES NOT 
INSURED: 
* * * * * * 
"2. Windstorm or hail. This peril does 
not include loss to property contained in 
a building caused by rain, snow, sleet, 
sand or dust. This limitation does riot 
apply when the direct force of wind or 
hail damages the building causing an 
opening in a roof or wall and the rain, 
snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through 
this opening. 
* * * * * * 
"11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which 
causes damage to property contained in a 
building. 
* * * * * * 
"SECTION I—LOSSES NOT INSURED 
* * * * * * 
"2. We do not insure under any cover-
age for loss (including collapse of an 
insured building or part of a building) 
which would not have occurred in the 
absence of one or more of the following 
excluded events. We do not insure for 
such loss regardless of: a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or b) other causes of 
the loss; or c) whether other causes act-
ed concurrently or in any sequence with 
the excluded event to produce the loss: 
* * * • • • 
"c. Water Damage, meaning: 
"(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal 
water, overflow of a body of water, or 
spray from any of these, whether or not 
driven by wind." 
[1] An insurance policy is a contract 
5 26-15-101 et seq., W.S.1977). 
"A policy of insurance is a contract be-
tween the insurer and the insured and 
construed in the same way. Wort king-
ton v. State, Wyo., 598 P.2d 796 (1979); 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Farmer's Insurance Group, 
Wyo., 569 P.2d 1260 (1977). When terms 
of a contract are shown without any con-
flict of evidence, interpretation of a con-
tract becomes a question of law for the 
court. Engle v. First National Bank of 
7S6P24—18 
Chugwaterf Wyo., 590 P.2d 826 (1979). 
Paraphrased, and as said approvingly 
from a quote in Horvath v. Sheridan-
Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 
P.2d 315 (1942), the interpretation of a 
written contract is a question of law for 
the court; but where the terms of a 
contract are conflicting or doubtful, it is 
for the jury to ascertain the intention of 
the parties and determine what the con-
tract was under proper instructions. The 
interpretation and construction of a con-
tract are done by the court as a matter 
of law. Amoco Production Co. v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyo-
ming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980). See 
also, Goodman v. Kelly, Wyo., 390 P.2d 
244 (1964)." Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wig-
wam Homes, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27, 31 
(1983). 
The only exception to construing insurance 
contracts as other contracts are construed 
is the requirement that ambiguous lan-
guage in an insurance contract is to be 
liberally construed in favor of the insured. 
"When there are any ambiguities or un-
certainties in the meaning of the lan-
guage used in a policy, they must be 
strictly construed against the insurer 
who drafted the contract. Wilson v. 
Hawkeye Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215 
P.2d 867, 874-875 (1950). However, if 
the language is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no room for the court to resort 
to a strict construction against the insur-
er, and the insurance policy must be in-
terpreted according to the ordinary and 
the usual meaning of its terms. McKay 
v. Equitable Assurance Society of U.S., 
[Wyo., 421 P.2d 166,] 168 [(1966)]; Ad-
dison v. Aetna Life Insurance Compa-
ny, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 (1961); Coit 
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 28 
Cal.2d 1, 168 P.2d 163, 169-170 (1946); 
Ostendorf v. Arrow Insurance Compa-
ny, [288 Minn. 491], 182 N.W.2d [190,] 
192 [(1970)]." Worthington v. State, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 796, 806 (1979). 
[2] The basic considerations for con-
struing a contract are summarized in Amo-
co Production Company v. Stauffer 
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Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 
612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980): 
"Our basic purpose in construing or in-
terpreting a contract is to determine the 
intention and understanding of the par-
ties. Fucks v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 
P.2d 733 (1945); Shellhart v. Azford, 
Wyo., 485 P.2d 1031 (1971); Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company v. Idaho 
Stockyards Company\ 12 Utah 2d 205, 
364 P.2d 826 (1961). If the contract is in 
writing and the language is clear and 
unambiguous, the intention is to be se-
cured from the words of the contract. 
Pilcher i\ Hamm, Wyo., 351 P.2d 1041 
(1960); Fucks v. Goe, supra; Holla-
baugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1359 
(1980); Wyoming Bank and Trust Com-
pany v. Waugh, Wyo., 606 P.2d 725 
(1980). And the contract as a whole 
should be considered, with each part be-
ing read in light of all other parts. 
Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 
Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Rossi v. Per-
cifield, Wyo., 527 P.2d 819 (1974); Shell-
hart v. Axford, supra; Quin Blair En-
terprises, Inc. v. Julien Construction 
Company, Wyo., 597 P.2d 945 (1979). 
The interpretation and construction is 
done by the court as a matter of law. 
Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, supra; Bulis v. 
Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487 (1977); Shep-
ard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., su-
pra. 
"If the contract is ambiguous, resort 
may be had to extrinsic evidence. / . W. 
Denio Milling Co. v. Malin, 25 Wyo. 
143, 165 P. 1113 (1917); Kilbourne-Park 
Corporation v. Buckingham, Wyo., 404 
P.2d 244 (1965). An ambiguous contract 
'is an agreement which is obscure in its 
meaning, because of indefiniteness of ex-
pression, or because a double meaning is 
present.' Bulls r. Wells, supra, 565 P.2d 
at 490. Ambiguity justifying extraneous 
evidence is not generated by the subse-
quent disagreement of the parties con-
1. See definition of ambiguous contract in quota-
tion from Amoco Production Company v. Stauf-
fer Chemical Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 
465, and in McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 
(1985); Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 
(1984); Matter of Estate of Reed, Wyo., 672 P.2d 
829 (1983); Busch Development, Inc. v. City of 
cerning its meaning. Homestake-Sapin 
Partners v. United States, 10th Cir. 1967, 
375 F.2d 507." 
The language of the contract quoted supra 
is not ambiguous.1 It is plain and clear. It 
does not have a double meaning, nor is it 
indefinite or obscure in its meaning. It is 
definite in expression and can be under-
stood in only one way. It has but a single 
meaning, and that meaning is not un-
certain. It provides that there is no cover-
age for loss due to "water damage" as 
"water damage" is defined in the contract, 
i.e., that resulting from "flood, surface wa-
ter, waves, tidal water, * * * or spray from 
any of these, whether or not driven by the 
wind." Appellee argues that the loss was 
caused by "rain"—which is not listed under 
the contract definition of "water damage" 
—and therefore coverage existed. Appel-
lant argues that the loss was caused by 
"surface water" and therefore is within the 
contract exclusion. This resulting issue 
was accepted by the trial court as the crux 
of the case. It said, in the Declaratory 
Judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law: 
"The Court views the coverage issue in 
this case as follows: if the water which 
fell with and after the hail and [d]id the 
damage is considered 'rain', then there is 
coverage. If such water is considered 
'flood' or 'surface water', there is no 
coverage * * *." 
The trial court also recognized that con-
tract language to be unambiguous—but it 
inconsistently concluded that the words 
"rain," "flood," and "surface water" were 
latently ambiguous. It said, in its second 
Conclusions of Law: 
"While the policy language is not inher-
ently ambiguous, it is ambiguous as ap-
plied to the extraordinary facts in this 
case because the terms 'rain', 'flood', and 
'surface water', are not defined in the 
insurance policy. An examination of the 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 (1982); State ex 
rel Albany County Weed and Pest District v. 
Board of County Commissioners of County of 
Albany, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979); DeHerrera 
v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); County of 
Natrona v. Casper Air Service, Wyo., 536 P.2a 
142 (1975). 
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cases referred to in the February 2, 1987 
letter decision reveal that the Courts 
have not necessarily agreed upon the 
'plain' meaning to be given to 'flood', 
'surface water' or 'rain'. Because the 
terms are not defined, the Court con-
cludes that rain does not become surface 
water immediately after it hits the 
ground; rather it remains 'rain' (a non-
excluded peril)." 
We cannot accept this conclusion. A pol-
icy must be construed according to its plain 
language, giving to the words their com-
mon and ordinary meaning. 
"[W]ords used will be given their com-
mon and ordinary meaning. 13 Apple-
man, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7402 
(1943). * * * Absent ambiguity, there is 
no room for construction and the policy 
will be enforced according to its terms. 
Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Com-
pany, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 [(1961)]. 
Neither will the language be 'tortured' in 
order to create an ambiguity. Malanga 
v. Royal Indemnity Company, 4 Ariz. 
App. 150, 418 P.2d 396, 399 [(1966)]; 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 
§ 7384 (1943)." McKay v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United 
States, Wyo., 421 P.2d 166, 168 (1966). 
It is true that "rain," "flood" and "sur-
face water" are not further defined in the 
policy. But neither does it define "fire," 
"theft," "freezing" or other perils with 
common and ordinary meanings. "Rain" is 
ordinarily and commonly thought of as wa-
ter falling from the sky. After it stops 
falling, one does not say that it is "raining" 
although there may still be wet sidewalks* 
and streets, puddles of water resulting" 
from the rain, or water running through, 
gutters and elsewhere as a result of thej 
rain. It is not common or usual to say in 
such instances that it is still raining. 
This common and usual meaning is the 
same as that legally determined and used 
in the science of hydrology. In Al Ber-
man, Inc, v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 216 F.2d 626, 628 (3rd Cir.1954), the 
court defined "rain" as: 
" The condensed vapor of the atmo-
sphere falling to the earth in drops large 
enough to attain sensible velocity.' New 
Standard Dictionary." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Expert witness Rechard testified at the 
trial: 
• "Q. Is there a distinction as a hydrolo-
gist, sir, and based upon your expertise 
in hydrology between rain and surface 
water? 
"A. Yes, there is. 
"Q. What is that distinction? 
"A. Rain is the water falling from the 
atmosphere striking the surface of the 
earth, and surface water is water on the 
surface of the earth. 
"Q. What happens after rain falls to 
the ground? Does it retain its character-
istic as rain or does it become something 
elset 
"A. It becomes either surface water or 
if it infiltrates it becomes underground 
water. 
"Q. Is that a commonly accepted defini-
tion, as far as you know? 
"A. As far as hydrology is concerned, 
yes. 
"Q. That's one that is used—has been 
used for how many years? For as long 
as you can remember? 
"A. As long as there has been the sci-
ence of hydrology." 
If, by definition, "rain" remains "rain" af-
ter it stops falling, then the water in 
streams and lakes, coming from household 
faucets, etc. is "rain" since it originated, 
partly at least, from water that fell from 
the sky. 
In any event, the important determina-
tion to be made in this case is whether or 
not the damage was caused in whole or in 
part by "surface water." If the water 
which accumulated on the ground and en-
tered the basement window was still 
"rain," then there is either no such thing as 
"surface water," or "rain" and "surface 
water" are synonymous. Obviously, there 
is such a thing as "surface water"—at 
least in the minds of the parties to the 
contract in which they used the term. And 
if the two terms are synonymous, then the 
exclusion provision of the policy for "sur-
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face water" also applies to "rain," and 
there is no coverage. 
Justice Blume, speaking for this court, 
defined "surface water" in State v. Hiber, 
48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935): 
" 'Surface water,' it has been said, is that 
which is diffused over the surface of the 
ground, derived from falling rains and 
melting snows, and continues to be such, 
and may be impounded by the owner of 
the land, until it reaches some well-de-
fined channel in which it is accustomed 
to, and does, flow with other waters; or 
until it reaches some permanent lake or 
pond, and it then ceases to be surface 
water and becomes the water of the wa-
ter course, or a lake or a pond, as the 
case may be. Kinney on Irrigation, [ (2d 
Ed.)] § 318; Crawford u Rambo, 44 
Ohio St. 279, 7 N.E. 429 [(1886)]; King 
v. Chamberlin, 20 Idaho[] 504, 118 P. 
1099 [(1911)]." 
At least some of the water which entered 
appellee's basement had diffused over the 
surface of the ground, was derived from 
falling rains, and had not reached a well-de-
fined channel, lake or pond. It fit other 
plain meanings of surface water as re-
flected ante. The evidence established the 
fact that this kind of water entered the 
basement and caused the damage. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. Thus, a 
contrary finding could not be made. M & 
M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek^ Wyo., 713 
P.2d 236 (1986); Alco of Wyoming v. Bak-
er, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982); Clausen v. 
Bolana\ Wyo., 601 P.2d 541 (1979); Doug-
las Reservoirs Water Users Association v. 
Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280 (1977). 
Appellee, himself, testified: 
"And then later on I had a city dump 
truck pick me up and leave me off a 
block away from my house over there. 
And I swam the rest of the way. 
"Q. You mean 3warn? That you were 
flat with both your legs and your arms 
kicking? 
"A. Right, right 
"Q. How deep was the water at your— 
in the street right by your house? 
"A. By the house? 
"Q. Yes, right by the house? 
"A. Oh, I would say maybe like oh, two 
and a half, three feet, something like 
that. T^vo and a half feet. 
"Q. Can you describe it for me by rea-
son of how tall you are or where it came 
up to you on your waist? 
"A. Oh, up to about the beltline. 
"Q. Came up to the beltline? 
"A. A little bit, yes. 
"Q. That's at the street by your house? 
"A. At the street by my house. 
"Q. Let's move up to the area around 
the house. 
"A. Okay. 
"Q. How deep was the water level at 
the house? 
"A. Oh, I would say approximately 
maybe like oh, six inches above the, you 
know, where it went into the basement, 
you know, the side of the basement, that 
wall, six inches above. The whole area 
in there could have been maybe like 20 
inches, something like that, 17. 
* * * * * * 
"Q. Okay. And do I understand cor-
rectly that when you went in the house 
the water was not only from the base-
ment but all the way through the joists 
and ceiling? 
"A. Right 
"Q. And up onto the first floor? 
"A. First floor about half an inch, 
maybe three-quarters. 
"Q. Now, was that—As you came to 
the house that evening, as you swam to 
the house that evening, was the water 
moving at all? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. In which direction was it moving? 
"A. I'd say it was coming in from the 
north. Coming in from the north. 
* « * * » • 
"Q. Now, Mr. Paulson, I would like to 
now ask you whether or not had it not 
been for the flood and the surface water 
you would have had the loss to your 
basement and its contents? 
"A. Maybe a minimum amount maybe. 
"Q. Just a minimum? 
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"A. Minimum." 
Mr. Rechard testified: 
"Q. So if we wouldn't have had the 
flood or surface water there is nominal if 
any damage to the basement and its con-
tents, correct? 
"A. That is my opinion." 
There is testimony that some "rain" may 
have fallen directly into the basement 
through the broken windows without first 
hitting the ground and becoming "surface 
water." But there was no contradictory 
evidence to the fact that some of the water 
which entered the basement and contribut-
ed to the damage was "surface water" as 
defined m* State v. Hiber, supra, and as 
such is commonly considered (see addition-
al definitions ante). 
Accordingly, the specific policy exclu-
sions prevent coverage in this instance. 
That quoted supra from "SECTION I-
LOSSES NOT INSURED" of the policy 
specifies that there is no coverage for loss 
caused by "surface water" or "flood," and 
(1) "We do not insure for such loss regard-
less of: a) the cause of the excluded 
event"; e.g., hail breaking a window and 
allowing the "surface water" or "flood" to 
enter; (2) "We do not insure for such loss 
regardless of: * * * b) other causes of the 
loss"; e.g., if the loss was also caused by 
"rain" falling into the basement through 
2. If a policy did not contain a sequential exclu-
sion, as did this one, coverage would exist if an •> 
otherwise excluded peril resulted in the occur-*> 
rence of a covered peril, such as non-covered 
peril of vandalism resulting in breakage of wa-
ter pipes which caused covered peril of water . 
damage. 
3. Franklin Packaging Company v. California Un-
ion Insurance Company, 171 NJ.Super. 188, 408 
A.2d 448 (1979), cert.'denied 84 NJ. 434, 420 
A.2d 340 (1980); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great 
Central Insurance Company, 280 Minn. 325, 159 
N.W.2d 268 (1968); Unobskey v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 147 Me. 249, 86 A.2d 160 (1952). 
4. Bartleit v. Continental Divide Insurance Com-
pany, Colo.App., 697 P.2d 412 (1984); Femdale 
Development Co., Inc. v. Great American Insur-
ance Company, 34 Colo.App. 258, 527 P.2d 939 
(1974); Maieer v. Reliance Insurance Co., 247 
Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797 (1967); Everett v. Davis, 
18 Cal.2d 389, 115 P.2d 821 (1941); Poole v. Sun 
Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 65 S.D. 422, 
274 N.W. 658 (1937). 
the broken window, or if it was also caused 
by "hail"; and (3) "We do not insure for 
such loss regardless of: * * * c) whether 
other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with the excluded event to pro-
duce the loss"; e.g., the loss was a result 
of the window being broken, "hail" and 
"rain" entering, together with "surface wa-
ter" or "flood'' entering—either at the 
same time or in sequence.2 
Although the foregoing may be suffi-
cient for a reversal of this matter, the 
second Conclusion of Law, supra, of the 
learned trial judge deserves additional com-
ment. 
Contrary to his statement therein that 
the cases referred to in his letter opinion 
"reveal that the Courts have not necessar-
ily agreed upon the 'plain' meaning to be 
given to 'flood', 'surface water' or 'rain'," 
(emphasis added) a review of such cases 
reflects that they are in substantial agree-
ment as to the meaning of these words. 
Of the sixteen cases there considered, three 
do not address those meanings;3 five de-
fine "flood";4 three of those defining flood 
also define "surface water," 5 as do an ad-
ditional seven;6 and one considers the 
meaning of "rain."7 Of course, the fact 
situation is not the same in all of these 
cases. 
5. Femdale Development Co., Inc. v. Great Ameri-
can Ins. Co., supra; Everett v. Davis, supra; 
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 
supra. 
6. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Raff kind, 
Tex.Civ.App., 521 S.W.2d 935 (1975); Aetna Fire 
Underwriters Insurance Company v. Crawley, 
132 Ga.App. 181, 207 S.E.2d 666 (1974); Hatley 
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 261 Or. 606, 495 
P.2d 1196 on reh. from 261 Or. 606, 494 P.2d 
426 (1972); Sherwood Real Estate & Investment 
Company v. Old Colony Insurance Company, La. 
App., 234 So.2d 445 (1970); Richman v. Home 
Ins. Co. of NY, 172 Pa.Super. 383, 94 A.2d 164 
(1953); Urse v. Maryland Casualty Co., 58 
F.Supp. 897 (D.C.N.D.1945); Fenmode v. Aetna 
Casualty <& Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 303 
Mich. 188, 6 N.W.2d 479 (1942). 
7. Goldfarb v. Maryland Casualty Co., 311 111. 
App. 568, 37 N.E.2d 376 (1941). 
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The policy exclusion prevented coverage 
if the damage resulted from a "flood." 
With reference to the five cases considered 
by the trial court which defined "flood," 
Bartlett v. Continental Divide Insurance 
Company, Colo.App., 697 P.2d 412 (1984); 
Femdale Development Co., Inc. v. Great 
American Insurance Company, 34 Colo. 
App. 258, 527 P.2d 939 (1974); Mateer v. 
Reliance Insurance Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 
A.2d 797 (1967); Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal. 
2d 389, 115 P.2d 821 (1941); Poole v. Sun 
Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 65 
S.D. 422, 274 N.W. 658 (1937), only Mateer 
v. Reliance Ins. Co. has language which 
could make "flood" a consideration in this 
case. It states: 
"Today we commonly speak of a cellar or 
basement being 'flooded' without regard 
to whether the water comes from the 
overflow of a stream, from a hard 
downpour, or from the bursting of 
pipes." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 799. 
In each of the other four cases, "flood" is 
defined in a similar fashion: Bartlett v. 
Continental Divide Insurance Company, 
697 P.2d at 413 states: 
"Ordinarily, 'flood' means 'a body of wa-
ter (including moving water) . . . over-
flowing or inundating land not usually 
covered/ 36A CJ.S. Flood * * V 
And it notes that no distinction is made 
between natural and artificial causes. 
Everett v. Davis, 115 P.2d at 823, and 
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of 
New York, 274 N.W. at 600, define flood 
waters as 
"those which escape from a stream or 
other body of water and overflow the 
adjacent territory." 
Femdale Development Co., Inc. v. 
Great American Insurance Company, 
527 P.2d at 940, adopts the definition from 
5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§ 3145 at 462 (1970): 
" ' "Flood waters" are those waters 
above the highest line of the ordinary 
flow of a stream, and generally speaking 
they have overflowed a river, stream, or 
natural water course and have formed a 
continuous body with the water flowing 
in the ordinary channel * * V " 
These cases do not indicate material dis-
agreement as to the plain meaning of the 
word "flood." 
The meaning of "surface water" is of 
much more importance to this case since, 
as noted, if it caused the damage—even in 
part—there was no coverage under the pol-
icy. A review of the cases defining "sur-
face water" and referred to or quoted from 
in the trial judge's opinion letter (see notes 
5 and 6, supra) attribute the meaning to 
"surface water" substantially as it is de-
fined by this court in State v. Hiher, supra. 
Transamerica Insurance Company v. 
Raffkind, Tex.Civ.App., 521 S.W.2d 935, 
939 (1975), defines "surface water" as 
"natural precipitation coming on and 
passing over the surface of the ground 
until it either evaporates, or is absorbed 
by the land, or reaches channels where 
water naturally flows." 
In Richman v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
172 Pa.Super. 383, 94 A.2d 164, 166 (1953), 
quoting Fenmode v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn,, 303 Mich. 
188, 6 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1942), it states: 
"[Sjurface waters are commonly under-
stood to be waters on the surface of the 
ground, usually created by rain or snow, 
which are of a casual or vagrant charac-
ter, following no definite course and hav-
ing no substantial or permanent exist-
ence." 
Urse v. Maryland Casualty Co., oS 
F.Supp. 897, 899 (D.C.N.D.1945) accepted 
two definitions of surface water, one from 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia: 
" 'Surface water is water of casual, va-
grant character, oozing through the sou, 
or diffusing and squandering over or un-
der the surface, which, though usually 
and naturally flowing in known direction, 
has no banks or channel cut in the soil; 
coming from rain and snow, and occa-
sional outbursts in time of freshet, de-
scending from mountains and hills, and 
inundating the country; and the mois-
ture of wet, spongy, springy, or boggy 
land. For obstructing or diverting sur-
face water, though damaging another, 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CAS. CO. v. 
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the party is not liable.' Neal v. Ohio 
River R. Co., 47 W.Va. 316, 34 S.E. 914, 
P t 2 Syl." 
The other definition was from Kinney on 
Irrigation and Water Rights, § 318 at 516 
(1912): 
" ' "Surface" water may be defined 'as 
water on the surface of the ground, the 
source of which is so temporary or limit-
ed as not to be a bit to maintain for any 
considerable time a stream or body of 
water having a well-defined and substan-
tial existence.' " 58 F.Supp. at 899. 
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of 
New York, 274 N.W. at 660 also used this 
definition from Kinney, together with that 
set forth supra by Richman v. Home Ins. 
Co. ofN.Y., 94 A.2d at 164, and Fenmode 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hart-
ford, Conn., 6 N.W. at 479. 
Sherwood Real Estate & Investment 
Company v. Old Colony Insurance Com-
pany, La.App., 234 So.2d 445, 447 (1970) 
states: 
"In 56 Am.Jur., verbo water, Sec. 65, it is 
stated: 
" 'The term "surface water" is used in 
the law of waters in reference to a dis-
tinct form or class of water which is 
generally defined as that which is de-
rived from falling rain or melting snow, 
or which rises to the surface in springs, 
and is defused over the surface of the 
ground, while it remains in such defused 
state or condition * * V " 
Everett v. Davis, 115 P.2d at 823 states: 
"Surface waters are those falling upon, 
arising from, and naturally spreading 
over lands produced by rainfall, melting 
snow, or springs. They continued to be 
surface waters until, in obedience to the 
laws of gravity, they percolate through 
the ground or flow vagrantly over the 
surface of the land into well defined 
watercourses or streams." 
Ferndale Development Co., Inc. v. 
Great American Insurance Company, 
527 P.2d at 940, again adopts the definition 
of "surface water" from 5 Appleman, In-
surance Law and Practice, supra at 463, as: 
" 'water wrhich is derived from falling 
rain or melting snow, or which rises to 
the surface in springs, and is diffused 
over the surface of the ground, while it 
remains in such a diffused state, and 
which follows no defined course or chan-
nel, which does not gather into or form a 
natural body of water, and which is lost 
by evaporation, percolation, or natural 
drainage.' " 
Aetna Fire Undtrwritcrs Insurance Com-
pany v. Crawley, 132 Ga.App. 181, 207 
S.E.2d 666, 668 (1974) states that "surface 
water" 
"is used as a part of a series of contin-
gencies all of which have in common the 
property that they comprise water flow-
ing on the surface of the ground at the 
time they enter the home of the insured." 
And finally, in Hatley v. Truck Insur-
ance Exchange, 261 Or. 606, 495 P.2d 1196, 
1197 (1972), the court said: 
"The term 'surface water,' particularly 
when used in conjunction with flood, 
waves, and tidal water, was intended to 
mean water 'diffused over the surface of 
the ground, derived from falling rains or 
melting snows.' Price v. Oregon Rail-
road Co., 47 Or. 350, 358, 83 P. 843, 846 
(1906)." 
The case of Goldfarb v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 311 Ill.App. 568, 37 N.E.2d 376, 
377 (1941) referred to in the opinion letter 
of the trial court did not define "rain," but 
did comment that "[i]t is difficult to say 
where the line of demarcation lies between 
rain and surface water." In finding that 
there was coverage under a policy provid-
ing coverage for the peril of rain, the court 
said that "[t]here is no evidence that there 
was any water lying on the ground, in the 
area * * * of the defective door," and that 
the plaintiffs' theory "is that the rain com-
ing between the two buildings, and through 
the fire escape, fell directly before and 
through the defective door of plaintiffs' 
premises." 
These cases do not indicate a disagree-
ment among the courts as to the meaning 
of the word "flood," "surf: 
"rain" sufficient to cloud 
ordinary meaning of them. Particularly 
with reference to "surface water," it is 
rface water" and 
the plain and 
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difficult to understand how an item can be 
more plainly labeled. It is water on the 
surface, other than in streams, lakes and 
ponds. The parties, as reasonable people, 
must have attached this plain meaning to 
the words in the policy. The words "sur-
face water" have the common meaning at-
tributed to them by this court in State v. 
Hiber, supra. 
Accordingly, and mindful of the follow-
ing admonishment in Worthington v. 
State, 598 P.2d at 807, we hold that appel-
lee's damages were not covered by his poli-
cy with appellant: 
"[A] court [is restrained] from liberally 
and unreasonably construing an insur-
ance contract to permit a strained or 
unnatural interpretation in order to find 
coverage for innocent victims who are 
subjects of enormous sympathy. Other-
wise, the effect would be to bind an 
insurer to a risk that was not contem-
plated and for which it was not paid. 
D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prod-
ucts, Co., 59 Wis.2d 46, 207 N.W.2d 846, 
848 (1973)." 
Case No. 87-259 is reversed. Since such 
reversal makes moot the issue in the cross-
appeal of Herb J. Paulson in Case No. 
87-260,8 the trial court's holding in that 
case is affirmed. 
CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting. 
I dissent. 
I would find appellant's insurance policy 
ambiguous. In Coverage B, it affords in-
surance against loss or damage caused by 
hail and rain that enter through an opening 
caused by the direct force of hail. Then 
§ 1 of the policy voids that coverage com-
pletely by providing thai a loss is not cover-
ed if caused partly by rain entering directly 
and partly by rain which has become sur* 
face water. It would be a rare occurrence 
in which some rain did not, as appellant 
claims, become surface water and enter the 
8, The issue argued by Mr. Paulson in Case No. 
87-260 is: "Under the circumstances of this 
case, State Farm's denial of coverage was unrea-
opening. It would seem that the parties 
mu3t have intended to provide insurance 
coverage for something, otherwise why 
write into the policy ail of the provisions 
concerning loss from windstorm, hail, rain, 
snow, sleet, sand or dust. 
Coverage B provides as follows: 
"We insure for accidental direct physical 
loss ' • ' . 
"2. * * * when the direct force of wind 
or hail damages the building causing an 
opening in a roof or wall and the rain, 
snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through 
this opening." 
The policy then provides, under SECTION 
1-LOSSES NOT INSURED: 
"We do not insure under any coverage 
for loss * * * which would not have oc-
curred in the absence of one or more of 
the following excluded events. * * * (1) 
flood, surface water * * V 
"We do not insure for such loss regard-
less of: * * * (c) whether other causes 
acted concurrently or in any sequence 
with the excluded * * * loss." 
The undisputed evidence in this case was 
that hail broke out basement windows and 
that hail and rain entered directly through 
the window opening causing some damage 
to the property. At this point in the occur-
rence, the damage was clearly covered by 
the policy, for it was hail damage that 
caused "an opening in a * * * wall" of the 
building and the rain and hail entered 
through the opening. Appellant even con-
cedes that the broken windows are covered 
damage under the insurance policy, al-
though at the time of argument such dam-
age was unpaid. 
The insurance coverage seemingly pro-
vided by Coverage B of the insurance poli-
cy then is claimed excluded by SECTION 
i—LOSSES NOT INSURED. The effect 
of a literal interpretation of the exclusion-
ary clause in § 1 is that the policy provides 
no coverage at all for damage caused by 
rain, for appellant contends that as soon as 
the rain settles upon some surface, it be-
sonable or without cause, thus entitling Mr. 
Paulson to interest and attorney fees pursuant 
to W.S. § 26-15-124." 
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comes surface water. And if any of that 
surface water enters through an opening 
caused by hail or wind and it, in combina-
tion with rain or hail entering directly, 
causes damage, it is not covered. For ex-
ample, assume that hail damage caused an 
opening in a roof, rain entered directly 
through the opening causing damage, but 
some of the rain which fell on the roof 
collected, ran down the roof and into the 
opening causing additional damage. Under 
the literal language of the policy, there 
would be no coverage for the loss and 
damage that occurred, for the rain that had 
collected on the roof would be surface wa-
ter, and it, in combination with rain enter-
ing directly and causing the total damage, 
is excluded under § 1. I cannot accept that 
as the intent of the parties in writing this 
policy. 
Appellant argued that rain did not be-
come surface water until it fell to the 
ground. I do not find that interpretation in 
the policy. At least we must agree that 
what is surface water and when it becomes 
surface water was ambiguous insofar as 
such term was used in this insurance poli-
cy. I would hold it was the intent of the 
parties to provide some kind of coverage 
for damage caused by hail and rain. An 
ambiguous contract must be most strongly 
construed against the drafter of the instru-
ment, in this case appellant. For this rea-
son I would affirm the decision of the 
district judge. And, in any event, I would 
hold that the insurance policy at least cov-
ered the damage caused by the hail and by 
the rain that entered, not as surface water, 
but directly through the opening itself. 
Appellant contends that the major damage 
was caused by surface water. That at 
least is a concession that lesser damage 
was caused by rain and by hail entering 
directly. Without doubt, this damage was 
covered under the policy. 
; HYXUMSiR SYSTEM £ 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff), 
v. 
Gareth H. BOWEN and Dorothy 
Bowen. Appellees (Defendants). 
No. 87-223. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
June 3, 1988. 
Appeal from the District Court of Lara-
mie County; Edward L. Grant, Judge. 
John A. Sundahl of Godfrey, Sundahl & 
Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for appellant. 
George Zunker, Cheyenne, for appellees. 
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, 
CARDINE and MACY, JJ., and 
ROONEY, J , Retired. 
ROONEY, Retired Justice. 
This is a companion case to State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company v. Paulson, 
Wyo., 756 P.2d 764 (1988). The damage to 
appellant's residence was caused by the 
same storm which damaged the Paulson 
residence. The insurance polices involved 
were the same. The trial court incorporat-
ed the opinion letter in the Paulson case 
into its Declaratory- Judgment, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case. 
In a short opinion letter in this case, the 
trial court stated: 
"The principal difference in the evidence 
between Paulson and Bowen was that in 
Paulson, falling hail directly broke the 
window and in Bowen, large masses of 
hail born by water broke the window, but 
the outside glass or plexiglass 'bubble' 
coverings over the window wrells that Mr. 
Bowen had installed were broken by 
hail's direct impact." 
The Declarator}7 Judgment, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case 
were identical to those in the Paulson case 
in all respects pertinent to this appeal. 
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Accordingly, and for the reasons stated 
in the Paulson case, the judgment against 
appellant in this case i3 reversed. 
CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting. 
I dissent from the majority opinion for 
the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion 
filed in State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company v. Paulson, Wyo., 756 P.2d 764 
(1988). 
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WYOMING SAWMILLS, INC., a Wyo-
ming corporation, Appellant 
(Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant), 
Robert B. MORRIS; Raymond McCoy, 
Gerald McCoy; and Gary McCoy, d/b/a 
J & D Wood Products; Sheridan Na-
tional Bank, and Edith I. Morris, Ap-
pellees (Defendants/Third-Party De-
fendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs). 
No. 88-3. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
June 10, 1988. 
Action was brought to enforce alleged 
oral settlement agreement of dispute aris-
ing from parties' competing claims to 230,-
000 board feet of green saw logs. The 
District Court, Sheridan County, Jame* N\ 
Wolfe, J., entered judgment enforcing 
agreement, and appeal was taken. The 
Supreme Court, Rooney, J., Retired, held 
that finding that parties had entered into 
binding oral settlement agreement prior to 
date set for execution of written settlement 
document was sufficiently supported by 
testimony of parties. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts <3»15 
Unconditional, timely acceptance of of-
fer, properly communicated to offeror, con-
stitutes "meeting of minds" and establish-
es contract. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Contracts <S=>29 
Whether contract has been entered 
into depends on intent of parties and is 
question of fact, both as to written and oral 
contracts. 
3. Compromise and Settlement <£=»23(3) 
Finding that parties had entered into 
binding oral settlement agreement prior to 
date set for execution of written document 
was sufficiently supported by testimony of 
parties that agreement had been reached 
as to all material terms; execution of writ-
ten document was not condition precedent 
to settlement. 
4. Compromise and Settlement <£=>23(2) 
Unexecuted copy of written settlement 
document, which merely incorporated 
terms to which parties had agreed in four-
way telephone conversation, was admissi-
ble in action to enforce alleged oral settle-
ment agreement to give meaning to and 
support parties' testimony regarding con-
versation. 
5. Appeal and Error <^204(4) 
Any error arising out of trial court's 
admission of unexecuted copy of written 
settlement document was not plain error, 
where information contained in document 
was already before court by virtue of testi-
mony of parties suing fo enforce oral 
agreement. 
Darlene L. Reiter of Burgess & Davis, 
Sheridan, for appellant 
Dan B. Riggs and Haultain E. Corbett of 
Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appel-
lees Robert B. Morris, Edith I. Morris, Ray-
mond McCoy, Gerald McCoy, and Gary 
McCoy d/b/a J & D Wood Products, and 
Sheridan Nat Bank. 
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[T 1101] L E E , P la in t i f f . A o o e l l a n t v. 
N A T I O N W I D E M U T U A L I N S U R A N C E , 
Defendant , Appellee 
Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section 
ai Nashviiie. No. S7-357-II. Filed Apni 29. 
1988.J\ppeai from me Chancery Court. David-
son County, ai Nashvil le. Affirmed and 
remanded. 
All-Risk Insurance—Exclus ions of E a r t h 
M o v e m e n t and Water 3e iow Surface of 
Ground 
Damage to tne wails of a house from a shift in 
the foundation caused by a leak in a sewer pipe 
inside the house resulting in liquid sewage flow-
ing beneath the foundation was excluded from 
coverage under the owner"s ail-risk insurance 
policy. The policy exclusions for earth move-
ment and for damage from water beiow the 
surface of the ground barred coverage. 
James W. Price. Jr.. 1st American Center. 
Nashville, Tenn. 57228. for Appellant. Stephen 
K. Heard. Michaei J. Quinan, 3rd National 
Financial Center, Nasnviiie. Tenn. 37219. for 
Appeiiee. 
O P I N I O N 
[All-Risk Insurance] 
Plaintiff sued to recover damages to a dwell-
ing under terms of an "ail risk" poiicy issued by 
defendant. Tne Trial Judge rendered summary 
judgment for tne defendant, and plaintiff 
appealed. 
[Issue] 
The soie issue presented on appeai is whether, 
under the undisputed facts, tne ioss was 
excluded by poiicy provisions. 
[Facts] 
Plaintiffs compiaint states that a leak in a 
sewer pipe inside tne nouse caused liquid sewage 
to flow beneath the foundation, causing the 
foundation to shift thereby producing cracks in 
the wails of the nouse. 
The poiicy upon which suit is brought pro-
vides: 
The Company snail not be iiabie for loss: 
7. due to any and all settling, shrinking, 
cracking, buiging or expansion of dnveways. 
Sidewalks, swimming poois, pavements, foun-
dations, wails, floors, roofs or ceilings; 
12. caused by, resulting from, contributed to, 
or aggravated by any of the following: 
(a) earth movement, including but not lim-
ited to earthquake, landslide, mudfiow, earth 
sinking, earth rising or shifting; 
id) water beiow the surface of the ground 
including mat wnicr. exerts pressure on or 
flows, seeps or ieaics througn sidewalks, drive-
ways, foundations, wails, basement or other 
floors, or tnrougn doors, windows or any other 
openings in such sidewalks, driveways, foun-
dations, wails or floors; 
2. The following is added to the EXCLU-
SIONS section: ; 
This poiicy does not insure under Section I 
for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of 
the following exclusions in this poiicy. Such 
loss is excluded regardless of any other cause 
or event contributing concurrently or in any 
sequence to the loss. 
c. Earth movement; 
g. Water beiow the surface oi the ground; 
Plaintiffs deoosition states that, in the spring 
of 1985. sne saw a cracx from the earth to the 
roof wnere the onck had puiied apart aoout an 
inch, windows seoaratec from tne nouse an inch 
or more, front door separated from tne nouse an 
men. roof sunk a coupie of menes: on tne inside 
sne saw dayiignt through the wail of the front 
foyer, cracks in the batnroom. bedrooms: and 
none of this damage was present when sne 
inspected tne house 60 days before. 
The affidavit of David C. Bourne, licensed 
engineer, states: 
6. As is reflected in the report, the distress 
experienced by the structure was aimost 
entirely in the form oi cracxing of the founda-
tions, wails and floors. Said cracking was 
caused by settlement of the structure. Several 
possible explanations for such settlement are 
contained in tne report, one of which being a 
reported sewer line leak under the foundation 
of the structure. Although the sewer line leak 
may have been responsible in part for the 
settlement which occurred. I observed no-evi-
dence, and it is my opinion that the sewer line 
leak caused no damage other than that result-
ing from such possible settlement, and erosion 
or )oss oi ground. 
7. If the sewer line leak was in fact respon-
sible for the settlement of the structure, such 
settlement occurred for the following reason: 
The ieak caused an accumulation of water 
beiow the surface of the ground, which in turn 
caused the movement or shifting of the earth 
which supports tne foundation of tne struc-
ture. 
Ui io i ©1988, Commerce Clearing House. Inc. 
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The affidavit of Edwin A. McDougie. licensed 
engineer, stales: 
6. Based uoon tne observations made on 
September 19 anc OctoDcr 8. 1985. a report 
was issuea :o Nationwiae - undated but sent 
with a cover letter aatea October 22, 1985) 
signed by botn myself ana Mark Dunning. A 
copy oi saia report :s attacr.ea hereto as 
Exhibit 2, ana a copy of said cover letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 3. Said report con-
cluded mat tne aamage v-isibie on :ne struc-
ture was the result of settlement in the 
structure foundation, apparently aue to con-
solidation of soii. resulting from water pene-
tration and not associated with biasung at 
the airport. In my professional opinion and in 
lignt of all information available, said report 
was and remains accurate and complete.. 
8. After a subsequent inspection of the 
house by myseif on April 20. 1986. a supple-
mental letter was issued to Nationwide Insur-
ance Company, signed by myseif and dated 
May 9. 1986. A copy of said letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit -v My conclusion, as 
reflected in said letter, was and is that the 
water coming from the numbing lea* satu-
rated the soii under the structure ana resulted 
in the settlement of the foundation, causing 
the aamage snown m our original report. 
9. As is reflected in the report and supple-
mental letter, the damages incurred by the 
structure were ;n the form of cracking of the 
foundations, wails, and floors. It was and is 
my opinion that such cracking was the resuit 
of settlement of the structure. Aithougn set-
tlement may nave been caused by the plumb-
ing leak discovered under the house, it is my 
oomion that the piumoine .eaic was responsi-
ble for aamaee amy to the extent that it 
causea the settlement of the structure. 
Tne affidavit of Geraid B. Kirksey, licensed 
engineer and attorney, states: 
4. Prior to preparing this Affidavit, I 
reviewed an .Affidavit of Eawm A. McDougie 
and an Affidavit of David C. Bourne. Mr. 
McDougie and I 'both reach the conclusion 
that a piumomg leak in tne sewer system 
triggered the movement and subsequent dam-
age to Ms. Lee's house. Mr. Bourne concluded 
that "[Bjased on the available information, 
the reported sewer line leak appears, in our 
opinion, to be the most prooaDie immediate 
cause of the distress . . . " 
First, in my opinion, the earth movement 
exclusion referred to on Pages 5 and 6 of the 
Memorandum refers to ear th movement 
caused by natural pnenomena. including 
earthquakes, landslides, mud flow as in the 
aftermath of the St. Heiens voicano, earth 
sinking such as sinkhoies, ana eartn rising or 
shifting aue to geologic piate movement, vol-
canic action, or changes in unaerground soii 
structure. 
Second, the water beiow the surface of the 
ground exclusion specifically refers to hydro-
static pressure caused by ground water and is 
particularly relevant to basement leaks and 
basement wail failures. 
The effluent leaking from the sewer pipe 
was not water, out was sewage wnich is a 
mixture of liquids, including water, and 
soiids. Whiie tne water content of the sewage 
was ultimately introduced into the ground 
water system, the immediate damage caused 
by tne sewage was not contemplated by the 
ground water exclusion. In addition, there is 
no indication that the original house, which is 
approximately 25 years old. or the addition, 
wmen is approximately 15 years oid. was ever 
adversely affected by earth movement or 
water beiow the surface of the ground prior to 
the 1985 sewage leak. 
Finally, most of tne damage to the struc-
ture was caused by lateral earth movement, 
not settlement. The north end of the two story 
portion of the house moved northward 
approximately two inches and westward 
approximately one inch. Parts of the house, 
particularly the onck veneering, were liter-
ally :orn into two parts by this movement. 
Based on interviews with Ms. Lee and her 
tenants, the Logsdons. and based on observa-
tion of tne aamagea area. I found no indica-
tion that the house had exhibited significant 
settlement or movement prior to Apni. 1985. 
• emphasis supplied) 
It is seen that the only conflict in the opinions 
of the experts involves tne following: 
Mr. Kirksey undertakes to define the words, 
"eartn movement", and "water beiow the sur-
face of the ground" by his "opinion". His affida-
vit aoes not assert his personal knowledge of the 
accepted technical definition of tne woras in use 
among engineers: but, even if he did so. such an 
opinion is immaterial to the meaning of the 
woras used in a contract between an insurance 
company ana a property owner neither of wnom 
is shown to be cognizant of technical engineering 
terms. 
[Ear th Movement Exclusion] 
The terms of a contract of insurance are to be 
construed according to their piam. ordinary, and 
popular sense, unless the words have acquired a 
technical sense by commercial usage. Purdy v. 
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.. Tenn. App. 
1979, 586 S.W.2d 128. or uniess a contrary 
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intent is snown. Williams v. Bankers Life Co., 
Tenn.App. 1971. 481 S.W.2d 386. 
There :s no showing that the quoted words 
nave acquired a technical meaning by commer-
cial usage or mat the parties intended a special 
meaning wnen making the contract. Accord-
ingly. :ne ordinary, popular meaning of the 
words wiii control. 
The woros. "earth movement", mean: 
differential movement of the earth's crust; 
elevation or subsidence of land. « 
Webster s Third New International Dictionary; 
Unabridged. < 
Taken separately the meaning of the word, 
"earth", includes: -
fraementai material composing pan. of the 
surface of the giooe: soil, ground, usually dis-
tmguisned from bed rock. 
Ibid. 
The word, "movement", means: 
The action or process of moving, change of 
piace or position or posture. 
ibid. •: 
It inus appears that, taken together or sepa-
rately, tne words, earth movement, mean any 
cnanse of piace, position or posture of the soil. 
[Water Beiow Surface of Ground] 
Likewise, the words, "water rjeiow the surface 
of me ground." have a ciear popuiar meaning. 
Water means: 
the licuid that descends from the ciouds as 
rain, forms streams. iaKes and seas. 
Weoster i. supra. No distinction is made in the 
definition of water to exclude that wnich con-
tains impurities or pollutants so long as it 
retains its predominant characteristic of liquid-
ity. For example, river water is water no matter 
how muddy and sea water is water no matter 
how saity. 
The word, "below", means: 
downward from, at a lower levei than, under-
neath. 
Webster's, supra. 
The word, "surface", means: 
the exterior or outside of an object, the outer-
most or uppermost ooundary. 
WeDster's. supra. 
The word, "ground", means: ' 
the surface on which man stands, moves and 
dwells and on which oDiects naturally rest, 
the surface of the earth. 
Webster's, supra. 
Thus, the words, "water under the surface of 
the ground", mean any water beiow the extreme 
upper crust of tne soil wnicn retains its charac-
teristic of liquidity. 
[Conclusion! 
The uncontradicted evidence shows that the 
damage was caused by water under the surface 
of the ground. Water flowing in a sewer pipe is 
still water, even though it is mixed with waste. 
The same water is stiii water wnen it ;eaKS from 
the sewer pipe and moves beiow the surface of 
the ground. Although it may not be "ground 
water" in the sense oi a suDterranean stream, it 
is nevertneiess "water under the surface of tne 
ground", as described in tne poiicy. 
It is uncontroverted from the factual state-
ments of the complaint, deposition and affida-
vits that plaintiffs damages resulted from: 
(a) Earth movement, including . . . mud flow. 
earth sinking.. . . rising or smiting; 
\d) Water beiow tne surface of the ground. 
Therefore, tne oss is excluded oy the provi-
sions of the poticy. quoted aoove. 
When tne undisDuted facts entitle a party to 
a judgment as a matter ox law. thai party is 
entitled to a summary judgment. Ferguson v. 
Tomerun. Tenn.App. 1983. 656 S.W.2d 378. 
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. 
Costs of this appeai are taxed against appellant. 
The cause is remanded for such further proceed-
ings, if any. as may be necessary and proper. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
HENRY F. TODD 
PRESIDING JVDGZ 
CONCUR: 
SAMUEL L. LEWIS. JUDGE 
BEN H. CANTRELL. JUDGE 
[11102] C H I C O L A d / b / a / C E N T R A L 
L O U I S I A N A F I S H E R I E S v. S U N 
I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y O F N E W 
Y O R K 
United States District Court, Western Dis-
trict of Louisiana. Alexandria Division. Civ. A. 
No. 85-1564. September 2, 1987. 677 F.Supp. 
463. 
Liability Insurance—Lack of Liability on 
Pa r t of Insured 
A carrier of fish, whose policy covered his 
"liability" as carrier oi merchandise, was not 
entitled to coverage under such poiicy for the 
theft from his truck of fish being transported 
from the owner to the owner's customers. The 
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